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This dissertation is based on a Q-methodology study 
of British public opinion about the Common Market which was 
done in the summer and autumn of 1971. The emphasis in this 
study was on the attitudes of "opinion leaders. " Seventy-five 
individuals were given a Q-sample of one hundred opinion state- 
ments about the Common Market and asked to use them to define 
their attitude about the issue. They were also asked to judge 
fifty of the Q-stntements on an eleven-point equal interval 
scale the ends of which were "Extremely pro-British member- 
ship" and "Extremely anti-British membership*" Q-factor 
analysis of the Q-sorts produced four factors of individuals, 
and composite Q-sorts for the factors revealed four distinct 
attitudes, two of which were pro-Market and two of which were 
anti-Market. However, counter-intuitively, the study revealed 
that the structure of opinion, and the constituenec. es of individua 
in each of the pairs - superficially 'pro' and 'anti' -were im- 
portantly different. ¶. ¶hese differences pointed to social divis- 
ions and to associated restricted domains in language and concept 
Q Methodology was successful in exposing a pattern of empirical 
findings hitherto unnoticed in the liter2ture, because inaccessible 
to less sensitive techniques. A two-way analysis of variance of the 
judgement data failed to show significant effects for attitude 
or involvement. However, when the judgements of the two pairs of 
socially similar factors dissimilar in attitudes were contrasted 
in an analysis of variance with paired comparisons, significant 
differences were revealed. 
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CHAPTER I 
AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT 
TIC; COMMON MARKET 
There has been a great deal written on the subject of British public 
opinion about the Common Market as it was before Britain joined it in 1972. 
Much of this has not been the result of systematic empirical research, but 
rather the speculations of particular authors. While such an approach has 
certain attractions and has been used with profit by astute observers, the 
range of questions it can address is restricted. However, other investi- 
gators (Durant, 1967; Butler and Stokes, 1969; Gleditsoh and Hveem, 1971, 
1972; Kitzinger, 1973) have attempted analysis and have interpreted the 
results of opinion polls conducted by various commercial polling organiza- 
tions. Hedges and Jowell (1971) carried the process one step further in 
their work and produced clusters of opinions rather than simple summary 
statistics. 
But none of these studies has examined the interlocking personal 
opinions which make up the collective attitudes . concerned with 
British membership of the Common Market. What is more to the point, and 
perhaps more surprising, is that before the present study the problem 
has not been tackled with the sophisticated techniques available to psycholo- 
gists. In the pursuit of coherent and sensitive national policy making, 
it is clearly of importance that the nature and operation of these 
attitudes be understood. This dissertation forms a contribution to 
that end. 
Fq 
The campaign to take Britain into the Common Market distinctly 
located itself in the confines of the opinion leaders, that is to say 
politicians, diplomats, big businessmen, journalists and academics, 
irrespective of their political affinity. It had little popular appeal, 
and indeed appeared to be very little understood by the general public. 
The debates held by opinion leaders, seemingly for each other, were in 
glowing if nebulous terms of sovereignty, balance of payments, nationalism, 
free trade areas and special relationships. The debate was not taken up 
by the general public until the concepts were translated into terms of 
pounds and pence in the weekly shopping basket by the Wilson Government 
in February, 1970. Even at the height of the "Great Debate", with 
numerous champions arguing one side of the cause or the other on their 
behalf, people still appeared to be perplexed. Evidence for this will be 
presented in Chapter VII. 
The key to understanding the British attitudes instrumental in taking 
Britain into the Common Market lies with the attitudes of the opinion 
leaders. That is not to say that the general public did not have some 
sorts of opinions about the Common Market, but they were less well 
structured and certainly less clearly expressed. It is on opinion lei'de-y's 
then, that this dissertation will focus. Indeed, the opinion 
leaders-politicians, journalists and especially interested parties-made 
up half of the sample in this study. 
Controversy has centred upon the problem of whether and to what extent 
those occupational groups conventionally called "opinion leaders" actually 
lead public opinion. (See "Two-step flow hypothesis" in Chapter II) 
Therefore it might be presumed that this dissertation addresses itself to 
this question. This is not the case. Whilst the reason for the choice of 
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this sample population is obliquely linked to the issue of public 
opinion formation, it stands independently. Whether "opinion leaders" 
deserve the name or not, they are unquestionably the filter, or 
"gatekeepers" in the terms of White's (1950) definitive study, through 
which the general public receives almost all of its information about a 
topic such as the Common Market. How that information is subsequently 
manipulated by the cultural forces within the society is outside the 
scope of this study. 
The key questions, especially in an issue such as the Common Market 
campaign which was dominated by the opinion leaders, , are what 
is the 
nature of the attitudes of these opinion leaders, and what is the way in 
which they judge the vast amount of information they receive about the 
issue. Obviously, these are the first steps in understanding what 
material these opinion leaders use in making their own decisions and 
then subsequently choose to pass on to the general public. This filtered 
information forms the pool of available ideas and material upon which the 
public can in turn draw in the process of forming its own opinions and 
attitudes about the issue. The "gatekeeper" plays a fundamental role in 
the opinion formation process to the extent that he controls and mani- 
pulates, whether it be intentionally or unknowingly, the actual pool of 
information generally available to the public. "Gatekeepers" are discussed 
in detail in Chapter II. 
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1. TBC PROBLH( ABOUT METHODS 
There are many theories of attitude formation and change (for a review, 
see Insko, 1967; and Jahoda and Warren, 1966) and nearly as many explana- 
tions about social judgement (Eiser and Stroebe, 1972). Any one of these 
could be chosen, built into the research design and tested. There are two 
major drawbacks to this method. First, it is all too easy, even in well 
controlled designs, for an assumption built into the study to shape the 
data which are produced. The assumption may be "proved" by the research, 
but without the researcher being any closer to knowing if this assumption 
was in fact the one he should have been testing, or if it actually explains 
the phenomenon he is studying. Second, if an assumption is built into the 
research design, it may mask more important aspects of the problem and 
thus prevent insights and understanding of the whole scope of the issue. 
The problem becomes one of how to free oneself from the potentially 
sterile restraints of a limited theory without going so far to the opposite 
extreme that one falls into the completely unstructured mire of interesting 
but statistically useless facts. The happy medium is a research design 
which allows the researcher to create order in the universal chaos of facts 
and permits them to speak, yet without imposing more a priori assumptions 
on the data than they will bear. 
Examination of the second substantive problem addressed by this 
dissertation is contingent upon finding a satisfactory solution to the 
practical problems of method described above. Specifically, it is to discover 
what makes up the attitudes of opinion leaders about the Common Market and 
how they judge the information which they receive about it. Q-Methodology 
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(Stephenson, 1953) is the investigative technique which best resolves the 
basic methodological difficulties; a detailed justification of this 
opinion is given in Chapter III. Therefore it was chosen as the primary 
component in the research design: that which explores attitudes. Bipolar 
equal interval scales provide the complimentary method. They are used to 
assess the individual's judgement of statements about the issue. 
In Q methodology, the individual uses a deck of cards containing 
opinion statements to model his attitude about the issue. The "Q sorts" 
of all the individuals in the study are submitted to Q, -type factor analysis 
and the resulting faotors are made up of individuals with similar attitudes 
about the issue. 
Coming at a time when Britain is still trying to find her role within the 
E. E. C., the factual material contained in this dissertation is as vital as 
any purely theoretical insights it might disclose. Therefore, the argu- 
ment of this dissertation is presented in a way intended to develop the 
theoretical and practical implications of the research simultaneously. 
Testing for this study was conducted during the summer and autumn of 
1971, just prior to the House of Commons vote on the question of British 
membership in the Common Market. This was a time at which the issue was 
receiving very substantial exposure in the mass media as well as from 
various vociferous interest groups. 
To recapitulate, the purpose of this dissertation is to explore 
through the use of Q-methodology the attitudes of opinion leaders to 
membership in the Common Market and to discover how these attitudes 
influence judgement of information about the issue. 
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2. ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
CHAPTER I 
To give the reader his bearings in the rest of the dissertation, the 
background to British public opinion about the Common Market will be 
traced in the remaining portions of this chapter. It will include a brief 
synopsis of the literature on early British relationship with the European 
Economic Community, and a review of the opinion polls and surveys in the 
periods of debate leading to the summer of 1971. 
The chapter then moves on to a discussion of the roles played in the 
"Great Debate" by the Government, political parties and the special interest 
groups which were trying to swing public opinion in their variously 
construed right directions on the issue. Finally, there will be an examina- 
tion of the contribution of the mass media to the Common Market campaign. 
CHAPTER II 
Chapter II begins with a discussion of the role of opinion leaders 
in the formation of public opinion, with special reference to their 
gatekeeping function. Some of the factors which may contribute to the 
formation of public opinion are then examined. This is followed by a 
critique of previous methods of examining public opinion, especially those 
used in the studies about the Common Market mentioned in Chapter I. 
Research designs which might have been appropriate to this type of study 
are reviewed and their relative merits are weighed. 
Finally, in view of the gatekeeping function of opinion leaders, the 
importance of their judgement of information is discussed and there is a 
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survey of social judgement theory with emphasis on current theory which 
is pertinent to the problems in this study. 
CHAPTER III 
The specific case for the use of Q-methodology is put in Chapter III. 
The critical literature about the technique is reviewed and its advantages 
are explored. In conclusion it is argued that by allowing an individual 
relative freedom to model his attitude himself, a more accurate profile of 
public opinion can be generated. 
CHAPTER IV 
The research design used to explore the problems with which this study 
is concerned is explained in Chapter IV. The chapter deals first with 
the construction and administration of the Q-sorts which were used to elicit 
the attitudes about British membership in the Common Market held by opinion 
leaders. It then is shown how some of the Q-statements were used with an 
eleven-point equal interval scale to test the subject's judgement of 
material on which he had previously indicated his feelings. 
This chapter ends with a critical discussion of the research in which 
possible pitfalls in the design and execution of the study are examined. 
CHAPTER V 
Chapter V is devoted to the results of the factor analysis of the 
Q-sorts. The Q Factors- two representing attitudes favourable to British 
entry to the E. E. C., and two expressing attitudes against entry - are 
examined individually. This is done in two dimensions: first by the 
demographic data about the individuals on the factor; and then by the 




In Chapter VI, the results are given of the various tests done on 
the scores obtained from the subjects' judgement of fifty of the 
Q-statements. These scores were first submitted to two-way analysis of 
variance (of attitude by involvement). In this section, the measurement 
of attitude used was the subject's self-rated position for or against 
British membership in the Common Market, whilst the level of involvement 
was derived by taking the mean of five self-ratings on various aspects 
of involvement in the issue. 
This analysis showed a significant involvement effect using 
Edwards' (1970) method for unequal cell distribution, but this was not 
replicated when the analysis was run using the more appropriate SPSS 
(version 6.00) analysis of variance programme. 
In the second part of the analysis, the judgement scores were 
examined by Q -sort factors in a one-way analysis of variance with planned 
comparison. This showed a significant difference when pro-Market Factor 1 
and anti-Market Factor 3 were contrasted with anti-Market Factor 2 and 
pro-Market Factor 4. 
CHAPTER VII 
The findings of the research are discussed in Chapter VII. This is 
done in two parts, the first being the results of the Q-study and the 
second, the analysis of the judgements made of the Q-statements. 
9 
CHAPTER VIII 
In the final chapter of this dissertation, it is argued that opinion 
polls and surveys have not produced a full or realistic picture of British 
attitudes to the Common Market, and whilst Q-methodology does not attempt 
to give an absolute statistical representation of the proportions of an 
attitude in the total population, it is a useful exploratory 
technique to elicit a comprehensive view of the nature of the attitudes 
which make up public opinion. 
The conclusion of this work was that the Common Market debate was 
being conducted by opinion leaders in terms and concepts not readily 
understood by the general public. These results were not apparent in 
studies in which pro-Market responses were lumped together in one category 
and anti-Market responses in another. 
The results of the two-way analysis of variance in this study have 
important implications for social judgement theory as they raise the 
question of employing students in experiments to test the hypotheses on 
which so many of the theories are based. 
z 
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2. BACKGROUND OF PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT THE EEC 
From a survey of the relevant literature, it would 
appear that there are nearly as many conjectures as 
commentators on why Britain's leaders did not choose to 
participate in the founding of the European Economic 
Community from the very beginning. However, several common 
themes do emerge, and extensions of these were apparent in 
the debate on British entry in 1971. 
One of the more succinct if somewhat harsh analyses 
came from Jean Monnet (quoted in Kitzinger, 1962): 
There is one thing you British will never 
understand: an idea. And there is one thing 
you are supremely good at grasping: a hard 
fact. We will have to make Europe without 
you - but then you will have to come in and 
join us. (p. 109) 
What would appear more likely is not that Britain did not 
grasp the idea in 1945, but that she construed it differently. 
On the political Right, Churchill in his Zurich 
"sovereign remedy" speech in September 1946, gave the 
Continental Europeans the impression that he advocated 
European integration. However, what he apparently did not 
endorse was the inclusion of Britain in such a venture. 
(Mackay, 1961; Middleton, 1963). Indeed, the separate role 
he invisaged"for Britain, with the advantage of hindsight, 
is clear from the speech itself: 
In this urgent work France and Germany must 
take the lead together. Great Britain, the 
British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty 
America - and, I trust, Soviet Russia ... - 
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must be the friends and sponsors [emphasis 
my own] of the new Europe and must champion 
its right to live. (Churchill, 1946, in 
Keesings Contemporary Archives, Vol. 6, 
p. 8138). 
Clearly, Churchill felt that Britain belonged in the 
ranks of the victorious super powers, not in the class of 
the defeated or conquered, and her duty in Europe was in 
the paternalistic mould. 
Nettl and Shapiro (1963), in their analysis of this 
period concluded that Churchill's speech "must unfortunately 
be classified as one of those British expressions of 
public morality which unfortunately boils down to telling 
other people what they ought to do. " (p. 25) 
On the other side of the political divide, Bevin, 
while giving lip service to a Council of Europe, was no 
more eager to tie Britain to a European body, preferring 
a policy which would foster her "special relationship', with 
the United States. (Mackay, 1961) 
This common adherence to the idea of Britain's 
separate position vis a vis Europe grew out of the postwar 
political philosophy which held that Britain was at the 
centre of three concentric circles: her position as head 
of the Commonwealth, her "special relationship" with the 
United States, and her geographical proximity to Europe. 
(Heath, 1970; Mackay, 1961; Shanks and Lambert, 1962; 
Gladwyn, 1966). 
One result of this "late imperial policy" (Nairn, 
1973) was that it was not felt necessary for Britain to 
become involved in any moves towards European unity because 
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she could rely for support on the Commonwealth, the 
United States, and "economically, the conviction of 
effortless British superiority". (Kitzinger, 1968, p. 
343). The 'myth" of the Commonwealth and the American 
relationship were strengthened as real power ebbed according 
to Nettl and Shapiro (1963), and "served as a very real 
buffer to cushion the shock of our declining international 
power. " (p. 261) 
Britain's separate position was emphasized again in 
a Labour Party foreign policy statement in 1952: 
... Britain could not join a European fed- 
eration or a European customs union. We must 
safeguard our freedom to play a full part as 
an independent member in the Commonwealth and 
the Atlantic Community. Moreover, we cannot 
surrender to any supranational authority the 
right to determine British policy on such vital 
matters as full employment and fair shares ... 
(in Mackay, 1961, p. 126). 
This approach was interpreted by several authors 
(Shanks and Lambert, 1962; Middleton, 1963; Heath, 1970) 
as indicating a general fear in the Labour Movement that 
membership in a European body would inhibit future exten- 
sions of socialism in Britain. 
Summing up Britain's pre-Market policy, Kitzinger 
(1962) writes: 
Whether under the Labour or Conservative 
Government, links with the Commonwealth were 
regarded as precluding too close links with 
the countries of Europe. The traditions of 
British foreign policy - to hold the balance 
but never to became [sic] entirely involved 
in Europe - as well as the empirical approach 
which was thought incompatible with rigid con- 
stitution-making, were. all invoked against 
British participation in a European federation 
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whatever the limits of its competence. (p. 9) 
Commentators were divided also over the nature of the 
factors which led to the re-thinking in British political 
policy culminating in her first application to join the 
Common Market in 1961, four years after it was founded. 
Most agree, however, that the political tide began to 
turn in the second half of the 1950's. Shanks and Lambert 
(1962) and Gladwyn (1966) felt that the Suez affair in 
1956 forced Britain to shed some of her "illusions of 
grandeur", and to look . 
towards Europe in preference to 
the Commonwealth or the Atlantic Alliance. There also 
appeared to be mounting indications that the United States 
did not regard the "special relationship" in quite the 
same terms as Britain (Shanks and Lambert, 1962), which 
led to a belief that Britain would have more influence 
with the United States and the world at large if she were 
to join the E. E. C. (Camps, 1964). 
At the governmental level, this gradual shift towards 
a European policy was crystallized for the Conservative 
Party in the Macmillian application to join the Common 
Market in 1961 which was vetoed by de Gaulle in 1962. The 
Labour Party opposed this attempt and led a heated debate 
against it which was well covered by the mass media. This 
coverage died away rapidly when Britain was refused 
admission and many newspapers withdrew their correspondents 
from Brussels (Nettl and Shapiro, 1963). 
Nettl and Shapiro, in analyzing the debate and its 
abrupt end, wrote: 
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From this we may conclude that the 'pros and 
cons, in the Common Market debate put forward 
at such great length last year were not the 
expression of deep popular feeling, but rather 
the view of a limited number of directly 
interested parties and experts aimed at con- 
vincing each other and not the public as a 
whole. (p. 24) 
The tables were turned in 1967 when the Labour Party 
was "converted" to the European idea and the Wilson 
government applied for membership and led the pro-market 
debate. 
It must be emphasized here that there was a core of 
strong "Europeans" on both sides of the House of Commons 
who consistently supported membership in the Common Market 
no matter which political party was proposing it. 
From the published debates among politicians, "experts" 
and "directly interested parties', it is necessary to turn 
to the public opinion polls and surveys for some indication 
of where public sentiment lay. 
The Opinion Polls 
Gleditsnh and Hveem (1972) reviewed and analyzed all 
of the polls of British opinion about the Common Market 
published between 1957 when the Treaty of Rome was signed, 
and the summer of 1971. "Published" appears to be the 
operative word here for while Gleditsh and Hveem were able 
to account for more than 200 polls from eight polling 
organisations, 
1 
they uncovered a number of "secret polls", 
1 British Market Research Bureau, Louis Harris Research, 
Marplan, Marketing Advisory Services, National Opinion 
Polls, Opinion Research Centre, Social Surveys (Gallup), 
and Taylor Nelson Associates. (Gleditsch and Hveem, 1972, 
p. 119) 
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the results of which they were not permitted to see. 
These unpublished polls were almost exclusively from those 
commissioned by special interest groups such as the 
European Movement. Gleditsch and Hveem (1971) refer to 
a statement made by a publications officer of the British 
European Movement to the effect that if a poll result did 
not help the pro-Market cause, they did not publish it. 
This author confirmed the practice in a telephone con- 
versation with another European Movement public relations 
officer (Langly, March 3,1972), who added that the Movement 
felt justified in this policy as it was their duty to win 
the British people over to the European cause. 
This alone makes the practice of interpreting public 
opinion through published polls from a single source a 
risky proposition at best. 
However, the failure to use data from more than one 
set of polls is not the only point which provokes questions 
about Durant's (1967) interpretation of poll material. He 
analyzed the results of polls conducted between January 
1957 and 1967 by Gallup on behalf of the Daily Telegraph 
and concluded from these that: 
The British reputation for insularity is not 
supported by the findings over the years of the 
Gallup Poll ... If it had been left to the 
people to decide, Britain would have been in 
the Common Market from the very beginning. 
(p. 231) 
His major premise for this assertion is a poll taken 
in January 1957,2 months before the Treaty of Rome was 
signed. It indicated that fifty-eight per cent of the 
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population thought that it was "important that Britain 
should move into closer partnership with other European 
countries. " (p. 231) However, Durant does not explain how 
he justifies the inference from this somewhat nebulous 
desire for "closer partnership" that a concrete motivation 
existed to join an organization which had not then been 
formed. 
Butler and Stokes (1969) in their analysis of the 
Gallup Polls of 1963 and 1964 offer further reason for caution 
in the use of this sort of interpretation. They point out 
that not only did "several million electors" think that 
Britain already belonged to the E. E. C. in 1963, but that in 
the Gallup Polls of 1963 and 1964 half of the people 
questioned had no opinion on British membership, and of 
those who did state a preference, less than eighty per cent 
expressed the same view in 1964 as they had in 1963. Butler 
and Stokes found changes in both the pro- and the anti-Market 
direction under the surface of seemingly consistent results 
and conclude: 
Substantial short-run reshuffling of views 
fails to yield the longer-run movement. of 
individual position which we would expect 
from real and cumulative attitude change ... 
There is quite enough circulation of opinion 
to shatter any idea that the bulk of electors 
hold fixed views, as the unchanging total 
proportions in successive polls might 
suggest. (p. 180) 
Hodder-Williams (1970) corroborates this view and 
feels that any poll which does not report a large proportion 
of people with no opinion about joining the Common Market 
should be questioned because he found subject involvement 
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in the issue very low. 
It is necessary to keep these cautionary notes in 
mind when reveiwing the trends in public opinion reported 
by Gleditsch and Hveem (1972). Working with 230 polls over 
a fourteen year period, they formed composites of the 
relevant polls for each year. They. do not indicate whether 
they took account of different . wording 
in the poll 
questions, different sample sizes and different inter- 
viewing techniques. 
Their results show two main phases in public opinion 
in Britain between 1957 and 1971, with smaller opinion 
swings within the phases. 
In the first phase which lasted from 1957 to 1967, 
they found that public opinion was generally favourable to 
the Common Market, with scores of fifty percent or more 
in favour. These scores which Gleditsch and Hveem have 
formed are consistently higher than any individual polls 
which this author has seen, and they did not reply to her 
inquiries about the methodology they used to derive them. 
They show two definite anti-Market swings in this 
period. The first began in 1962 when Gaitskill and the 
Labour Opposition came out against the Macmillan application 
for membership on the grounds that it would damage 
Britain's relationship with the Commonwealth. The trend 
to oppose the Common Market continued through 1964, having 
been reinforced in 1963 by the de Gaulle veto. 
Pro-Market feeling grew again in 1965 and continued 
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into 1966 when the Wilson Government made Britain's second 
application for membership. Durant (1967) also reporting 
on this period, writes that a Gallop pol :L of "influential 
opinion" in July 1966 indicated that seventy-one per cent 
of the people drawn from "Who's Who,, and sixty-eight per 
cent of company directors thought that Britain should try 
for membership. This contrasted sharply with the forty- 
eight per cent of the electorate questioned at the same 
time who favoured membership (p. 243). 
The second phase which Gleditsch and Hveem report 
began with the French veto in May 1967 which gave impetus 
to the anti-Market faction. From this time to the end of 
their study in 1971, they do not show pro-Market opinion 
rising above the fifty per cent point. 
Anti-Market opinion reached its peak on their scale 
in February 1970 when the Wilson Government published a 
White Paper giving details of the cost of membership to 
Britain, and throughout 1970 and early in 1971. anti-Market 
opinion outnumbered pro-Market opinion three to one. 
In their 1971 article, Gleditsch and Hveem argued that 
the polls indicated that the main cause for opposition to 
the Common Market in Britain was a fear of rising prices. 
They cite the difference between 1961 when just as many 
people thought that membership would mean a lower cost of 
living as thought that it would increase prices, and 1970 
when ninety-nine percent of the people polled felt that it 
would mean an increase in prices. None felt it would mean 
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a decrease and one per cent thought prices would remain the 
same. 
In the summer of 1971, at the height of the pro- 
Market campaign, Gledisch and Hveem (1971) contend that 
only the polls carried out by the Opinion Research Centre 
for the European Movement showed a pro-Market majority, 
while all of the rest showed less than fifty percent of the 
population in favour of membership. 
A somewhat more comprehensive type of survey was 
conducted by Social and Community Planning Research in the 
spring of 1971 with a grant from the European Movement 
(Hedges and Jowell, 1971). In terms of the percentage of 
favourability to British membership in the Common Market, 
their findings were in line with those of Gleditsch and 
Hveem for the same period. In their sample taken in 
February and March 1971, they found that half of the 
electors interviewed would be "disappointed if Britain 
joined the E. E. C., " only three in ten would be ""pleased", 
and the other two percent were undecided (Hedges and Jowell, 
1971, p. 5). 
However, in this study they tried to go beyond the 
techniques which lumped people into "yes", "not' and 
"undecided" groups. In their questionnaire they asked 
questions which they hoped would elicit more of the short 
and long term fears and aspirations of the people in these 
groups. 
They submitted their results to factor analysis (R- 
type) and found two factors which they considered salient. 
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One was made up of items which dealt with long-term 
problems and attitudes, whilst the. other was concerned 
with short-term items. Not surprisingly,, of their subjects, 
the ones who feared short term price increases and failed 
to see long term advantages tended to be against Common 
Market membership, while subjects who supported membership 
were found to put heavier emphasis on long term advantages 
(P. 8). 
In more detail, on the economic side, eighty-six per 
cent of their total sample saw disadvantages (notably of 
higher prices) resulting in the short term if Britain 
joined the Common Market. Projection into the future 
was nearly equally divided between those subjects who 
thought membership eventually would bring advantages to 
Britain (49%) and those who thought it would bring dis- 
advantages (46%). 
A majority of their sample thought Britain was be- 
coming poorer in relation to other industrial countries, - 
and one of the principal long-term advantages was considered 
to be larger markets, increased industrial growth and price 
stability. Other advantages were seen as mutual under- 
standing between countries, a stronger defence position, 
the formation of a strong European unit and lower unemploy- 
ment levels (pp. 45-46). 
The subjects who foresaw long-term disadvantages were 
concerned about loss of British influence and independence, 
high unemployment, lowering of standards in the National 
Health Service and continued high prices (pp. 45-46). 
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Hedges and Jowell produced a profile of a typical 
person who favoured British membership in the Common Market. 
According to this, he would tend to be young, male, and 
"non-manual". The strongest pro-Market subjects tended to 
have education at sixth form or university level, and to 
be a member of one of the professions (p. 8). 
While the Hedges and Jowell study produced a fairly 
believable if somewhat superficial picture of typical pro- 
Market and anti-Market opinion, it would not appear to be 
safe to place too much reliance on the opinion polls of the 
1960's. The most that can be said with any assurance is 
that they represent a period in which opinion about the 
specific question of joining the Common Market was not 
firmly fixed. 
Durant (1967) interpreted what he apparently believed 
to be concrete results from the Gallup polls from 1957 to 
1967. Butler and Stokes (1969) showed that at least for 
1963 amd 1964, these results were highly deceptive with 
opinions changing in both directions under the surface. 
These discrepancies may be explained by a clear 
design fault in the Gallup questionnaire. The main 
question on which the percentages of opinion for and against 
membership were based was some variation of, "If the 
British government were to decide that Britain's best 
interest was served by joining the European Common Market, 
would you approve or disapprove? " If, as Hodder-Williams 
(1970) points out, people were not well informed or highly 
involved in politics beyond the scope of their immediate 
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interests, this question could as well be testing faith 
in the government of the day to take a right decision 
in a little known area as any opinion about the Common 
Market. 
The issue probably did not become meaningful to 
most people until the Labour Government's White Paper of 
1970 framed it in terms of the cost of living. Indeed, 
the polls in 1971 showed that people were far more con- 
cerned with what difference membership would make to their 
weekly shopping basket 4Kitzinger, 1973), than with anything 
so esoteric as sovereignty and independence which were the 
itopics favoured by politicians. 
"The Great Debate" 
From this review of the opinion polls, the chapter 
turns. finally to the controversy surrounding Britain's 
last and succesful attempt to gain entry to the Common 
Market. This came to be known as "the Great Debate" in 
popular parlance. Here the position of the Government 
and major political parties will be examined, and also 
the roles of the partisan pressure groups and the press. 
After two previous French vetoes to British applica- 
tions, de Gaulle's resignation in April 1969, paved the 
way for the Hague Summit Conference of the Six in 
December of that year to extend the invitation to Britain 
to again enter membership negotiations. 
The three major political parties put forward their 
position in the party manifestoes for the General Election 
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of 1970. 
The Conservative Party considered that if fair and 
equal terms could be negotiated, Common Market membership 
"would be in the long term interest of the British people", 
but that "obviously there is a price we would not be 
prepared to pay". (Keesing's 1971-1972,, p. 24465). 
The stated position of the Labour Party - that 
negotiations would be "pressed with determination with 
the purpose of joining an enlarged Community provided that 
British and Commonwealth interests can be safeguarded" - 
was similar to that of the Conservatives. However, Labour 
added the premise that unlike her position in the previous 
attempts, Britain was working from a strong position and 
she now-would "be able to stand on her own feet outside 
the Community". (Keesing's 1971-1972, p. 24465). 
Of the three political parties, the Liberal Party 
showed the most open enthusiasm for membership of the 
E. E. C. They regarded it as "an exciting experiment in 
the pooling of national sovereignty in the economic 
sphere. " They also expressed the opinion that economic 
co-operation could be a precursor of "a similar unity in 
foreign policy and defense". The Party was convinced that 
the results of the negotiations would provide a satisfactory 
basis for British entry. (Keesing's, 1971-1972, p. 24465). 
The Heath Government came to office in June 1970, 
and shortly thereafter led the British negotiating team 
to Brussels. This Government felt that the terms which 
they obtained were acceptable, and on July 7,1971, published 
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a White Paper, "The United Kingdom and the European 
Community", stating these terms and recommending to 
Parliament that they be accepted. (Keesing's, 1971-1972). 
The Government set out its position in the White 
Paper as follows : 
Our geographical, military, political, economic 
and social circumstances are so similar to 
those of the Six, and our objectives so much 
in common, that it is in our interest to join 
forces with them in the creation of a wider 
European Community of free nations, whose 
joint strength and influence on the world can 
be so much greater than that of its individual 
members. If we remained outside the 
Communities we should have-.. to maintain our 
national interests and develop our national 
resources on a narrower base. No doubt we 
could do this; but the task of doing so would 
impose progressively heavier burdens on us, 
and would become progressively more difficult 
as European political and economic unity 
proceeded without us in a neighbouring Com- 
munity several times our size. (Keesing's, 
1971-1972, p. 24901). 
On the economic side, the Government stressed that 
while there would be price increases as a result of member- 
ship, they were a sacrifice worth making in light of the 
long-term benefits to the economy which would accrue. 
Heath emphasized this point in his broadcast to the 
nation in support of the Paper on July 8: 
Yes, of course there is a price. But it is 
a lot lower than many people thought it would 
be. If as a 'country we are as good as we 
think we are, we shall soon be able to pay, 
that price out of the growth we can expect 
as a result of being able to trade in a bigger 
market ... This country belongs to all of us, 
but the future belongs to those who are young 
or still unborn. And in reaching our de- 
cision we must keep them in mind. (Keesing's, 
1971-1972, p. 24901). 
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The following evening Wilson, as leader of the 
Opposition, attacked both the terms set out in the White 
Paper and Heath's defence of it. He centred his 
criticism of the Paper on four points : failure of the 
Government to give a figure for the cost to balance . 
of trade and payments, failure to mention what would be done 
about the Commonwealth sugar agreement, failure to mention 
what would be done about New Zealand exports after the 
five-year transition period was over, and the Government's 
agreement to abolish British safeguards on capital movement 
without eliciting anything in return. (Keesing's 1971- 
1972, p. 24902) 
Wilson rounded on Heath's interpretation of the 
importance of the cost of membership at the close of his 
speech: 
Very many will judge the issue by what they 
feel is likely to happen to the prices they 
will have to pay, especially for food, and 
what it is likely to mean for them in terms 
of unemployment. Mr. Heath made light of these 
things in his broadcast last night. He will 
have to forgive millions of people to whom only 
a year ago he made all those fine promises 
about prices and jobs if they are less than 
willing to accept his word on these matters 
now. (Keesing's, 1971-1972, p. 24902) 
The Conservative Party Position. The Conservative 
Party, in their Annual Party Conference passed a resolution to 
support the Government on the terms negotiated for Common Mar- 
ket membership. (Keesing's, 1971-1972, p. 24904) There was 
26 
however, some. opposition within the Conservative Party. 
Derek Walker-Smith, speaking against the resolution 
warned that membership would mean subordinating British 
legal traditions and practice to that in Brussels, and 
therefore Britain would lose not only her money but also 
her sovereignty in the E. E. C. (Keesing's, 1971-1972, 
p. 29405). Also speaking against the resolution, Enoch 
Powell said that going into the Common Market, whatever 
its virtues, was "incompatible with national independence". 
(Keesing's, 1971-1972, p. 24905). 
Answering the anti-Market case against the Common 
Market on grounds that it would mean a loss of 
sovereignty and independence, a Conservative political 
policy maker argued: 
... We have no choice of whether or not 
to be independent we are in fact dependent 
on other countries and we have to choose 
between different kinds of dependence or interdependence. So the choice facing us in a lot of ways is one of with which 
countries we will do things together ... We have got to create a united Europe on 
the basis of merging sovereignties rather 
than try to decry it because it's the most 
powerful bond people have invented yet. 
(Interview 7, Appendix A, p. 237). 
One of the economic arguments used by pro-Market 
Conservatives was that the entire British economy would be 
made freer by entering the Common Market because it would 
mean a free movement'of capital, goods, labour and 
factories within the Community. This, they reasoned, 
would lessen the "prospect of whole-hog socialism in this 
country, " (Interview 7, Appendix A. p., '. 37) because if 
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business was "persecuted" in one place, it could move some- 
where else in the Community where it would be welcome. 
The reasoning behind the Government approach to the 
Common Market campaign was explained as follows: 
It's the job of leadership in politics that 
if you are convinced that a certain course 
of actions is right and that public opinion 
is not on your side, then if you are in 
charge, you have got to go out and have a 
crusade and change public opinion. 
(Interview 7, Appendix A. p. 239 ) 
The Labour Party Position. The Labour Party, at 
their Annual Party Conference, October 4,1971, adopted 
a resolution which opposed "entry into the Common Market 
on the terms negotiated by the Conservative Government". 
(Keesing's, 1971-1972, p. 24904) 
The Trades Union Congress also passed a resolution 
stating that the terms negotiated by the Government "would 
not be advantageous to the British people". (Keesing's, 
1971-1972, p. 24930) This was adopted by a vote of 346 to 
244, so the resolution did not represent by any means a 
unanimous sentiment against joining the Common Market. 
A representative of a trades union summarized the 
general union position as follows: 
The Transport and General Workers Union and 
the Amalgamated Engineering Union are ideo- 
logically opposed to enlarging the Community. 
They consider the community is based on very 
agressive free enterprise principles ... fear 
is still expressed that Britain will be 
joining an aggressive, abrasive economy. This 
is against the British tradition of welfare 
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and looking after the speed of the slowest 
rather than the fastest. (Interview 6, 
Appendix A, p. q). 
The arguments used by the Labour Party against 
joining the Common Market on Tory terms were very similar 
to those outlined by Wilson in his attack on the White 
Paper. Among the rank and file, however, the question 
of increased prices and the possibility of higher unemploy- 
went outweighed the other reasons. 
There were a few left-wing socialists who opposed 
joining the Common Market under any conditions because 
they felt that strenghthening an organization-of rich 
industrial countries was ideologically unacceptable: 
It must be realized that the Common Market 
is a retrogressive organization in that it 
is a rich man's club, a sort of protection 
racket, and to this end it is serving to 
intensify the polarization of resources in 
a world where the sheer demands of population 
are making such polarization not merely 
unfortunate but fatal. (Interview 10, Appendix A, 
P. 7. % )" 
Pro-Market opinion within the Labour Party answered 
these charges with the reasoning that Britain was too small 
to form an equitable partnership with the United States, 
and too large to retreat to a "Little England" 
isolationism similar to that of Switzerland. They felt 
that the Common Market, on the other hand, was a useful 
compromise and saw it as "a pragmatic series of economic 
and political arrangements, commonly worked out and 
meeting the interests of the greater majority. " (Interview, 
6, Appendix A, p. 'ß'34 ) 
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They felt that Britain would have a more controlled 
economy within the E. E. C. where the drift was towards 
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greater rather than less control, and a higher level of 
public ownership. Labour pro-Marketeers also stressed 
that social welfare was in some respects even higher in the 
Common Market than in Britain. (Interview 6, Appendix A) 
The Liberal Party Position. The Liberal Party 
continued to give almost unqualified support to the 
concept of Common Market membership and passed a resolution 
in their Annual Party Conference supporting entry on 
the terms negotiated by the Conservative Government. 
(Keesing's, 1971-11972, p. 24905) 
Groups Supporting E. E. C. Membership 
The political parties and the Government were not 
alone in trying to organize support for or against 
British membership in the Common Market. The pro-Market 
lobby was far better organized, unified and financed than 
the more diffuse anti-Market groups. 
The European Movement. The most prominent organization 
in the pro-Market camp was the British Council of the 
European Movement. It was founded in 1969, a union of 
two previous groups, the United Kingdom Council of the 
European Movement and Britain in Europe. (Kitzinger, 1973). 
Roth (1971) reported that they had a budget of £250,000 
for the year beginning March 1971 and Gleditsch and Hveem 
(1971) said they had received "hints" that this figure was 
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even higher. In fact, Kitzinger (1973) gives a European 
Movement balance sheet with an income of £915,904 and 
expenditures of £644,734 for the year 1971-1972. (p. 210) 
This income total included a Foreign Office grant of £7,500 
and a £6,00 contribution from the European Education 
Trust. The bulk of their resources, however, came from 
"subscriptions and donations". (Kitzinger, 1973) 
The European Movement made an extensive use of 
public opinion polls and surveys in their campaign which 
was handled by the advertising agency Collett, Dickinson 
and Pearce (Jackson, 1971) who were retained at a fee of 
£1,500 pgr. month (Kitzinger, 1973). Poll results were 
used directly for propaganda purposes, but they were more 
extensively used in planning long term strategy. 
The emphasis of the campaign was to shift attention 
from short term costs of membership to the long term 
benefits. Hence, they distributed posters of happy 
children waving European flags with the caption "Say 
Yes to Europe" and of a pretty English boy with the head- 
line "Give Him Cheap Butter Today and Let Him. Worry 
Tomorrow Where His Bread Will Come From". (Gleditsch and 
Hveem, 1971) When the dollar crisis in August 1971 made 
unemployment an issue, stickers reading "For more jobs in 
Britain/Scotland/Wales /The North" according to the 
region where it appeared were added to the "Say Yes to 
Europe" posters. (Kitzinger, 1962) 
The main impact of the European Movements Campaign 
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originally was aimed at opinion leaders: politicians, 
journalists and industrialists, but in the summer and 
autumn of 1971, the slant was shifted to include the 
"grass roots" with advertisements in the mass press and 
various mass appeal gimmicks. (Kitzinger, 1973) 
Most of the pro-Market groups, such as the Conservative 
Group for Europe, the Labour Committee for Europe and the 
Trades Union Committee for Europe were affiliates of 
the European Movement, and it maintained a close working 
relationship with the Conservative Political Centre, the 
Government and the mass media through frequent "media 
breakfasts". (Kitzinger, 1973) 
The Anti-Market Groups 
The groups which opposed either entry into the 
Common Market on any terms, or those who were objecting 
to the terms which the Conservative Government had obtained 
were much more disorganized than the pro-Market camp. 
This author also found inthe process of interviewing 
the leaders of these groups that they were prone to 
taking swipes at each other as well as at the pro-Market 
"opposition". 
The Common Market Safeguards Campaign. Nationally 
the best known of these groups was the Common Market Safe- 
guards Campaign. It was established in February 1970 
under the Chairmanship of Douglas Jay to press for "far 
more stringent and effective safeguards" for Britain before 
/ 
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accepting any terms of membership in the E. E. C. (Keesing's, 
1971-1972, p. 24465) 
In an interivew, Ron Leighton, the director of the 
Campaign outlined the five safeguards which were felt to 
be necessary: 
1-To safeguard Britain's political independence, 
parliamentary system, ability to play her 
full part in democratic international 
institutions, while opposing the submergence 
of Britain in any federal state. 
2 To safeguard the British consumer against 
unnecessary rises in food prices and the 
cost of living. 
3 To safeguard Britain's balance of payments 
and world wide trading interests and her 
Commonwealth responsibilities. 
4 To examine alternative policies designed 
to promote wider free trade in the interest 
of all, including developing countries. 
5 To ensure that the British electorate has 
a chance to express its will clearly, before 
any irrevocable constitutional change is 
accepted in the name of the British people. 
(London, September 23,1970) 
These "safeguards" in the climate of 1971 were 
tantamount to saying "No" to Common Market membership. 
The Safeguards Campaign, although originating from 
the Labour Committee for Safeguards on the Common Market, 
assiduously tried to remain apolitical. It served as an 
umbrella, if a somewhat leaky one, for the more politically 
motivated groups: The Anti-Common Market League, The Keep 
Britain Out Campaign, The National Common Market Petition 
Council, and the Conservative Anti-Common Market Information 
Service. The work of these groups was not only not well 
co-ordinated, but was often somewhat competitive. (Kitzinger, 1973) 
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The Safeguards Campaign tried 
of an organization representing the 
the powers of politicians, big bush 
and almost appeared to try to avoid 
limelight. (Kitzinger, 1973) 
In comparison to the European 
to foster an image 
"Common Man"" against 
zess, and the media, 
the press and the 
Movement, the Safe- 
guards Campaign operated on a shoe string, and their total 
expenditure in 1971 was £15,000. They published a bulletin 
and organized several rallies, but on the whole remained 
low key. (Kitzinger, 1973) 
The Anti-Common Market League. The Anti-Common 
Market League originally was a Conservative organization 
founded in 1961 to work against Britain's first attempt to 
join the Common Market. Although its mandate subsequently 
was extended to include all political parties, its tenot 
remained predominantly Conservative. (Kitzinger, 1973) 
They were far less reticent than the Safeguards 
Campaign to take a stand and a member of their executive 
summed up their position as follows: 
The Common Market Safeguards Committee's 
five safeguards are based on the Labour 
Party's Brighton line which is political 
doubletalk to me. Why not just come out 
and say you are anti-Market? I'm a good 
European. I'm not against the Common 
Market, I'm just against Britain joining 
it. (Interview 2, Appendix A, p. 213 ) 
Their principal argument against joining the E. E. C. 
was that in doing so, Britain would lose her sovereignty 
and be subjected to "a written constitution, alien laws in 
which rigid institutions are set up, which are designed for 
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Frenchmen, Germans and Italians. They suit them but they 
don't suit us". (Interview 2, Appendix A, p. J$ ) 
This informant also expressed the fear that there 
was a conspiracy of power and money behind the Common 
Market campaign. He concluded that the real danger of 
membership would be that in the end it would mean membership 
in a federal superstate, and therefore, if there was only 
one reason to oppose joining it would be thatt 
Power one day must be put into the hands 
of one man who will not be an 
Englishman. He will most likely be 
German or French and this is what most 
Britons balk at. (p., 'Lj9 ) 
In 1971, the Anti-Common Market League, like the 
Safeguards Campaign, had roughly £15,000, most of which 
went on producing and distributing literature and advertising, 
and on contributions to other groups for demonstrations. 
(Kitzinger, 1973) 
Women Against the Common Market. Like the Anti- 
Common Market League, Women Against the Common Market was 
adamant that Britain should not become a member of the 
E. E. C. This group was founded with a one hundred pound 
grant from the Keep Britain Out Campaign, (Kitzinger, 
1973), and operated from the home of its leader, Mrs. Ann 
Kerr, the former Labour M. P. It is difficult to discover 
what this group actually did during the campaign. They 
did participate in several demonstrations (Kitzinger, 1973) 
and solicit members and funds in small advertisements in 
the Personal Column of The Times (which is how this author 
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discovered the group. ) Perhaps their greatest national 
coverage came later when Mrs. Kerr had to be removed from 
the Strangers Gallery of the House of Commons for dis- 
rupting the proceedings of the House. (The Times, 
March 9,1972, p. 3) In any case, during the subsequent 
referendum campaign in 1975, WACAM was refused membership 
of the National Referendum Campaign on the grounds that 
the organization was t'too small". (Butler and Kitzinger, 
1976) 
The argument of this group was that membership in 
the E. E. C. was not only undesirable, but was made unnecessary 
by the existence of the Commonwealth: 
... For Britain to turn its back on the 
Commonwealth and go into Europe I feel 
would be a totally wrong decision, not 
only from the point of view of our own 
consumer interests, but also ... for the far more important aspect of being an 
influence for peace ... and for ending 
poverty and racial conflict. We have a 
multiracial Commonwealth which to me 
provides us a marvellous opportunity to 
start from to end racialism. I feel 
passionately in favour of trying to 
enable the British Commonwealth to 
eventually become an important, signif- 
icant foundation for some sort of world 
order. (Interview 9, Appendix A. p. 24°1 ) 
In contrast to the "multiracial" Commonwealth, the 
Common Market was seen as a big business man's club, and 
not in the interest of the "ordinary" people in Britain at 
all. Membership of the Community would exclude the trading 
partners in the Commonwealth who came to help Britain fight 
Nazism in the last war and who "have served 
[emphasis 
my 
own) us marvellously over the years". (p. 251 ) 
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This spokeswoman felt that the motivation behind 
the Government's desire for E. E. C. membership was Mr. Heath 
"just seeing what he and his friends in the higher 
echelons of industry and finance can get out of it ... 
(p. 252 ) She felt that public sentiment in Britain was 
against membership because most Britons were more afraid 
of the Germans than of the Russians. The purpose of 
WACAM, therefore, was to inform people how they "can 
bring their democratic will to bear on their elected 
representatives in Parliament ... many of whom are totally 
out of touch with the opinions of the people they represent". 
(p. 253 ) 
Conservative Anti-Common Market Information Service. 
The Conservative Anti-Common Market Information Service 
operated from an office at the same address in Park Lane 
as the Common Market Safeguards Campaign (this author 
visited both organizations). Kitzinger (1973) notes 
that their office space was provided by Sir Lan Mactaggart 
of Keep Britain Out (p. 232). 
The scope of the Information Service's activities 
was limited to providing anti-Market literature with a 
Conservative slant to counter the material issued by the 
Government and the Conservative Party. 
Keep Britain Out. The Keep Britain Out campaign, 
as the name suggests, was perhaps the most unequivocal of 
all the groups, It was founded in the early 1960's and 
revitalized in 1966 by Christopher Frere-Smith ,a Liberal 
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who found the Anti-Common Market League too Conservatively 
orientated. Keep Britain Out conducted the most dramatic 
and visible campaign of all the groups, organizing 
demonstrations, printing posters and cleverly engineering 
agreat deal of free press coverage: 
Compared with the European Movement's 
expensive operation with glossy handouts 
and cocktail parties for journalists, the 
KBO campaign displayed a fine flair for 
getting themselves into the news on a shoe- 
string. Indeed, the European Movement 
regarded KBO rather than the ACML or the 
Safeguards Campaign as their most effective 
opponents - no doubt because KBO thought 
very much in publicity terms. (Kitzinger, 
1973, p. 247) 
The regional organization of the group was very loose 
and local action groups were left very much to their 
own devices, with the exception of literature and visual 
materials which were supplied free from London. This 
author, after interviewing one local organizer was 
invited to become the KBO local secretary. It is hard to 
say whether this was due to a successful "supportive" 
interview technique, or deafness for an American accent 
on the part of the subject. 
The Role of the Mass Media 
The perceived role of the Mass Media in the 1971 
Common Market Campaign appears to vary with the faction 
describing it. The actual role is both easier and more 
difficult to pin point. It is easier in the respect that 
it is possible to catalogue the used made of television 
and the press by the Government, the European Movement, 
38 
the Safeguards Campaign, Keep Britain Out, etc. The 
reader who is interested in the mechanics of media 
manipulation is referred to the account of this given by 
Kitzinger (1973), especially in Chapters 7,8 and 11. Far 
more difficult to ascertain are the effects which the 
various uses of the media had, and a detailed discussion 
of this is beyond the scope of this dissertaion. 
This returns the discussion to the role of the 
mass media as perceived by the various interest groups. 
One example of the preceived authority of the 
press, at least among less well informed people, can be 
seen in the case of one subject in this study who 
volunteered the information before the testing session 
that she was anti-Market because she read the Daily 
Express. This newspapaper, she said, had given in a special 
box on the front page each day a different reason to 
oppose membership. However, on questioning, she could not 
recall even one of these reasons. 
Of the journalists who were interviewed in this 
study, eight, including the relevant correspondent from 
the Daily Express, were pro-Market, while the ninth, who 
was an editor of a national daily generally considered to 
be pro-Market, was opposed to British membership. 
Of the national dailies, the Conservative Daily 
Express, alone with the communist Morning Star opposed 
membership, whilst the traditionally Labour mass 
circulation papers, The Mirror and Sun, as well as the 
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Conservative Daily Mail and the "elite" press were 
strongly pro-Market. Commentators on television and 
radio, while operating a complicated parity system, were 
generally considered to be pro-Market. Televisionis 
system was criticised by some anti-Marketeers who argued 
that whilst moderate speakers were chosen to put the 
pro-Market cause, the anti-Market's '3equal time" was 
given to extremists such as Enoch Powell, thus giving 
the impression that the pro-Market case was the more 
reasonable. (Kitzinger, 1973) 
Anti-Common Market opinion seemed to perceive 
television and the press in this manner, but at least 
one anti-Market organization felt that the pro-Market press 
was going against the national grain: 
Sir Max Aiken and the Beaverbrook Press 
couldn't have done it by themselves. They 
are only reflecting an attitude of the 
British people. You cannot just push 
over a line of propaganda if it isn't 
capable of being reflected. That's why the 
Common Market Campaign is failing. Despite 
all the propaganda, it just isn't going. 
(Interview 2, Appendix A, p. 214 ) 
On the pro-Market side, the perception of the influence 
of the press was somewhat more divided. One influential 
Conservative M. P. felt that: 
... people are skeptical about what they 
think is an unholy alliance between the 
politicians of the different parties, 
between the big noises in television and 
the press. It doesn't actually help you 
to put the pro-case because however right 
it is, it is being treated with too much 
reserve. (Interview 8, Appendix A, p. 24t ) 
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Another opinion was that the problem was not that the 
press was not sufficiently pro-Market, because they had a 
"record of being almost overwhelmingly pro", but that 
"people apparently aren't swayed by what they read ... +ý 
(Interview 7, Appendix A, p. 2316 ) 
On the whole, anti-Marketeers interviewed in this 
study tended to view the press as strongly pro-Market, 
and the television and radio as moderately so, while pro- 
Market opinion held that the press was moderately pro- 
Market and television and the radio were neutral. 
From the discussion about previous studies of public 
opinion about the Common Market, and the participants 
in the "Great Debate" in this chapter, in Chapter II 
attention shifts to the theoretical basis of this research. 
CHAPTER II 
OPINION LEADERS AND PUBLIC OPINION 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the nature and role of 
opinion leaders in the formation of public opinion with special reference 
to their gatekeeping function. It moves on to examine some of the factors 
which may contribute to the formation of public opinion. This is followed 
by a critique of previous methods for examining public opinion, especially 
those used in the studies about the Common Market mentioned in Chapter I. 
Then other research designs which might have been appropriate to this type 
of study are reviewed and their relative merits are weighed. Finally, in 
view of the gatekeeping function of opinion leaders, the importance of 
their judgement of information is discussed and there is a survey of social 
judgement theory which is pertinent to the problems in this study. 
1. OPINION LEADERS 
The campaign which led Britain into the Common Market was an exercise 
by groups of opinion leaders - politicians, diplomats, big businessmen, 
academics and journalists - in which one group of opinion leaders was 
busily trying to influence the other groups, while all groups claimed to 
speak for, and to lead, the "common man". Whatever the basis of these 
claims was in fact, the groups of individuals who made them were highly 
visible, often thanks to the mass media which also gave them billing as 
spokesmen and leaders. Sometimes the groups and individuals were able to 
cast themselves in the role of opinion leaders by clever manipulation of 
the media, as in the case of the Keep Britain Out Campaign. 
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Some of the people, such as experts and special interest groups, 
who do act as opinion leaders vary from issue to issue (Katz and 
Lazarsfeld, 1955) while others, such as journalists and politicians, are 
more or less visible as opinion leaders on most issues. The role these 
different types of people play in the opinion leading process also varies. 
The journalists have a special position. First, in the course of 
their work they act as gatekeepers, deciding what information is to be 
printed or broadcast, and what emphasis it should be given. In the case 
of major issues, the second role of the journalist comes when he is 
assigned as the correspondent or editor responsible for that issue. He 
then becomes the "expert" for other journalists, and may also pass along 
his own views in "in-depth" and feature reporting. 
Politicians are also in a special position in that they want to 
propagate their own views through the media, but also want to be seen by 
their constituents to be representing their majority view, and the two 
positions very well may be quite different. Politicians may also serve 
as gatekeepers when they choose what information they will pass on to 
journalists to relay to the public. Whereas journalists are supposed in 
theory to try and make unbiased factual judgements about news items, politi- 
cians are not generally expected to encumber themselves thus. 
Specially interested groups play an active and explicit role in the 
process of trying to influence opinion. Often their main outlet is 
through the media, although they also try to reach the public through other 
means such as public meetings, pamphlets, posters, lobbying and forming 
pressure groups. 
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In the specific case of the Common Market campaign, the journalists 
involved were usually correspondents from the major national newspapers 
and television who had been given specific responsibility for European 
affairs. Regional newspapers tended to use copy from their newspaper 
group's Common Market correspondent, or that which was supplied by the 
wire services. Politicians had more of a problem than usual, as feelings 
ran high over the issue and they were likely to have many unhappy 
constituents no matter what side they took. 
Special interest groups proliferated in the Common Market campaign. 
There were organizations representing both sides of the issue and, in 
addition, various groups such as farmers, fishermen, big business and 
trades unions agitated through their local and national organizations. 
All of these groups were anxious to put their views across in the media 
so as to reach as many people as possible. They also worked at lower 
levels, giving talks to organizations, holding meetings, publishing 
pamphlets and canvassing. 
The role of the various opinion leaders in the formulation of public 
opinion is a complex operation. Turner and Killian (1972) suggest that 
a "public" is composed of groups of people discussing an issue with the 
hope of coming to a collective opinion which they hope will influence the 
behaviour of some individual or group. They then go on to define public 
opinion as "that which is communicated to decision makers as a consequence 
of the functioning of the public". (p. 180) As it stands, this appears to 
be too simple because it fails to account for the influence which opinion 
leaders appear to exert on the public. Kelman and Bloom (1973) see public 
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opinion as a dynamic interaction between decision makers and members of 
the general public in which the decision maker may actually share in the 
"moods" of the public. They feel that these "moods" may actually have 
their origins among the elites" from which the opinion leaders are drawn 
and only then permeate among the general population, so that it is risky 
to try and define who is influencing whom. Klapper (1960) sums up this 
mutually re-inforcing system: 
Individual business and political leaders may or may not 
be 'opinion leaders' in the sense in which the term is 
used in communications research - i. e., they may or may 
not critically influence a handful of their peers. But 
their decisions and their consequent behavior in them- 
selves affect society at large, and the mere fact of their 
taking a particular stand frequently serves to make that 
stand and the issue to which it pertains a topic of media 
reporting and debate, and a topic in regard to which 
personal influence, in the more restricted sense is exercised. 
The media may, in short, stimulate the elite to actions 
which affect the masses and which inoidently restimulate 
and so affect both the media and channels of interpersonal 
influence. (p. 253-254) 
Both Rosenberg (1965) and Kelman and Bloom (1973) point out sources 
of error in the way public opinion is perceived by the 'elites: Rosenberg 
suggests that in the course of a public opinion survey interview, the 
subject may give an incorrect report of his opinion, shifting from a 
position of personal indifference, to the position he perceives as the 
consensus view or the position of a "prestigeful" person or body. 
Kelman and Bloom believe that misapprehensions also arise at the decision 
making level if decision makers assume a static model of public opinion, 
make prejudiced selections of the reports of public opinion they choose 
to believe, or if they fail to understand the response and involvement 
of the public in an issue. Kelman and Bloom suggest that these mistakes 
45 
are often "reinforced" by the results of opinion polls. 
The function of public opinion in the realm of decision making 
is that it serves "as a context that sets significant limits on the 
maneuverability of national decision makers". (Etzioni, 1969, p. 576), 
a view with which Rosenberg (1965) concurs. Kelman and Bloom intimate 
that the climate created by public opinion serves to "impel decision 
makers towards perceptions and actions that reflect public sentiments". 
(1973, p. 269) They feel that pervasive public apathy about an issue 
creates a special decision making situation in which decision makers 
have a wide leeway in their formulation of policy before they find them- 
selves at risk of objections from the public. 
Kelman and Bloom also suggest that decision makers may generate a 
feeling of national crisis in order to define narrowly what they consider 
to be the proper attitudes or behaviour for a specific situation. 
The Two-Step Flow Hypothesis 
One of the ways in which it has been suggested that information is 
disseminated to various groups in the public is through the offices of a 
person who acts as an opinion leader for his group. His function is to 
relay information from the media to members of his group. This idea was 
first proposed by Lazarafeld, Berelson and Gaudet in 1948 (1968,3rd 
edition) in their "two-step flow of communication" hypothesis in which 
they suggest that during an election campaign, information and ideas 
in the mass media first flow to opinion leaders and then from the opinion 
leaders to less active members of the population. 
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Katz and Lazarefeld (1955) substantiated this hypothesis for other 
types of communication situations as well as for political campaigns. They 
found that opinion leaders had greater exposure to the media than did the 
people they influenced, especially exposure to information pertinent to 
the area in which they exercised leadership. This is hardly surprising. 
Reviewing the previous studies of the two-step flow hypothesis, 
Katz (1957) concluded that this type of opinion leader is very similar 
to the people he influences and while leading opinion on one issue, may 
in fact himself be led by another member of his group on a different issue. 
These opinion leaders were found to have more contacts outside their groups 
than other members, yet paradoxically, in_spite of their greater use of 
the media, they were themselves most influenced by other people, than by 
those media. Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1968) found that in an 
election campaign, people who made their choice of candidate late in the 
campaign were most likely to cite the influence of other people in their 
decision than the mass media. 
Later research has shown that in some cases more than two steps may 
be involved in the process whereby one opinion leader will pass informa- 
tion to another opinion leader who in turn disseminates it to a wider 
audience (Rogers and Beal, 1958). Opinion leaders may also serve to 
arouse the curiosity of people in. their group about an issue, so that 
after hearing about it from an opinion leader, they in turn may seek 
further information from the media. (Secord and Backman, 1974, Chapter 5) 
It is important to remember that of course a two-step flow is not 
an essential stage in the transmission of information; nor is it a 
necessary condition for communication effects. It is merely one possible 
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condition. Many people can and do receive information directly from 
the media as their source with no mediation by opinion leaders. This 
also underlines the need to distinguish between communications as a 
source of information and communications as a source of influence. 
Although, as Weiss (1969) points out: 
Since information can influence, this differentiation relates 
to whether or not the mediator between the mass media and the 
general public merely acts as a relay or, in addition, offers 
judgements and opinions selectively taken from the media, or 
presented as his own views. (p. 145) 
Another study reports that the opinion leaders' function as mediators 
between the mass media and their group tends to become less important as 
the volume of information to be passed on becomes greater. (De Fleur and 
Larsen, 1958) Finally, it has been shown that with important issues the 
two-step process is by-passed: information reaches people directly, 
although they may then talk over the news with others. (Larsen and 
Hill, 1954) 
In case confusion arise from the use of the phrase "opinion leaders" 
by Lazarsfeld and his colleagues in terms of their two-step flow hypothesis, 
it should be pointed out that such an opinion leader is not necessarily 
or even likely to be the same sort of person, or provide the same sort 
of function as the people to whom the label was applied earlier in this 
chapter. For example, an opinion leader (in the two-step sense) for a 
group of his mates on the shop floor is not likely to become a national 
opinion leader on an issue such as the Common Market. A politician, on 
the other hand, while he may serve as an opinion leader in the two-step 
flow sense for a group of his colleagues, becomes an opinion leader in 
a much wider, if perhaps more nebulous sense, when his views are broadcast 
to a national audience. 
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In an issue as pervasive as the Common Market campaign which at the 
time of this study was receiving very heavy media coverage, it does not 
seem likely that the simple relay function of an opinion leader as 
proposed by the original two-step flow hypothesis was paramount in the 
spread of information. Indeed, except for journalists, politicians 
and diplomats whose jobs entailed seeking out other sources of information, 
most people in this study reported that their main source of information 
about the Common Market was one of the mass media of communication. 
Gatekeepers 
This brings the discussion to the issue of what may have been the 
most important function of opinion leaders in the Common Market campaign, 
and what certainly was their most fundamental function. 
The diffusion of information about an issue throughout a society 
makes public opinion about that issue possible in the first place 
(Cooley, 1971). In industrialized, literate societies, there are many 
"gates" through which a piece of information must flow before it reaches 
a member of the public. At each of these gates there is a gatekeeper 
, who must 
decide whether the piece of information is to be passed on, and 
if so, in what form. Clearly, this gatekeeping role is crucial in social 
communications. As Schramm (1960) points outs 
Some gatekeepers are more important than others. In society, 
certain individuals identified as 'influentials' are usually 
persons who have an uncommonly large number of message chains 
centering on them. (p. 177) 
Because the opinions of influentials or opinion leaders are 
respected, what they choose to pass along is especially important. The 
decisions these people make provide the pool of information on which 
the public can draw to help form their views about an issue. The factors 
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which influence the gatekeepers' judgements at each gate, and the 
integrity and knowledge of the person making those judgements, are clearly 
critical in the process of public opinion formation and change. Lewin 
(1947) suggests that there is a social function attached to each gate and 
argues that in order to change an existing social process at any gate, 
one must first influence or change the gatekeeper. 
Gatekeeping starts right at the source of an item of news (Carter, 1958). 
In the case of the Common Market, this could be a diplomat reporting on the 
proceedings of the day's negotiations, a civil servant preparing a report 
on some aspect of Market life, a journalist at a press conference in 
Brussels, or perhaps a politician briefing journalists after a committee 
meeting. Whoever it might be, he chooses the information he feels to be 
important and expresses it in a manner designed to present the story best 
from his point of view. He may or may not be trying to be objective about it. 
A special gate through which information must flow from the Common 
Market exists with the Council of Ministers. The Council meets in closed 
sessions, often lasting all night. The only way a journalist working for 
morning newspapers can obtain a story before his paper goes to press is 
if a minister or spokesman from his country hears the call of nature before 
the appointed hour, and then to follow him to the toilet. Journalists then 
compare the leaks from their source with those obtained by other journalists 
and thus build up their stories. One correspondent once observed to me 
that if toilets were built inside the Council Chamber (or indeed, if a 
female minister were sent), the news flow from the Council of Ministers 
would come to an abrupt halt. (Personal communication, Brussels, Sept. 18, 
1968). It is not difficult to see how all sorts of bias can enter a story 
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under these circumstances, even in the hands of the most skilled 
journalist. 
Even when there is written communication originating from the 
Common Market countries, there is still room for confusion. A graphic 
example was of a Foreign Press Conference in Brussels which proceeded 
smoothly until one correspondent pointed out that the French text of 
M. Pierre Harmel's speech said exactly the opposite from the Flemish 
text. (Personal communication, Brussels, Oct. 4,1968). 
When a story reaches a member of the press, in theory, at least, 
the decisions made about the story - what to leave out, what to report 
and how to present it - are supposed to be objective. One has only to 
compare articles about a specific incident in several newspapers, to 
realize that one journalist's objectivity is another journalist's 
propaganda. Breed (1964) suggests that in order to preserve their own 
individual and social values, journalists may make responsible decisions 
to omit certain facets of a story. Gieber (1964) neatly sums up this 
line of argument: 
News does not have an independent existence; news is a 
product of men who are members of a news-gathering (or 
news originating) bureaucracy. But the question remains: 
how 'subjective' is news? Very much so, in my opinion. (p. 180) 
The bureaucratic structures of the news source and communicator 
create the frame of reference which moulds a story as it passes through 
the prescribed gates on its way to the general public. Gieber (1964) 
further defines these influences as follows: 
The press hold a basic tenet that it must remain aloof from 
the influences of other institutions - sources, public relations 
experts and others desiring to reach, or to avoid, the'public'. 
It is likewise well laiown that other institutions - and all 
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persons eager to reach or avoid the 'public' - exert 
pressures on the press to get it to behave as they 
would like. Politicians and government bureaucrats 
are traditionally the most notorious for applying 
such pressures on the press. (p. 178) 
White (1950) studied the mechanics of gatekeeping at the level of 
newspaper editors and found that only about ten per cent of the wire 
copy received by an editor of a Midwestern U. S. A. newspaper actually 
found its way into print. Roberts (1971) points out that the selection 
process in this culling of news copy makes particularly clear the potential 
importance of the effects of what the gatekeeper decides to leave out. 
Roberts felt that several factors in the gatekeeping process tended 
to help preserve the status quo in society. The editors and reporters 
who are responsible for gathering and selecting the "news" naturally will 
perceive events "in terms of their own image of reality". (p. 382) He 
also indicates that there is evidence that journalists "respond to a 
number of subtle pressures which influence them to 'slant' their reporting 
of events so as to conform with the publisher's implicit policy". (p. 382) 
Bauer (1971) argues that people remember communications highly 
selectively and this is governed by their perceptions about the future 
audience of the news. They tend to remember less well items which would 
conflict with their audience's opinions than they do items they feel would 
be well received. Their analysis of their audience's reaction to news is 
usually more or less correct. (Bauer, 1964) Donahew (1967), however, 
found that perceived public opinion did not influence gatekeeping 
behaviour, although he did find that there is some evidence to suppose 
that the attitude of the newspaper's publisher is an "important force in 
the news channel". (p. 68) Pool and Shulman (1964) found that "good" news 
tended to be more accurately reported than "bad" news. 
52 
From this discussion it becomes apparent that opinion leaders - 
politicians, diplomats, specially interested parties and journalists - 
all serve as gatekeepers at some stage in the communication process and 
that "feed back" to them in the form of perceived and real audience 
reactions and social forces may further complicate the gatekeeping 
process. The important question which arises then is how these people 
actually make judgements about the information they receive. This 
problem will be examined in the section on social judgement at the end 
of this chapter. 
To recapitulate, it would appear that the interaction of opinion 
leaders and public opinion is a complex process which operates on a 
number of levels, whether it be that of an especially interested person 
in a small group, a politician making news, or a journalist choosing 
what he will report. Smith (1971) suggests that: 
According to Kurt Lewin's methodological premise anything 
that has effects is 'real', and this surely applies to 
reifications of public opinion as they enter the belief 
systems of legislators and policy makers, as they are 
surveyed by the mass media, and as they are entertained 
by different segments of the general citizenry. What 
people in these various roles believe public opinion to 
be obviously effects what they do. (p. 39) 
2. FACTORS INFLUENCING PUBLIC OPINION 
From the specific role of opinion leaders in the process of public 
opinion formation, this chapter now turns to other factors which may 
influence individuals and groups as they try to come to terms with an 
issue of social importance. 
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Personality 
It has been often popular when discussing why both opinion leaders 
and different public groups behave in different ways to assume that the 
personality of the individual has some influence on his social actions. 
Kelman and Bloom (1973) assert: 
A wide variety of personality factors - authoritarianism, 
xenophobia, extrapunitiveness, need achievement, and self- 
esteem being just a few of many examples - are potentially 
relevant to the political process. The dispositions that 
characterize important decision makers and opinion leaders may 
have a direct impact on the decision process. Dispositions 
that are widely shared within a society or at least among its 
major elites may play an indirect yet often pivotal, role in 
the process. 
What is more difficult, both for serious students of personality 
and of politics to agree is how this influence takes place. There is 
not even a general consensus about how to define personality or how to 
measure it. Knutson (19734)identifies three assumptions basic to most 
theories of personality. The first is that personality is an "organized 
internal disposition", the second is that it is stable or consistent 
over time, and finally, "that behaviour is related to a system of intra- 
psychic determinants in knowable ways and that these ways vary with the 
parameters of the external situation". (p. 30) 
These assumptions, while providing a basis for defining personality, 
raise problems for measuring it. By definition it is a theoretical 
construct and can thus only be measured in terms of the behaviour 
resulting from it. This brings one full circle back to the question 
of how personality affects behaviour, and thus what part of the 
personality one is measuring by observing some behavioural manifestation. 
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One approach employed by some theorists is to define personality in 
terms of "subconcepts" and to attempt to build up a picture of personality 
by observing traits, values, needs, drives and habits. The drawback to this 
approach is that this method of dividing up personality into subconcepts 
can be arbitrary; it does not take into account the internal organiza- 
tion of the personality, and it is not often possible to predict from the 
defined subconcepts the nature of other hypothesized subconcepts. 
Another school of personality theories takes an "holistic" approach 
and is based on: 
understanding the organizing principle (for example, the 
dominant need area) of each personality and on the belief 
that an adequate measure of a single personality's function 
is predictive of all aspects of the personality. (Knutson, 1973V"32) 
The holistic approach to personality has traditionally been applied in 
clinical case studies, but Knutson argues that there is a place for 
these theories at the level of laying down the "laws" of the discipline. 
However, whether personality is studied at the trait or the holistic 
level, it is necessary to recall that these definitions are still 
constructs, posing problems of inference for the observer from the 
observed behaviour to the personality itself. 
Knutson (1973. b)also warns that: 
For many research problems, personality may not be a useful 
variable to include - in spite of the siren's call to employ 
easily available and easily administered scales. In a number 
of politically important areas, situational, role, and demo- 
graphic factors offer the most parsimonious avenue to 
predicting political behavior. -(p. 34) 
Knutson suggests that in reviewing studies of personality in 
relation to politics it is useful to divide them into two types, those 
which deal with the political activity of the individual, and those 
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which involve his political ideology. 
In the first group, one finds studies of such traits as efficacy, 
in which it has been shown that an individual's feeling of potency 
affects the amount of his political activity; anomie and alientation, in 
which feelings of powerlessness are related to lack of political know- 
ledge and activity (however, this trait has been correlated with low 
socio-economic status and thus should be approached with caution); and 
power motivation. 
One trait which has received a great deal of study and which may 
be of relevance to the material in this thesis is that of dogmatism 
(Rokeach, 1960). In his introduction to the Open and Closed Mind, 
Rokeach states that he has developed the theory of dogmatism to account 
for all belief systems as he argues that the "Authoritarian Personality" 
(Adorno et al, 1950) only accounts for dogmatism of the Right. In this 
theory he deals with the structure of beliefs rather than their content 
and argues that individuals at the closed-minded (dogmatic) end of the 
scale differ from people on the open-minded (undogmatic) end in their 
approach to information. He found that closed-minded people, when 
compared to open-minded people had a more rigid approach to problem 
solving, that they thought in more concrete terms, had less competence 
in a given subject, tended towards premature closure in their 
perceptual processes and to distortions in their memory, were less able 
to tolerate ambiguous situations or information, and tended to accept 
without question information which appealed to them while rejecting 
information with which they disagreed. This all has obvious implications 
for opinion leaders in their judgement of new information. 
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Although Rokeach argues that dogmatism can be associated with 
people at the extremes of both the political Left and Right, DiRenzo 
(1967) and Barker (1963) found that it was associated with politics of 
the Right only in their studies. Knutson (1971, quoted in Knutson 1973-b), 
in a study of political leaders holding a wide range of beliefs, found, 
on the other hand, that there were both authoritarians and dogmatists 
on the political Left as well as on the Right. 
Putnam (1971) in a study of political leaders isolated another 
personality factor which he called "ideological style". Individuals high 
on this factor preferred general, abstract theory to concrete fact in 
their analysis of situations, and liked to use an ideology or doctrine to 
bolster their own position. They also liked to use hypothesised ideal 
situations as a yardstick to judge a policy. He found that this style 
was associated with people on the extremes of both the political Left 
and Right, who also tended to be alienated from existing political and 
social institutions. These ideological traits were not, however, 
positively correlated with dogmatism, authoritarianism, moral 
absolutisms, or political and social mistrust. 
Knutson (1973- in reviewing Putnam's work argues that it "underlines 
the impossibility of our finding any simple relationship between political 
behavior and personality". (p. 53) She suggests that from all the studies 
of the relationship of personality to political behavior, one can conclude 
only that "personality variables undoubtedly are related to the direction 
of political ideology" and that "the direction of political activity 
appears to be multidetermined". (p. 54) She warns that "we scholars 
have sometimes repeated the sins of our forefathers, who used personality 
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as a conveniently simplistic way of categorizing political activity". (p. 55) 
Common sense concurs. 
Attitudes and Beliefs 
It often has been argued that another set of factors which affect the 
formation of public opinion are the existing attitudes and beliefs of both 
opinion leaders and the public at large: 
Individuals - whether they are national decision makers, 
opinion leaders, or involved citizens - bring to the political 
arena a complex of underlying assumptions, conceptual frame- 
works in terms of which they formulate specific opinions and 
arrive at decisions on issues of international politics. (Kelman and 
Bloom, 1973, p. 272) 
Unfortunately for the student of public opinion, as is the case with 
personality theory, there is not only a welter of theories of attitude 
formation and change (for comprehensive surveys, see Insko, 1967; Jahoda 
and Warren, 1966) but little coherent agreement about the precise 
mechanism by which attitudes and beliefs actually do influence political 
opinion and political behaviour. 
Smith (1973), in a review of the empirical application of current 
theories and findings of attitude research to political behaviour 
argues that while 
most of the points seem obvious, yet the contraries of many 
of them could reasonably be maintained ... qualifications 
must be introduced about the evidential status of these 
assertions and about the adequacy of this account of 
persuasive communication for political psychology. (p. 66) 
He goes on to suggest that the various theoretical approaches to the 
study of attitude, whether they be learning theory, theories dealing with 
cognitive processes, or personality theories, because they deal with 
different variables in the problem should be considered to be complementary 
rather than mutually exclusive and therefore competitive concepts. 
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He does, however, single out the application of one set of theories, 
the theories of social judgement as being particularly relevant to the 
study of political attitudes and behaviour. These will be dealt with in 
the final section of this Chapter. 
The discussion of beliefs in relation to public opinion and political 
behaviour is also fraught with problems of definition if one insists on a 
rigorous theoretical approach. It would appear to be more productive 
to adopt a different approach and to acknowledge that there are, in a 
given society, shared beliefs, some of which are widespread, others of 
which are more specific (Hartman, 1977), whether defined as a cognitive 
component of attitudes (Osgood et al, 1957) or as underlying them (Lane, 
1973; Kretch et al, 1962; Rokeach, 1960; Stephenson, 1965), which in some 
way influence the attitudes of individuals in society. 
I would argue that at our present state of knowledge, it is 
intellectually more honest to admit ignorance on the precise role of 
beliefs as a part of influence on attitudes when doing attitude research, and 
thus to adopt an open-ended technique which is not likely to introduce 
bias in the form of over-specific theory, and to allow the data to speak 
for themselves. In this way, one is more likely to build up a reliable 
body of evidence which will eventually contribute to the understanding 
of the relationship of attitude and belief, their role in public 
opinion, and the role society plays in shaping and maintaining them. 
Social and Group Mediation 
The discussion now turns to the question of what effects social and 
group pressures have on the formation and change or stability of public 
opinion. Hartman: (1977) argues that social psychology's fascination 
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with scaling methods has meant that it has for too long concentrated 
on one component of attitude, the evaluative, and neglected the social 
aspects of attitude and belief and their acquisition which are necessary 
to explain how individuals see themselves in their social world. 
The way attitudes and values characteristically relate to 
each other may tell us as much about the society that produces them 
as about individual personality dynamics. The common tendency 
to ignore the social content in the quest for a better understanding 
of individual behavior can only produce distortions in the theories 
of man in society that we generate. (Hartman:, 1977" p. 92) 
He suggests that it is not possible, as some people seem to believe, 
to change society by changing individual attitudes: 
This is to ignore the fact that social attitudes are not just 
characteristics of the individual. They tend to form part of 
a pattern that is socially coherent as well as psychologically 
coherent - but more importantly, established social attitudes 
tend to form part of a systematically fostered view of the 
world that is disseminated and reinforced by a society's 
major institutions of socialization. (pp. 92-93) 
This has particular relevance to the study of public opinion about 
the Common Market, and in particular, the Common Market campaign in 
which the Government and interested bodies mounted an intensive 
propaganda campaign to win the "hearts and minds" of the people. While 
attitudes sometimes seemed to incline in the desired direction, the 
socially based beliefs pertaining to the issue would appear to have 
remained fairly stable. It is not difficult to hear voiced, all be it 
disguised in rational argument, that hallowed British belief that "wogs 
begin at Calais", to put it crudely if succinctly. 
In his discussion of the cognitive aspects of prejudice, Tajfel 
(1969) set out his position as follows: 
Much of what happens to us is related to the activities 
of groups to which we do or do not belong; and the changing 
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relations between these groups require constant 
readjustments of our understanding of what happens 
and constant causal attributions about the why and 
the how of the changing conditions of our life. (p. 81) 
He then identifies the process of categorization (stereotyping to 
simplify information), assimilation (acquiring the social values and 
norms which belong to the categories) and the search for coherence 
(the attempt to understand change) as the underlying foundations of these 
attributes. Of the search for coherence he says: 
This need to preserve the integrity of the self-image 
is the only motivational assumption that we need to 
make in order to understand the direction that the 
search for coherence will take. (p. 92) 
This socialization which leads to the acquisition of political attitudes 
almost certainly begins early in life, although how early is still in 
dispute (Niemi, 1973). However, young people do not wake up on the day when 
they obtain legal majority and suddenly start casting about for a political 
stance. Early factors most certainly must include the political and social 
orientation of the child's parents and the groups in which they move. The 
learning involved here is both from overt teaching, and from observing 
parental attitudes and behaviour. This is also the first way in which an 
individual learns about political authority and develops his attitudes to it. 
He recognizes that his parents obey laws (or otherwise) so as not to run foul 
of them, he learns about political leaders such as a president or prime 
minister and he tends to idealize these people. If some of this idealiza- 
tion carries over into adult life, it would contribute to the explanation of 
the undying faith in the actions of a government displayed by some 
individuals (Niemi, 1973). As a child grows in understanding, Niemi suggests, 
he gradually realizes the importance of institutions, rather than just of 
individual leaders in politics. However, in studies of these patterns of 
socialization over time it would appear that while the general pattern 
probably remains stable, the degree of support for political figures and 
institutions may fluctuate. (Niemi, 1973) 
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This would be particularly understandable in periods when a child's 
parents may be expressing extreme dislike for some political leader or 
law. It is also possible for children to develop hostility towards 
rather than idealization of authority. 
Tajfel (1970) asserts that not only do young children learn early 
on the hierarchical relationship of various groups in their society, but 
also that children as young as six and seven show distinct preferences 
for certain foreign countries. 
It is difficult to tell how much childhood socialization influences 
adult attitudes but it seems safe to say that at least something carries 
over. In a study of secondary school pupils, it was found that the 
similarity in political attitudes between parents and their children was 
less than one would expect to be the case if, as previously argued, the 
family was the primary unit of political socialization. (Niemi, 1973) 
Niemi suggests that children's attitudes tend to be similar to those of 
their friends, but notes that studies of this as well as those of the 
influence of school and other groups either have not been done, or are 
not conclusive. He concludes that whereas some influence from childhood 
socialization may carry over into adult life, the impact of this is 
neither so great nor so influential as was once believed, and the adult 
retains the capacity for radical attitude change even late into life, 
given adequate stimulus. 
An apparent example of a proper stimulus for attitude change in an 
educational institution is presented in Newcomb's (1943) study of women 
attending Bennington College. Both in this study and in the subsequent 
follow-up reported by Newcomb,. Koenig, Flacks and Warwick (1967), Newcomb 
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was able to demonstrate significant changes in the college students' 
attitudes, which persisted into adult life. But, as Newcomb hastened 
to point out, Bennington was a special case, and he was unable to 
replicate the results in studies done in other colleges. Furthermore, 
he cautions about the reports 
Descriptively, its findings were dependable enough, having 
been shown to reappear in each of four consecutive years. 
But in the absence of systematic 'controls' there was no way 
of isolating the essential ingredients, the crucial causative 
factors. The original report made no claim to universality, 
indeed, it stressed the probable uniqueness of both the world 
situation and the institutional setting. (Newcomb, et al., 1967, p. 8) 
At the time of the original study Bennington was a newly established 
college of experimental nature with a highly involved and dedicated staff. 
It was also relatively isolated physically. Whether these factors were 
sufficient to explain causative grounds for change, will as Newcomb 
points out remain a matter for speculation. 
We have seen in this section that while family, school and friends 
play some role in the socialization of an individual, none of them has 
been proved to exert individually an absolute, immutable, influence on 
the individual, who retains his capacity for change even into adult 
life. These factors in socializations may provide the parameters 
within which this change must take place, but this hypothesis has yet to 
be reliably tested. 
The Mass Media of Communication 
The final factor which may influence public opinion to be 
considered in this Chapter is the effect on individuals of information 
carried by the mass media. It is indisputable that in industrial, 
literate societies, the mass media play an important role in public 
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opinion by putting issues before the public, and equally, by withholding 
other issues as "unnewsworthy". It would have been very difficult indeed 
for someone residing in Britain at the time when this research was under- 
taken, not to have heard of the Common Market because of the saturation 
coverage given by the media. Yet, in the same period in the United 
States, any number of people would have been hard pressed to explain, 
even in rudimentary terms, what or where the Common Market was because 
American editors did not feel it had the same relevance for their readers, 
and did not give it the same coverage British editors did. Whatever 
effects on public opinion mass communications may be proved to have 
subsequently, they undoubtedly place material in the public arena so 
that it is there for those who want to use it. These individuals may 
also be used by it, but in any case, it plays an important role in the 
socialization of an individual in his culture. 
By expressing, dramatizing, and repeating cultural patterns, 
both the traditional and the newly emerging, the media 
reinforce tradition and at the same time explain new roles. 
Members of the society thus remain integrated within the 
sociocultural structure. As a form of adult socialization, 
the media are seen as guarantors that a body of common 
ultimate values remains visible as a continuing source 
of consensus, despite inroads of change. (Breed, 1964, p. 187) 
The actual effects of a given communication are more difficult to 
ascertain. Klapper (1960) argued that, "Mass communication ordinarily 
does not serve as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects, 
but rather functions among and through a nexus of mediating factors and 
influences". (p. 8) 
Blummer and McQuail (1968) in their study of the effects of 
television on voters in the 1964 General Election found that television 
had the greatest effects on the "politically more indifferent electors". (p. 218) 
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This they felt was due to the fact that these viewers, while they would 
not ordinarily seek out political information, if they did not want to 
give up television during an election campaign, would be exposed to a 
marked increase in political broadcasts. As they were not likely to be 
attending strictly to the message in the programme, their defences 
against it were less likely to be aroused and therefore it had a 
greater chance of getting through. They concluded: 
This captive, mildly tolerant, but rather passive audience 
relies indifferently on television for its political 
impressions, since the positive effort required to seek 
out campaign material from the press or elsewhere would be 
out of character in the case of individuals who have no 
burning desire for political enlightenment. Consequently 
it is mainly television, and only marginally the press and 
the local campaign, which precipitated the major attitude 
change that affected the less motivated respondents. (p. 218) 
As it will be argued later in this thesis, this hypothesis is of 
particular relevance to work on attitudes about the Common Market in 
Britain at the time prior to the accession to the Treaty of Rome. One 
has only to look at the "don't knows" and the shifts from "yes" to "no" 
in the opinion polls in conjunction with the massive coverage given to 
the issue by television to realize that Blumer and Mcquail would have 
found here an excellent situation for their research. 
Turner and Killian (1972) suggest another possible effect of mass 
communications: 
When members of the mass are free to select from among the 
available media those which are most congenial with their 
points of view, the media may provide validation for 
preconceptions and vocalize existing inclinations through 
giving them specific direction and ideology. (p. 175) 
Selective Exposure 
This argument leads to the question of what role selective exposure 
plays in moderating the effects of mass communication on public opinion. 
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Hoveland (1959) found that individuals tend to avail themselves of 
communications for which they have a pre-existing bias. 
In addition to attending to communications which are in agreement 
with their prevailing attitudes, people prefer to avoid communications 
incongruent with their views and interests. Klapper (1960). Sears and 
Freedman (1971) suggested that: 
There seems to be some evidence ... for the existence of 
defacto selectivity. Most audiences for mass communications 
apparently tend to overrepresent persons already sympathetic 
to the views being propounded, and most persons seem to be 
exposed disproportionately to communications that support 
their opinion. (p. 232) 
However, in reviewing the findings of experimental research they 
did not find evidence of a "general psychological preference for 
supportive information". (p"292) 
Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1968,3rd ed. ) pointed out in 
their study of the 1940 United States elections that "availability 
plus predispositions determines exposure - and predispositions lead 
people to select communications which are congenial, which support 
the previous position". (p. 89). On the whole Sears and Freeman (1971) 
concluded that people were perhaps more likely to mount a defence 
against the influence of communications when they were evaluating the 
information itself, rather than at the stage at which they would have 
the opportunity to either avail themselves of, or to avoid information. 
Selective Perception 
If the individual is unable to avoid communications dissonant with 
his own attitudes, other self-protective devices, such as selective 
perception, may come into play. Krech and Crutchfield (1971) argue that: 
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Perception is functionally selective. That is to say, 
our cognitive worlds are organized and meaningful, and 
the way we perceive whatever we expose ourselves to in 
the mass media is determined by how it will be useful 
to us against the background of the cognitive structure 
we have already built. (p. 235) 
White (1950) suggested that people of different persuasions will 
perceive an event in the light of their preconceptions of the situation. 
An American may view the invasion of Czechoslovakia as another Russian 
step towards world conquest, while a Russian may regard it simply as a 
move to protect a weak flank. White claims that communication about 
such an incident creates a 
situation G, hicl1 is psychologically ambiguous - 
that is, it is psychologically possible for two 
persons or groups of persons to attach different 
interpretations to it - however unambiguous it 
may be 'objectively', or in the eyes of a relatively 
objective historian. (p. 260) 
Cooper and Jahoda (1947) found that prejudiced individuals, when 
shown a cartoon ridiculing their prejudice, while initially under- 
standing the cartoon, went to great lengths in the end to misunderstand 
the point of it, and thus avoid bringing the ridicule on themselves. 
Cooper and Jahoda felt that, "Evasion appears a well-practised form of 
behaviour which receives encouragement from the social structure in 
which we live. " (p. 24) Other studies report that people are more 
likely to retain communications which are favourable to their view- 
point than material which is opposed to it. (Klapper, 1960) 
These defences may not be used in all cases, however. Klapper (1960) 
suggested that: 
Selective exposure, selective perception and selective 
retention do not, of course, occur among all people in 
all communication situations ... Immunity to the selective 
process can be documented in almost any of the studies cited. 
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In summary, it would appear that as people tend to select communi- 
cations which reinforce their own position, and to avoid or misconstrue 
dissonant material, mass communications will not usually "serve as a 
necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects". (Klapper, 1960, p. 8) 
The Blumer and McQuail hypothesis that television effects are seen most 
strongly in disinterested audiences has special significance in situations 
in which there are a large number of undecided and uninterested viewing voters. 
In this section we have explored the various factors both individual, 
and those in society, which may influence public opinion; while some of 
these factors may be necessary causes to the formation of opinion, none 
has been proved to be sufficient cause. In the next section, we move on to 
look at ways in which public opinion may be assessed. 
3. THE MEASUREMENT OF PUBLIC OPINION 
Smith's (1971) argument that what people believe to be public opinion 
influences the way they act presents an interesting dilemma. Many social 
psychologists, sociologists and political scientists are keen to distance 
themselves from the techniques of public opinion polls, and generally 
refuse to discuss a topic which they feel that they have put many methodo- 
logical miles behind. I share their sentiment but not their complacency. 
To borrow an analogy from Koestler (1975), some dead horses definitely 
need kicking. 
The dilemma is fairly simple. At one level, whilst behavioural 
scientists tend to suggest that opinion polls are not the instrument of 
choice to study public attitudes, polling organizations go on conducting 
them with ever increasing sophistication, giving politicians something to 
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quote and the media something to report. The results of these polls thus 
enter the public arena with all the trappings of concrete fact and the impact 
of these polls as a contributing factor to public opinion cannot be ignored. 
The problem with opinion polls is that they were developed mainly in 
fields such as marketing research and voting behaviour in which there were 
a limited number of choices of action available and the attempt has been 
to predict which choice will be made. Indeed, opinion polls have become 
quite accurate for one type of circumstance: this is when the subject 
under test is entirely precise and uncontroversial in that precision, 
for example, the selling of soap powder. The danger arises when the 
technique is applied to inappropriate situations where the subject under 
test is complex and controversial in its complexity, for example, political 
issues which have many possible facets and outcomes. As Kelman and Bloom (1973) 
point out, in this type of situation 
A ... major limitation of the standard opinion poll is 
that it ascertains only the percentage who approve or 
disapprove of a particular policy action without 
exploring the meaning these opinions have for different 
respondents, the context within which they are held, and 
the depth of commitment they represent. (p. 274) 
Unfortunately, behavioural scientists have not always been willing 
to apply the appropriate techniques to the problems of practical politics. 
Furthermore, some of those who have done so have diminished the usefulness 
of their studies by using the most readily available subjects, usually 
university students, rather than going farther afield and drawing from a 
more realistic population sample. 
Others go farther afield, turning to "survey research" for their 
answers. It is here that the other horn of the dilemma presents itself 
and dead horses raise their ugly heads. Whilst academic researchers 
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express strong reservations about the opinion poll as a serious tool, 
such coolness is not in evidence when it comes to survey research, a 
close relative, which shares all its fundamental methodological 
assumptions. 
In fact, a positively glowing account of the beauty and potential 
of survey research for political psychology is presented by Hyman (1973)" 
He begins by arguing that since McClosky (1967) states that surveys are 
good for political science and Katz (1967) reasons the same for psychology, 
then they must be good for political psychology. He claims that Katz's 
paper "fills one with expectations of the better psychology that could be 
founded upon the creative use of survey methods". (p. 323) He goes on 
to lay down his criteria for surveys: they must contain "a large number 
of people, selected by rigorous sampling, conducted in normal life 
settings by explicit, standardized procedures yielding quantitative 
results". (p. 324) He argues that both survey staff and the standardiza- 
tion of measurements must be rigidly controlled, but at the same time 
claims that the survey technique, by approaching subjects in their 
normal environment is much more "naturalistic" than laboratory experiments. 
Hyman justifies the necessity for quantitative measurement not only 
because it can deal with the mass of data generated, but because "it 
also makes for exactitude of description and permits a great many 
statistical and analytic procedures to be applied". (p. 325) While he 
admits that some important details may "slip through the net" because 
surveys are too "large, rigid and cast over too wide an area", he none 
the less argues that they are to be preferred to smaller, more sensitive 
studies because one can generalize and predict from surveys but not from 
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small scale studies. Hyman sums up the technique: 
The national survey - better yet, the survey of several 
national populations - approaches the study of mankind 
in all it's generality, describes humans over the widest 
range of social contexts. Thus it is a form of inquiry 
to be cherished. (p. 327) 
Describing the results of a survey, he says, "By the power of words 
and memory, the respondent's past, present and view of the future can be 
encompassed in the lavish list of questions". (p. 334) He suggests 
building into the survey rating scales, TAT's, story completions, graphic 
material and projective tests. "The examples presented are not typical 
of the routine, unimaginative survey. But in the hands of ingenious 
investigators, the survey is an instrument that is most pliable". (p. 337) 
He does note, I am pleased to add, that surveys should be based on good 
hypotheses. 
Despite his plea for creativity, Hyman fails to demonstrate how his 
new, sensitive surveys differ in any fundamental way at a technical level 
from the old, routine, unimaginative brand, and therefore, the criticisms 
made earlier of opinion polls must still apply. Even in his own terms, 
he compounds his problems by advising the addition of various projective 
techniques without explaining how these could be analyzed on such a 
large scale with any degree of reliability, while at the same time 
conforming to his "rigidly controlled" standards of measurement. 
A more fundamental error derives from Hyman's strong preference for 
the ability to generalize to large populations, which he feels accrues 
from large, controlled samples and a sterile technique, over the 
discoveries which he admits can be made in small, well organized subjective 
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studies. Because he believes that he is launched on a scientific 
endeavour, he provides no self-defence (in the form of awareness of 
the danger) against the subjective judgements which must go into the 
design of the questions and the interpretation of the results, however 
purely statistical and therefore superficially objective the design 
may appear to be. It is only by recognizing, and controlling 
subjectivity that it can be successfully combated and creatively 
employed. 
Hyman also gives no indication of being aware that while a person 
is capable of giving a response to questions asked in a survey because 
they are asked, it is not justifiable to further infer that these answers 
represent his conceptual framework about an issue, or even that he thinks 
about the issue in the terms posed by the question at all. 
With these important limitations upon the utility of survey techni- 
que, the ability to generalize from the results is useless, unless and 
until what these results actually represent can be clearly and reliably 
established. The individuals involved in these grand surveys of 
"several nations" may be answering questions otherwise irrelevant to 
them, only for the simple reason that they were asked. To then apply 
"a great many statistical and analytical procedures" to draw conclusions 
from these answers can only compound the existing error, and in the long 
run, international misunderstanding. 
Another source of error in survey technique arises out of its 
treatment of "don't know" responses. Because a question is meaningless 
to an individual, it does not necessarily follow that he has no opinion 
on the topic about which the question was asked. Yet this is the 
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interpretation often given in the analysis of a survey. The irrelevance 
of the poll or survey question to the individual may in part account for 
the high proportion of "don't know" responses reported in studies about 
the Common Market (Butler and Stokes, 1969; Hodder-Williams, 1970). The 
individuals in this category did not have an opinion about the question 
they were asked, but may have had important opinions related to the Common 
Market issue about which they were not questioned. They may not have 
developed their conceptual framework about the Common Market to the point 
where they could say "yes, we should go in", or "no, we should stay out", 
but this is not grounds for the researcher to say that theindividual had 
no opinion at all. 
It is this point that also precludes the use of such standard techni- 
ques for studying attitudes as the semantic differential (Osgood, Suci 
and Tannenbaum, 1957). In this technique the individual could easily go 
through the test, rating the bipolar adjectives the researcher has chosen 
to define a concept, and yet actually not come across any terms in which 
he actually defines his own semantic space for the concept. Because he 
has given "answers" to the "questions" asked, his semantic space is then 
defined, statistically and scientifically, in what may be totally irrelevant 
terms, to the complete satisfaction of both the researcher and his theory. 
A good pilot study may go some way towards providing generally relevant 
scales, but the technique contains no safeguard which would insure speci- 
fic applicability for every case, or the means to know when the scales 
are not relevant. 
This same argument applies to such other attitude scaling techniques 
as the Likert (1932), Guttman (1950), and Thurstone (1929) scales. They 
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may have internal consistency within themselves, but offer no guarantee 
of revealing the internal consistency of the subject. 
In this study, the primary problem was to discover what attitudes 
there were about the Common Market, especially those held by opinion 
leaders. It should be clear from the discussion above that survey 
technique leaves too many loopholes through which attitudes can slip 
to be of use in an investigative study. It also becomes clear that what 
is needed is an "ipsative" technique, that is, one which allows the 
holder of an attitude the greatest possible latitude to choose the terms 
in which he will define his attitude and to reject inappropriate terms 
and concepts. 
Knutson (1973-c-) suggests that a profitable way of studying-political 
attitudes is through the development of projective techniques, but warns 
that they reveal only "slices of behaviour", and thus their utility rests 
on the inferences made about the behavioural segments. But it is here 
that psychology and particularly personality theory, is lacking. Thus 
this deficiency is felt equally in all other forms of behaviour measure- 
ment as well. 
Knutson suggests that projective techniques are a good means by which 
to examine more closely relationships which have already been documented 
by other techniques, and therefore feels that they have shown most value 
in investigating such problems as ethnocentrism. The techniques as they 
stand are not sufficiently developed to reveal all components of an 
undefined attitude, even if psychologists could agree on an interpretation 
of the results the techniques produce. Projective techniques would not 
have been suitable for this study which is of an exploratory nature. 
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For example, although I might have hypothesised that ethnocentrism 
formed an important component in some individual's attitude about the 
Common Market, no one is likely to argue that it is the only component 
or even that it is a factor in everyone's attitude. Therefore it is 
necessary to find a technique which will provide the greatest possibility 
for discovery while still maintaining the necessary control over the data. 
In the next chapter it will be argued that for the purposes of this 
study, Q-Methodology provides an "ipsative" technique in which the 
individual is able to choose the terms in which he will model his attitude 
about the Common Market, while at the same time providing a reliable 
means for the measurement and interpretation of the results. 
4. THEORIES OF SOCIAL JUDGEMENT 
In the discussion about opinion leaders or "influentials" earlier 
in this chapter, it was argued that their most obvious and perhaps their 
most important function in the formation of public opinion was in their 
role as gatekeepers. The opinion leaders had access to sources of 
information not readily available to the general public. Furthermore, 
in some instances they were seen as sources of news themselves because 
of their influential position or because of some special knowledge they 
might possess about the issue. In any case, they were privy to many 
channels of information and what they passed on to the public in certain 
quarters and at certain times was viewed as factual information. The 
key question in this process of the flow of information is how the opinion 
leaders who filter the material before passing it on to the public judge 
the information. Presumably, if they see the information as extreme, 
ýt 
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they will present is as such, whereas if they judge material to be factual 
and useful, this too will influence the manner in which they pass it along 
to the public. The necessity of understanding this gatekeeping function 
of opinion leaders leads to an examination of the theories of social 
judgement which might help to explain the process. 
The pioneering work on a theory of social judgement began when 
Thurstone and Cave published their assertion in 1929 that a properly 
constructed, valid rating scale would not be influenced by the attitude 
of the subject. This generated a plethora of data, some of it supporting 
Thurstone and Cave (Beyle, 1932; Hinckly, 1932,1963; Eysenck and 
Crown, 1949), while others argued that an individual's attitude did 
influence his judgement. (Hovland and Sherif, 1952; Mauis, 1960; Upshaw, 
1962; Zavalloni and Cook, 1965; Ward, 1966). 
One approach to the problem of how judgements are made has been in 
the area of psychophysics. Here the assumption is that after judgements 
are made about some physical continuum, such as a series of weights or 
lines of various lengths, then the relationship between the psychological 
aspect (the apparent weight to the judge) and the physical aspect (the 
actual weight of the object) can be established. A number of theories 
grew out of this "absolute judgement" approach, including the adaptation 
level theory of Helson (1964), Volkman's (1951) Rubber-band theory and 
Parducci's (1965) Range-frequency model. 
Stroebe (1971) criticises all of these psychophysically based 
models on the grounds that they cannot predict the behaviour of judges 
when faced with attitude rating scales. He suggests that this is because 
the psychophysical judgement research from which these theories grew 
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varied only on the judgemental dimension (polarities such as favourable - 
unfavourable) whereas attitude statements vary in a number of dimensions, 
and not just the dimension being rated. He also suggests that, "if 
principles which could account for the effects of this incidental stimulus 
variation on attitude ratings could be incorporated into psychophysical 
models, the predictive qualities of these models could be improved 
considerably". (p. 419) 
Another approach using psychophysical judgements which differs from 
the theories based on unidimensional judgement effects is one which 
focuses on incidental stimulus variation. This is referred to as 
"accentuation theory" (Eiser and Stroebe, 1972) and was first proposed 
by Tajfel (1959). 
He suggests that: 
When a classification in terms of an attribute other than the 
physical dimension which is being judged is superimposed on a 
series of stimuli in such a way that one part of the physical 
series tends to fall consistently into one class, and the other 
into the other class, judgements of the physical magnitudes of 
the stimuli falling into distinct classes will show a shift in 
the directions determined by the class membership of the 
stimuli, when compared with judgements of a series identical 
with respect to this physical dimension, on which such a classi- 
fication is not superimposed. When a classification in terms 
of an attribute other than the physical dimension which is 
being judged is superimposed on a series of stimuli, and the 
changes in the physical magnitudes of the stimuli bear no 
consistent relationship to the assignment of the stimuli to 
the distinct classes, this classification will have no effect 
on the judged relationship in the physical dimension between 
the stimuli of the series. (pp. 20-22) 
This predicts that if, for example, a series of weights are painted 
in shades of a colour, consistently correlated with the weight, then the 
difference between each class of weights will be seen as larger. Tajfel 
and Wilkes (1963) further hypothesized that given a series with a super- 
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imposed peripheral dimension, which is consistently correlated with the 
focal dimension, then the differences within classes would appear smaller. 
When they tested this hypothesis, along with that of Tajfel (1959), while 
they were able to show that the differences between classes were 
accentuated, their findings failed to establish at a significant level 
that differences within classes were seen as smaller. 
Tajfel, Sheikh and Gardner (1964) applied the Tajfel and Wilkes 
(1963) hypothesis (that differences would be minimized within groups) to 
a study of how individuals viewed stereotyped characteristics within 
ethnic groups. They found that there was a "minimization of the differences 
between members of an ethnic group on traits which subjectively characterize 
that group". (p. 199). Eiser and Stroebe (1972) in reviewing this study 
and the possible criticisms that could be made of the research design 
tentatively suggest: 
The extreme indeterminacy of the positions of each of the 
four stimulus persons on the various dimensions, combined 
with a highly discriminable classification, may have 
contributed to the reduction of intraclass differences which 
Tajfel et al (1964) found. This would imply that one might 
expect ä reduction of intraclass differences only under 
conditions of low focal and high peripheral discriminability, 
but that one might still expect an accentuation of interclass 
differences under conditions where the proportion of peri- 
pheral to focal discriminability was too low for a reduction 
of intraclass differences to occur. (p. 61) 
Another approach to judgement theory has been in the "assimilation- 
contrast" model first set out by Hovland . ; fi 
(1957). They 
proposed that an individual's own attitude about an issue forms an 
internal anchor or basis from which he can judge communications about 
the issue. If the communication is close to the person's own stand on 
the issue he will see it as favourable, fair and factual. As the distance 
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from the anchor is increased, the communications appear less and less 
favourable until a widely divergent communication is seen as unfavourable 
and unfair. An individual whose own stand is very different from the 
view expressed in a communication will see it as being farther away from 
his own stand than it really is ("contrast effect"), while if the communi- 
cation is close to his own stand, he will perceive it as being closer than 
it actually is ("assimilation effect"). They suggest that if a communication 
advocates a position very different from a person's own position, the most 
usual response would be for the person's attitude to remain unchanged. 
Individuals with moderate views receiving communications closer to their 
own position would be the most likely to change in the direction the 
communication advocated. 
Elaborating on the theory, Sherif and Hovland (1961) suggested that 
a person's stand on an issue encompasses a "latitude of acceptance", which 
is a range of acceptable positions, and a "latitude of rejection", a range 
of unacceptable positions. Between the two there is a "latitude of 
neutrality". 
If the individual is highly involved in an issue, his latitude of 
acceptance for communications about that issue would tend to be narrower, 
and his latitude of rejection broader. The reverse would apply to an 
individual with low involvement on an issue. (Sherif and Hovland, 1961). 
Working with the judgement of statements by the equal-appearing 
intervals method, Sherif later suggests that: 
The evaluation, or placement of communications were 
shown ... to be a function of the degree of a person's 
involvement ... Operationally, in the present approach, 
degree of involvement is established through the 
relative restriction and extension of the subject's 
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latitude of acceptance and latitude of rejection. 
(Sherif, Sherif and Nebergall, 1965, p. 220) 
They feel that the more highly involved an individual is in an 
issue, the fewer the judgement categories he will use in judging state- 
ments about the issue. Their prediction for the effectiveness of a 
communication from this is that for a communication on a low involvement 
issue falling within a person's latitude of acceptance, the greater the 
amount of change advocated by the communication, the greater will be the 
change obtained. (Sherif, Sherif and Nebergall, 1965). 
In a replication of Hovland and Sherif's study of attitudes towards 
Negroes on which this material was based, Zavalloni and Cook (1965) 
endorsed Hovland and Sherif's central hypothesis that an individual's 
judgement of social issues is influenced by his attitudes towards the 
issues, but they found a tendency for pro-Negro individuals to give more 
extreme ratings than did individuals with anti-Negro views. That is, 
they found assimilation-contrast effects for the pro-Negro but not for 
the anti-Negro judges. 
This finding was confirmed in Upshaw's (1962) study also using 
attitudes about Negroes, and in User's (1971-a) study of attitudes about 
drug use. Eiser found that individuals with "permissive" views about the 
use of drugs used significantly more polarized judgements than did 
individuals with "restrictive" views about drugs. 
Mania (1960,1961) in studies of attitudes to the college fraternity 
system, obtained results which he felt to be completely in agreement with 
Hovland and Sherif's assimilation-contrast theory. His findings showed 
that individuals who were very pro-fraternity as well as individuals who 
were very anti-fraternity gave more polarized judgements than individuals 
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who were neutral on the fraternity issue. 
Mania (1964) suggests that the reason that the results obtained 
by Upshaw (1962) were not completely consistent with assimilation- 
contrast predictions was due to the failure to include subjects with 
as strongly anti-Negro views as compared to the strength of the views 
of the pro-Negro judges. He proposes that the anti-Negro judges were 
more to the middle of the pro-anti scale and therefore only assimilated 
statements as none were far enough from their own position to be 
contrasted. Eiser and Stroebe (1972), while accepting Mania' comment on 
Upshaw's study, did not feel that it applied to the Zavalloni and Cook 
study. They reasoned that Zavalloni and Cook's anti-Negro judges were 
sufficiently "anti" to be valid because they 
were 'pledges' of fraternities known to have led a campaign 
against admission of Negro students to the university. 
Although it is possible that these subjects did not hold as 
extreme attitudes as the most pro-Negro subjects, their 
attitude position should have been more extreme than those 
of the two groups in the study ... with moderate attitude 
positions. (Eiser and Stroebe, 1972, p. 136) 
These pledges were found to give less polarized judgements than the 
moderate group of judges. This justification of the Zavalloni and Cook 
finding does not completely satisfy the present writer for whornthe fact 
that the extreme anti-Negro subjects were fraternity pledges immediately 
raises the question of whether the pledges participated in the campaign 
because of fervent commitment to the segregationist cause, or, as seems 
likely at least in some of the cases, because they were required to do so 
as a 'pledge duty'. In any case, membership in a segregational fraternity 
does not necessarily imply anti-Negro attitudes at their most biggoted 
extremes. This also raises the question of the possible connotations 
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attached to the "anti-Negro" end of the scale. It was not unusual in 
the Deep South in the 1960's to hear statements like, "I'm not anti-Negro, 
I'm just against having them in my school/church/neighbourhood". 
At best, the pro-anti-Negro question seems a risky one to use to test 
this theory because of the difficulty in finding representative judges 
(especially within a university context), and relevant statements, and in 
controlling for the current social stigma in academic communities in the 
United States where these studies were done against expressing blatant 
anti-Negro views. 
Esser, in the light of Manis' comment on Upshaw's work, re-analyzed 
the ratings of his "restrictive" judges (Eiser, 19714 and found that his 
most extreme restrictive judges gave less polarized ratings than his 
moderately restrictive judges, although the differences were not statis- 
tically significant (Eiser and Stroebe, 1972). This does not, however, 
take into account another possible intervening variable which could be the 
effect of the negative connotations of the term 'restrictive' on the 
ratings by a 'restrictive' judge. 
This problem was taken up by Eiser (1973) in another study of 
attitudes to drug use in which he showed that the connotations of the 
terms used to label the judgement scale had an effect on the influence of 
subjects' attitudes on their judgement about the issue. Eiser and 
Mower White (19744 found that 
the perceived value connotations of the judgement scale 
terms (a) may effect the relationship between judges' 
attitudes and polarization of judgement, (b) may influence 
the mean judgement of a series of attitude statements, and 
(c) may themselves be different for judges with different 
attitudes. (p. 357) 
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In another study of boys' and girls' attitudes to adult authority, 
Eiser and Mower White (1975) confirmed these findings and stated, "It is 
our contention that ... these results reflect a common principle, that 
categorization processes depend on congruity between stimulus attributes 
and the language in which the judgements are expressed". (p. 774) 
However, Eiser (1971, b) suggested that neither this assimilation- 
contrast model, nor the adaption-level theory proposed by Nelson (1964) 
provides adequate explanation for the relationship between social judge- 
ment and attitude organization: 
Perhaps one of the more important implications of this 
relationship is the possibility that individuals with 
different attitudes on an issue may see different 
dimensions of that issue as salient ... If this can be 
confirmed and generalized to other issues, it calls to 
question the view that individuals with different 
attitudes differ simply along a dimension of favour- 
ability to unfavourability; rather they may differ in 
terms of the total frames of reference according to 
which they see the issue in question, in which case a 
description of an individual's frame of reference as 
such may tell one far more about his 'attitude' than 
would any mere measure of favourability. (pp. 450-451) 
In exploring the question of why different dimensions will be 
salient to different people, Eiser and Stroebe (1972) suggest that there 
may be two factors at play. They feel that the first may be found in 
Sherif et. al. 's (1965) notion of the relationship of involvement to 
attitude change, wherein "the individual's self-esteem is somehow 
bound up with and committed to a particular position on the issue in 
question, so that a challenge to an individual's attitude on that 
issue represents a challenge to the individual himself". (Eiser and 
Stroebe, 1972, p. 211) 
The second factor they find useful is Tajfel's concept of 
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"dimensional salience" and "value". Tajfel predicts greater polarization 
of judgements along a focal dimension if a value is associated with an 
attribute, thereby increasing the salience of the attribute. The 
increase in polarization is greater because the associated value is 
supposed to have "emotional significance". 
Thus, the greater the 'value differential' of a given 
dimension (i. e. the more differences along that 
dimension are systematically related to differences in 
value), the more salient is that dimension. This implies 
in other words, that a salient dimension is par excellence 
a dimension that is relevant to an individual's evaluations 
of the stimuli he is required to judge. (Eiar and Stwebe, 19? t, p"211) 
Esser (1971, b) seeks explanation for the phenomena in terms of the 
theories of cognitive consistency which 
embody the assumption that the dimensions an individual 
will tend to regard as most salient in any given 
situation will be directly related to his own evaluations 
of the concepts considered, and will be such that his 
evaluation of his own position is most securely positive. 
Eiser and Mower White (1974, b) propose an interesting application 
of the hypothesis when they suggest: 
It seems plausible, however, (at any rate judging from 
the speeches of many politicians), that a major function 
of persuasive communications may be to render salient 
certain aspects of an issue as opposed to others, and to 
provide the listener with a particular frame of reference 
so that he will interpret the facts presented to him in 
the manner advocated by the communicator. (p. 91) 
The rationale applied to these findings (Eiser and Mower White, 
1974,1975) was that individuals tend to seek simpler rather than more 
complex frames of reference in which to place their cognitions, whether 
the explanation for process comes in terms of one of the cognitive 
consistency theories such as the principle of congruity, or in terms of 
the principle of categorization which emphasizes the relationship between 
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social and psychophysical judgement. 
The principle of categorization holds that polarization occurs 
because of "judges accentuating the differences between stimuli which 
differ in terms of a peripheral attribute which is correlated with a focal 
attribute ... " 
(Eiser and Mower White, 1975, pp. 772-773). The principle 
of congruity explains polarization in terms of individuals trying to 
organize their cognitions in the least complicated manner, and therefore 
tending to see items with which they agree in a positive light, and 
items with which they disagree in a negative light. (Eiser and 
Mower White, 1975). 
They concluded, 
The overall tendency for judges with more extreme attitudes 
to give more polarized ratings when all scales are averaged 
together is precisely the effect which would be predicted 
for any scales taken singly by the 'assimilation-contrast' 
model of Sherif and Hovland (1961), and by our own 
categorization principle for any scale which was free of 
evaluative bias. Although most previous research has 
failed to demonstrate a straight forward relationship 
between extremity of attitude and polarization of judge- 
ment, it has also failed to control directly for any such 
evaluative bias in the response language employed. For 
reasons such as these, we feel that a consideration of 
semantic factors must be an integral part of any adequate 
theory of social judgement. 
(Eiser and Mower White, 1975, p"774) 
Eiser and Stroebe (1972) re-examined and reinterpreted the results 
obtained by Sherif and Hovland, Manis, and Zavalloni and Cook discussed 
earlier in this chapter in the light of accentuation theory. They 
predict that 
when the continuum is labelled in such a way that one end 
of the scale is marked by a term with relatively positive 
value connotations and the other end marked by a term with 
relatively negative value connotations, individuals whose 
own positions lie closest to the positive end of the scale 
85 
should give the most polarized ratings whilst those 
whose own positions lie closest to the negative end 
of the scale should give least polarized ratings. 
This involves the assumption that individuals will 
tend to perform the judgement task in such a way as 
to maintain and/or present a positive self-image. (p. 168) 
They submit studies to support this prediction and suggest that 
"such differences in polarization cannot be completely attributed to any 
hypothesized individual differences in categorizing style". (p. 168) 
While Eiser and Stroebe do not claim that the accentuation theory 
approach will explain all the phenomena observed in social judgement, 
they do feel that 
the notion that individuals attempt to present or perceive 
themselves in positive terms implies that they should tend 
to present or perceive their own positions as lying closer 
to the centre of the underlying psychological continuum 
than they 'really' are, if it is assumed that the extreme 
positions tend to be negatively evaluated. If this were 
so, then an inverse relationship between own position and 
overall mean judgement would be predicted without having 
to postulate the operation of any adaptation processes. (p. 170) 
Further support for this approach was provided by Osmon and 
Mower White (1977) who found that not only did judges give more polarized 
ratings when they found the scale used relevant to the particular aspect 
of the issue dealt with by the attitude statement being judged, but also 
that the individuals tended to give more extreme judgements to statements 
which emphasised an aspect of the issue in which they had a particular 
interest. 
They conclude that 
the present study implies that meaningfulness is 
determined by the particular frame of reference. 
Therefore it appears that the concept of 'dimensional 
salience' may either be applied to rating scales or 
issues. The main point of the study is to emphasize 
both meanings of concept. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In reviewing the material contained in this section, it becomes 
apparent that fifty years of research has not gotten psychology much further 
down the road to an understanding of the "mechanism" of social judgement 
(if indeed, there is such a "mechanism"). Eiser and Mower'White's (1975) 
warning about the value of work which failed to take semantic factors in 
the judgement scales into account, places the validity of the theories 
based on this work in serious doubt. I would level a perhaps more serious 
and certainly more fundamental charge against many of the studies on 
which social judgement theory is based. The psychologists conducting 
these studies seem far too ready to rely on their local student population 
for their subjects; yet they do not show whether the extreme opinions on 
the issues they are testing actually exist in this atypical population, 
nor whether these issues are relevant to their subjects. Furthermore, at 
least in the United States, the "volunteers" for these studies are often 
required to participate in a given number of experiments each term for 
their undergraduate psychology courses. This was certainly true in the 
university where I followed undergraduate psychology. Other experimenters 
pay their subjects. Yet in none of these studies are we told how these 
sampling procedures may have introduced bias into the results, or even 
that the experimenter is aware of the possibility. Yet Socrates knew that 
knowleage of ignorance is the beginning of wisdom. 
So the result of this review of current social judgement theories 
is sombre. All are more - or less - flawed; many in fundamental ways. 
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The only potentially profitable approach was found in User's (1971, b) 
article. He suggested that: 
individuals with different attitudes on an issue may 
see different dimensions of that issue as salient ... If this can be confirmed and generalized to other 
issues, it calls to question the view that individuals 
with different attitudes differ simply along a dimension 
of favourability to unfavourability; rather they may 
differ in terms of the total frames of reference 
according to which they see the issue in question ... p. 450 
I have found this observation fruitful and, as will be seen below, the 
present research carries it further. 
From the sheer number of theories and methods reviewed in this 
chapter, it should be apparent to the reader that human behaviour is not 
a phenomenon that can be reduced to a pure science or explained by a 
monolithic theory, no matter how elaborate. I would argue that instead 
of spending time trying to legitimate complex theories, the psychologist 
should take a more open view of his subject and work in a manner which 
will allow him to make discoveries leading to understanding, rather than 
accumulating facts which may in the end lead up the garden path. 
CHAPTER III 
Q-METHODOLOGY 
This chapter begins with a brief history and definition of 
Q-methodology as it was developed by William Stephenson. It then moves 
on to explore the theoretical background of the methodology. This is 
followed by a detailed explanation of the technique employed by 
Q-methodology, and the chapter ends with a study of the criticisms and 
defences made of it. 
1. HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION 
In the 1920's and 1930's, when "factor analysis" was in its 
infancy, one of the problems to attract investigators was the possibility 
of performing correlations between persons rather than the standard 
procedure of correlating tests. For the most part they explored the 
periphery of the idea and then dropped it. Then, in 1935 Stephenson (1935) 
and Thomson (1935) independently and almost at the same time, focused their 
attention precisely on the problem of the correlation between persons. (Burt, 1972) 
It is Stephenson, however, who deserves the credit for following the exercise 
through to its logical conclusion, and for evolving a concrete methodology 
consisting of a number of related techniques. This methodology he called 
"Q" to distinguish it from "R", which correlates traits or tests, and set 
it forth in his definitive work on the subject, The Study of Behaviour 
(Stephenson, 1953).. 
It is interesting to note that the seeds of the methodology which 
were germinated at University College, London and later at Oxford, only 
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came to full fruition when transplanted across the Atlantic after the 
last war to the University of Chicago. One of his Chicago students has 
written: 
There was a natural fit between William Stephenson and the 
University of Chicago in his period of teaching there. In 
part the fit was due to the fact that Q methodology provided 
an approach to the questions being asked at Chicago. A 
quantitative approach for dealing with the subjective and 
the qualitative, with the individual case as well as with 
populations, combining hypothetics - deductive and inductive 
methods of inquiry, had an almost magical appeal for many of 
us interested in social, personality and clinical psychology. 
(Kohlberg, 1972, pp. xi-xii) 
Stephenson and his students have applied the methodology to problems 
in a number of areas in psychology and psychiatry. It has been used to 
study the structure of self-concept, and the changes this may undergo 
during normal living and under the influence of psychotherapy. In the 
psychoanalytic field, "... Q technique suggested a firm approach for 
studying the relations between the conscious structure of the self, 
represented in Q-sort self reports, and unconscious dynamics inferred 
from projective tests and psychiatric interviews". (Kohlberg, 1972, p. xii) 
Another avenue of exploration was in the relation between personality and 
the structures of various environments. Stephenson (1972, b) and others 
also applied the methodology to the problems of the logic of interpretation 
of art and literature. When Stephenson moved on to the University of 
Missouri in 1958, he introduced the methodology into the study of communi- 
cations and the broader reaches of attitude research. ($tePhenson, 197z. Ri 
Fundamental to Q methodology is the determination of clusters (patterns) 
of persons or "factors". The methodology is based on a card sorting 
technique which forces responses into a pre-established distribution. 
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When a number of people perform the same Q-sort, the results are factor 
analyzed to yield factors of individuals who have sorted the cards in a 
statistically similar fashion. When Q methodology is used in single case 
studies (Stephenson, 1974; Block, 1961), for example, in personality 
assessment, or in psychiatric research, other statistical methods of 
analysis are applied to the resulting sorts. 
Stephenson (1967) describes his technique as follows: 
This miniscule procedure calls upon the individual to 
model his subjectivity (such as his attitude of mind 
about a matter) in the form of distributions of scores 
which are subjective to him but which again are subject 
to the law of error. A basis is provided in this way 
for measurement of anything subjective to the person ... 
All scores are pure numbers; all are standard scores (mean 0, 
standard deviation 1.0). They are relative to a parent 
population of statements (and not to individuals) ... But, 
most important, the scores given to the statements by 
different individuals are comparable - the zero on all 
scales is the same absolute value for everyone. (p. 11) 
Before embarking on a more detailed explanation of -methodology 
and the application of its techniques, it might perhaps be helpful to 
the reader to have a grounding in the theory that underlies them. 
2. UNDERLYING THEORY 
In the general excitement that surrounded the introduction of the 
idea of correlating persons rather than tests, there were a number of 
critical voices which claimed that Q factorization, after all, was 
nothing more than the reciprocal of standard or R factorization. 
(Brunswik, 1944; Cattell, 1951; Thomson, 1951; Eysenck, 1953). Their 
argument ran that if one had more persons than tests in a study, one 
correlated the tests down the rows of the factor matrix and had aR 
91 
factorization, while if there were more tests than persons, one would 
correlate the persons along the columns of the same matrix and have a 
Q analysis. This, Stephenson (1953) argues, is not the case and subsequent 
research has indicated that he is correct. (Brown, 1968, and 1972). If 
Q were merely the reciprocal of R factorization, it hardly would be right 
to call Qa methodology, and I could end this chapter here by referring 
the reader to a standard text on factor analysis and suggesting that he 
read it held at a 90 degree angle. 
Stephenson's argument is that R methodologists who become worried by 
the question whether Q is the reciprocal or the inverse or the transpose 
of R apparently have missed the point. Q, as he devised it, is none of 
these because Q-methodology, properly applied, deals with completely 
different sorts of data than does R, and the question of using the same 
factor matrix in different ways should never arise. Stephenson (1952) wrote, 
"R and Q always involve two quite different, and singly centered, tables 
of correlations, each subserved by its own distinctive quantitative and 
qualitative principles". (p. 484) 
The important difference between R and Q lies not in factor matrices, 
but in their basic approach to human psychology. The realm of R is the 
objective world and its fodder is the things which R methodologists feel 
can be measured scientifically - traits, abilities, intelligence, 
anxiety. The Q methodologist, on the other hand, is interested in what 
the individual he is studying feels about things - his is the subjective 
world. This mere mention of subjectivity is usually enough to bring 
fresh protests from the R methodologists, and the arguments often become 
bogged down in misunderstood semantics before any solid commonground of 
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understanding can be reached. The R methodologist, as Brown (1972) 
describes him 
... is accustomed to thinking of subjectivity in a 
statistical way. Subjectivity is what remains of 
an individual's objective test performances after 
all sources of variance attributable to the common 
factors have been partialled out. Subjectivity is 
but idiosyncracy, random error, an accident. As 
such, it is to some extent unreliable and uncorrelated 
with anything else, and as a consequence hardly seems 
an appropriate subject matter for scientific scrutiny. (pp. 61-62) 
In other words, subjectivity is "noise". For Stephenson and the Q 
methodologist, however, 
... subjectivity is merely a person's own point of view - 
what the individual himself was willing to say, to himself 
or to others - made objective (i. e. public) through formal 
representation in aQ sort. As such, subjective response 
was not what was left over after the factoring process; 
the factors themselves were the categories of response. 
(Brown, 1972, p. 62) 
What Stephenson was arguing for, and what he developed Q-methodology 
to undertake, was a fresh approach to the study of psychology in which 
the individual was central, and the psychologist tries to come to some 
understanding of him, rather than amassing what the R methodologist 
would call objective facts about him. Stephenson (1972, c) suggested 
that "with facts the scientist seeks to change the world outside him; 
with understandings he may be glad to leave things outside him as they 
are". (p. 2) 
Stephenson (1972, b) argues that if one wants to understand what 
people are thinking about on an issue, the only logical thing to do is to 
ask them. This, whilst perhaps not producing a completely full picture 
of the attitude involved, at least gives the investigator the beginnings 
of an understanding of what is important to the individual, and what 
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avenues it would be fruitful to pursue. When people talk about their 
attitudes and feelings about an issue, they often describe them in terms 
of the opinions they hold about it. Stephenson (1972, c) writes of these 
subjective opinions: 
There is only one difference between opinions so regarded and 
facts in the objective world; it is not that they the opinions 
are mental, psychical phenomenological, consciousness, or the 
like, but merely that only the individual himself can observe 
and measure them, whereas it is the sine qua non of objectivity 
that everyone (or machines) can make observations and measure- 
ments (in principle). (p. 22) 
The R methodologist, championing the objective cause in psychology, 
relies on the hypothetico - deductive method to test his theories. The 
Q methodologist argues that while it may be deceptively easy to prove a 
theory by these means, they pay little regard to the problem of whether 
that theory was in fact the one which should have been examined to 
arrive at an understanding of the phenomenon which it maintains that it 
explains. (Stephenson, 1967) 
Stephenson (1967) argues that in R-methodology 
self-reference is everywhere overlooked ... 
A profound and basic error is made in R-method to 
achieve objectivity; it measures ideas, attitudes, 
beliefs, opinions, and so on categorically, that is, 
as abstractions - oblivious of the self-reference 
which attaches to all such matters. (p. 11) 
Stephenson (1972, a) suggested that in place of these deductive 
procedures, one should adopt an "abductive" approach in which the 
individual under observation is central and himself plays a guiding 
part in the process of revealing his attitudes, feelings and the 
like. Stephenson explained that in terms of his proposition, "an 
abduction is not a logical statement of a theory: it is a guess that 
along certain lines discoveries are highly probable". (p. 29) But 
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this was not to say that one should engage in mere speculation about a 
topic or line of reasoning. Rather, he suggested, an orderly observation 
should be made through the use of Q-methodology, based on the study of 
single cases either as an end in themselves, or as the groundwork for 
understanding more complex interrelationships. 
Brown (1972) argued that Stephenson's emphasis on subjectivity and 
abduction has been a stumbling block for many researchers who otherwise 
might have employed Q-methodology successfully to solve their problems. 
However, they have been immersed in the rhetoric of scientific method 
so that the mention of "subjectivity" immediately puts them on the 
defensive. If they had looked a bit farther, they might have seen that 
whereas Stephenson was well trained in physics and psychometrics 
(and therefore knew his science), he also had the sensitivities 
of a clinician and was aware of the realities of subjectivity. 
The problem he posed for himself, therefore, was how to apply 
the principles of the former to the realities of the latter. 
As he said at one point, one of the problems he set out to 
solve was how to bring the method of physics into the realm 
of personality measurement ... (Stephenson, 1936, d, p. 299) 
One could not advance a science of subjective behavior, or so he 
believed, by denying its existence. (Brown, 1972, p. 59) 
Stephenson was at pains to emphasize that because the areas of 
human behaviour he chose to study were termed "subjective" because they 
were central to the individual himself, it was not to say that this 
behaviour did not follow some orderly design, nor that it was impossible 
to study it in a scientific fashion. His task, as he saw it, was to 
study the subjective aspects of behaviour in an objective way and this 
is what he tried to develop Q-methodology to do. 
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3. Q-TECHNIQUE 
In Q-methodology, the individual and the aspects of his attitudes 
and behaviour as he sees and describes them are central. Q therefore 
can be called a "pure" ipsative technique, that is, one in which the 
scores are based on the norm for an individual and in no way are 
affected by the performance of other individuals. (Boverman, 1962). 
Thus, when a number of "Q-sorts" on the same topic are submitted to 
factor analysis, the resulting factors are made up of individuals 
who have sorted the items in a statistically similar fashion, and not 
of tests as in R-methodology. 
This methodology entails a fundamentally different conceptual 
approach from the traditional R method experimental designs, as 
Boverman (1962) explains: 
Ipsative measurement orientation ... assumes that 
each individual is, himself, a universe within 
which variations in behaviour occur. Ipsative 
relationships are frequently ascribed in theory to 
an entire population, i. e. the rules or laws between 
internal psychic events may be generalized to all 
humans. Thus it is not contradictory to seek 
commonly occurring ipsative relationships. (p. 296) 
Q-Population Sampling 
Because Q-methodology focuses on the individual, it requires a 
sampling schedule which reflects this bias towards the individual 
as "a universe within which variations in behaviour occur". For this 
reason, Q does not employ the large random sampling techniques found in 
R-method, but instead relies on small structured samples of people 
chosen to represent different interests on the topic under observation; 
of course, a Q-sample can (and does in clinical studies such as those 
described by Stephenson, 1974) consist of one individual. 
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It is also possible to administer a Q-sort under different 
conditions of instruction to the same person, and then to correlate and 
factor analyze the resulting sorts. (Stephenson, 1974) If the conditions 
of instruction were, for example, "sort the cards as you yourself feel"; 
"as you think your mother would sort them"; "as your best friend would 
sort them", etc., a study of the factor analysis of these sorts would 
reveal, "what is somehow intrinsic to the individual's ... conception 
of himself in contrast to merely what is of him, but not what he really 
identifies with". (Stephenson, 1972, c, p. 15) 
Stephenson (1935) explained the difference between R and Q in 
application at the simplest level thus: 
Whereas previously a large number of people were 
given a small number of tests, now we give a 
small number of people a large number of tests 
or test-items, or require a large number of 
responses from them. (p. 19) 
Typically, there are between fifty and one hundred individuals in 
a Q-population sample. Stephenson (1953) argues that this is 
sufficient due to the nature of the methodology: 
factors found in Q-technique for relatively few persons 
are likely to remain substantially unaltered, under 
certain conditions, no matter how many persons are 
considered. Statistical inferences in Q-technique 
have reference to the intra-individual differences 
between the statements, not to the persons. 
Inferences about the latter and their factors depend 
upon the total scientific situation. (p. 218) 
Because Q is a small sample technique, two points must be given 
careful consideration, one before and the other whilst employing it. 
The first is to decide what one wants to learn by doing the research. 
If the object of the exercise is to collect a mass of specific data 
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which may be immediately generalised to a wide population, then the 
researcher had best go off in search of an appropriate R-technique 
using a traditional large sample method. In Chapter II I have expressed 
my doubts about the usefulness and, indeed, the validity of generalizing 
from the samples of university students and other relatively homogeneous 
groups often used in psychological research, but that is a point on which 
the R methodologist will have to satisfy himself and his readers. 
If, on the other hand, the researcher is interested in his research 
with making discoveries and exploring avenues which might lead to a 
clearer understanding of the attitudes and feelings of groups within the 
population, and is willing to set aside the ability to make precise 
statistical generalisations from his results, then a Q-study may be 
worth considering. Q will not yield information about the proportion of 
the population holding a given attitude, but can be useful in making 
discoveries about general trends in attitudes. 
The second point follows on from the first. Since there are 
relatively few people in the Q population sample, the structure of this 
sample must be carefully and thoughtfully designed to meet the require- 
ments of the research problem. It would be useless to evolve even the 
most elaborate design employing university students or even a random 
sampling from a provincial telephone directory if, in fact, one were 
interested in the views of politicians or journalists or fishermen. 
Because one does not generalise to large populations from a Q_ 
study in the statistical way one does in R-methodology, it is not to 
say that the understanding one has gained is not useful in analyzing 
trends in the population; nor is it to say that a Q-study is not 
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statistically reliable and therefore not capable of replication. 
Stephenson (1953) showed that if the same Q-sort was administered to 
different people selected under the same sort of sampling conditions as 
the first sample, similar factors would emerge. 
In a discussion of the nature of Q-factors, Stephenson (1972, c) 
has argued that: 
Q-factors, that is to say, groups of individuals 
with similar attitudes of mind, are in no 
essential way dependent on the instrumentation: 
different Q-samples, different Q-sort score- 
distributions (forced or unforced) and even 
different conditions of instruction may have 
little intrinsic influence on a factor. (p. 20) 
Support for the assertion that the structure of Q-factors will 
hold over time and different samples comes in the data of a Q-method 
study of the dynamics of the United States public opinion about the war 
in Viet Nam. (Brenner, 1972). In 1967, a Q-sort was administered to a 
structured sample of sixty-six individuals representing experts, 
authorities, "special interest" and uninformed groups on the Viet Nam 
issue. The same Q-sort was given again in 1968 to a sample of forty 
seven people, only twelve of whom were in the 1967 sample. The 1967 and 
1968 data were factor analyzed, and simple structure was approached by 
hand rotation of the factors. The four factors from 1967, along with 
individuals from the 1968 study, came out on four factors very similar 
(in the type of people appearing on them) to those in the 1967 study. 
The differences in the opinions expressed by the comparable factors 
in the two samples can be accounted for by the "dynamic" nature of 
public opinion. (Brenner, 1972) In other words, the progress of events 
over a year will cause shifts in opinions and therefore modifications 
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in the attitudes about the issue, but the types of people on 
each factor were found to shift in similar direction. Thus, "the 
structure was found to hold during the one-year study period, but with 
identifiable and systematic shifts. " (Brenner, 1972, p. 377) 
Brenner states clearly that, "of course, one cannot make statistical 
projections onto populations from such data" (p. 373), but shows in his 
factors for the two years that they can be replicated. 
It is essential that the distinction between "generalisability" and 
reliability be understood if the relevance of Q-methodology is to be 
appreciated and certainly before one tries to make use of the data from 
a Q-sort. 
The Q Universe and Q sample 
The basic tool of Q-sorting is the Q-sample. It is usually composed 
of statements of opinion representing various facets of an issue, but can 
be made up of anything capable of eliciting a response: bits of coloured 
paper, words, photographs, or even perfume bottles, depending on the 
nature of the study to be undertaken. 
Stephenson (1972, c) suggests that a universe of "subjective" 
opinion statements exists for any given issue on which there is public 
opinion. Stephenson uses the word "subjective" to describe statements 
of opinion which are made by one individual and with which other people 
may or may not be able to identify or relate. Such statements often 
begin "I feel, I believe, I think". He uses "subjective" to draw the 
distinction from statements of fact about which an individual might 
likely feel the need for some information before making a positive or 
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negative judgement. The use of the term "subjective statement" with 
reference to the Q-sort does not mean that the person doing the Q-sort 
has actually made the statement, but that he is using the statement to 
express his own feelings. 
Stephenson suggests that these statement universes should be called 
"concourses", 
to remind us that the concern is with conversational 
possibilities, not merely informational. There is a 
concourse for every concept, every declarative state- 
ment, every wish, every object in nature when viewed 
subjectively. (p. 9) 
He goes on to explain that because of the "conversational" nature 
of these opinions, the best way to discover what they are is to ask a 
person or persons to talk about his feelings on the issue. A concourse 
of statements can be gathered from one person, but it is more usual to 
interview ten to twenty selected people who represent various stands on 
the issue under investigation. These interviews are of the type 
commonly referred to as "in-depth", in which the person is encouraged 
to talk for as long as he likes about the aspects of the issue which 
interest him, and with as little intervention by the interviewer as 
possible. 
Stephenson (1967) explains the logic of this method as follows: 
About most events many statements are common to 
different persons, and almost every statement will 
mean something to many others, whether it is 
collected from one or many. (Also, Q-method takes 
care of statements which mean nothing to a person 
by scoring them zero in Q-sorting. ) (p. 15) 
Subjective statements of opinion are drawn from the concourse or 
Q-universe (in practice, represented by an interview or interviews) 
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of statements about the issue under study, and these form the Q-sann le. 
The statement for the Q-sample may be taken from the Q-universe either 
randomly, or as is more usually the case, using a balanced block design. 
(Stephenson, 1967) For statistical reasons, the Q-sample usually 
consists of between sixty and one hundred statements, although it is 
possible to use fewer than sixty statements from a well tested 
universe. (Kerlinger, 1967) 
The Q. -sorting 
Once a Q-sample has been drawn, it is used by the people in the 
population sample to express their own attitude about the issue in 
question - their feelings about something, to show their likes and 
dislikes for certain objects or pictures, or whatever the purpose of the 
study may be. Each person is asked to sort the cards into piles along 
an approximately normal, symmetrical fixed distribution continuum 
using a suitable criterion for the project, such as "agree-disagree", 
"like me-not like me", or "like-dislike". 
A sample distribution for an eleven-point scale with sixty items 
might be as follows (although there is no absolute distribution for any 
given frequency). The researcher is free within reason to choose both 
the number of points on the scale and the distribution he feels will 
best serve the purposes of his project. 

























In practice, it is easier if the person sorting the cards on which 
the statements are printed, first places them in three piless an agree 
(or the appropriate "positive" word of the particular instructions 
used), a disagree and a neutral pile of cards which either do not mean 
anything to him, or he feels ambivalent about, or do not matter to him. 
He can then begin to make the finer distinctions as he works through 
one pile at a time in whatever way he chooses, so long as he fits his 
final piles to the final specified distribution. There is no time limit 
imposed and the person is encouraged to go about the task in what ever 
way best suits him. 
This fixed distribution sorting style is one of the major advantages 
of Q-methodology because it requires the individual to make comparisons 
between all the different items found in the Q-sort, and thus elicits 
specific comparative information without the danger of the individual 
falling into the response sets often found in other techniques. (Nunnally, 1970) 
Obviously, due to the nature of the technique, one does not obtain 
absolute judgements about the items being Q-sorted, but ( should not be 
employed if absolute rather than comparative information is sought. This 
leads to a further argument for using the fixed distribution in Q, which 
is that: 
With the Q-sort if subjects are allowed to put as 
many stimuli as they like in a pile, the method 
begins to regress to the method of single stimuli, 
a method of studying absolute responses ... If one 
wants to have comparative response made with respect 
to all the stimuli in a set, rather than with two at 
a time, as with the method of pair comparisons or in 
other subsets, the mean, standard deviation and curve 
form must be fixed. (Nunnally, 1970, Pp- 448-449) 
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When administering Q-sorts, I have found that even initially 
hostile individuals who at the beginning of the testing claim that it 
would be absolutely impossible to fit their opinions into a fixed 
distribution pattern, soon become absorbed in the sorting process, and 
most report afterwards that they have found it an enjoyable experience. 
Perhaps this lends some credence to Stephenson's (1972, a) argument 
that "the statement of opinion is a matter of communication-pleasure". (p. 25) 
Factor Analysis of the Q-sorts 
Once all of the individuals in the study have completed the 
sorting procedure, the scores given to the statements by the individuals 
are correlated, factored, and the resulting factors are (if desired) 
rotated to a satisfactory solution. The process of correlation, 
factoring, and the initial rotation, by programmes such as Varimax, 
Quartimax, Equimax or Oblique, are done by computer. A discussion of 
the factor analysis package programmes available for the social sciences 
can be found in Nie, Hull, Jenkins, Steinbrenner and Bent (1975). 
Although there is generally a consensus that it is often difficult, 
if not impossible, to interpret the raw data produced by the centroid 
factor solution as it comes from the computer, there is still a lot of 
controversy surrounding the method and theory to be used in rotating 
the factors to produce solutions which are easier to interpret. (Thurstone, 1947) 
The methods of rotation can be divided into two main categories: 
those which employ orthogonal rotations, and those which employ oblique 
rotations. In orthogonal rotations, the angles between the axes are 
kept at 900, which maintains the independence of the two factors being 
rotated. In oblique rotations, on the other hand, the angles between 
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the axes are allowed to assume obtuse or acute angles, thereby 
establishing a correlation between the factors. 
Proponents of oblique rotation tend to argue that it is natural 
to assume that some correlation does exist between the factors, that it 
is easier to adjust the oblique axes to fit the factor structures, and 
that it is easier to approach simple structure (which is discussed below) 
using an oblique rotation. Researchers who use orthogonal rotations do 
so because they feel that it is better to assume independence of the 
factors than to make assumptions about the data (necessary in oblique 
rotations) which might prove misleading and bias the results. Kerlinger (1967) 
maintains that in the end, the choice of method probably boils down to 
the personal taste of the individual researcher. 
The guide many researchers use to aid them in their rotations is 
the concept of "simple structure" described by Thurstone (1947). He 
suggests that in the factor matrix, every row should have at least one 
near-zero loading, and that in every column, there should be at least 
as many near zero loadings as there are factors. When looking at pairs 
of factors, there should be several variables with loadings on one 
factor which do not appear on the other, and there should be only a 
small number of variables with appreciable loadings on both factors. 
Finally, when there are four or more factors, an appreciable proportion 
of the variables should have near-zero loadings on any pair of factors. 
Stephenson (1953) prefers to rotate towards what he calls 
"simplest structure", in order to account for the confounded and unloaded 
variables, as well as the "pure" ones. His aim is to obtain a small 
number of factors accounting for the same data, rather than a solution 
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containing a large number of "pure" Thurstonian variables. 
Where to begin doing rotations by hand is also left to the taste of 
the researcher. Stephenson personally insists on rotating from the 
centroid solution (personal communication to author, 1975), while most 
researchers prefer to allow the computer to take them part of the way 
down a difficult road and begin hand rotations from the rotated solutions 
produced by one of the computer programmes. Varimax, Quartimax and 
Equimax all execute orthogonal rotations, while Oblique, as the name 
suggests, produces oblique rotations. 
Some factor analysts will accept the computer programme's factor 
rotation as it stands, while others would argue with Cattell and Foster 
(1963) that it is always necessary to perform further hand rotations of 
the factor matrixes produced by the computer rotation: 
The trouble is that a lot of researchers-in-a-hurry 
do not stop for this important visual 'polishing' and 
the defects are large enough to upset their factor 
interpretations considerably. This is especially true 
in regard to their understanding of the factor inter- 
correlations and the second order structure. (p. 157) 
From experience, Cattell and Foster suggest that it generally 
requires between four and twenty hand rotations to approach an 
acceptable simple structure when working from a Varimax solution. 
The theories behind the rotation of factors are considerably more 
ambiguous than the methods of achieving them. They can be divided roughly 
into three schools: those, such as Cattell, who believe in a purely 
mathematical procedure; those who feel that the rotation should be based 
on the psychological meaning of the data; and those who come somewhere 
in between the other two. Stephenson's approach falls in the final 
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school as he rotates with an eye for what he considers to be both 
mathematically and judgementally sound solutions. (Thompson, 1962) 
In Q-methodology studies a factor is accepted for examination if it 
contains two or more unconfounded (that is, variables appearing on not 
more than the one factor) significant loadings. (Stephenson, 1967) 
Significance of a factor loading for a given set of data is determined 
by using the Holzinger-Harman table for standard errors. (Harman, 1960) 
Many Q-studies result in only two factors and Stephenson (1972, a and c) 
has argued that: 
Three or four factors are all that most well planned 
studies require; there's something loose in the works 
if anything like ten or so factors are carved out for 
interpretation. The key to sound work, that is to make 
discoveries, is what one puts into Q-method as abductions, 
not what factor analysis turns out deductively. (p. 45) 
The Interpretation of Q-Factors 
Since, in Q-methodology, individuals are factored and not tests, 
Q-factors are made up of people who have performed the Q-sorting on a 
given topic in a statistically similar fashion. One can study the 
common characteristics of the people on the Q-factor, and also the 
shared view they seem to be expressing through their use of the Q-sort. 
This shared view is studied by forming a "composite" Q-sort for the 
factor. 
To do this, the scores given to each item in the Q-sort by the 
individuals on the factor are averaged. This average score then becomes 
the score for that item on the composite Q-sort, and the items can be 
laid out according to the distribution used for the project and studied 
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as if they represented a Q-sort done by the mythical individual who 
could be said to represent the factor. 
An example elucidates this: if the distribution for 60 items given 
in Table 1, p. 101) is used, the items would be given a score ranging from 
one to sixty by assigning the score of one to the item appearing in the 
first position in the +5 category, two to the second item in that 
category, three to the item at the top of the +4 category and so on 
until the score of sixty is given to the item placed at the bottom of the 
-5 category. Then each item is located on the Q-sort done by each 
individual who appears on the factor, the score for that item on the 
individual Q-sort is calculated and averaged with the scores given by the 
other individuals to form a composite score for that item on the composite 
Q-sort for the factor. The item with the lowest score is then placed at 
the top of the +5 column, the next lowest score in the second place, and 
so on. 
In interpretating the composite Q-sort for a factor, the most weight 
is given to the few items at the two extremes of the Q-sort, and less to 
the various items towards the centre of the sort, which by definition 
have less relevance for the individuals on that factor. However, the 
neutral items are not ignored, as items which an individual indicates 
are meaningless for him, or about which he does not wish to take a 
positive or negative stand, can provide very useful information about 
his overall attitude. (Stephenson, 1967) 
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In studying Q-sorts, Stephenson (1972, c) has argued that it is 
important to remember that: 
Q. -method makes it possible for the individual to observe 
and measure his own subjectivity and this without 
operational connections with anything outside him ... He indicates what is important, what the values are, what the 
valency is, and the themes. (pp. 22-23 
If an individual in a Q. -study has not developed a coherent attitude 
about the issue being studied, if his attitude is significantly different 
from the other people in the study, or if the items in the Q-sample are 
meaningless to his frame of reference, then he will not appear on any 
factor. Unlike R-method studies in which the responses of all the 
individuals in the study often are averaged together, Q-methodology 
provides for observation only those individuals on each factor who have 
indicated that they share a similar attitude with other individuals, 
and their scores are not influenced by those of individuals who do 
not share this attitude. This is a valuable methodological advantage 
facilitating the demonstrably greater sensitivity of Q. 
Stephenson (1972, c) has indicated that the principal aim of 
Q-methodology in public opinion research is to make discoveries about 
the types of people who hold similar attitudes and what those attitudes 
are. "Interpretation of Q-factors leads to understandings, not 
explanations in objective respects". (p. 20) 
4. CRITICISMS OF Q-) THODOLOGY 
Q-methodology has always had a number of critics. However, this 
criticism itself has most consistently been characterised by a 
misunderstanding of the axioms upon which the methodology rests or by 
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a desire to make it do things for which it was not designed and which it 
is therefore incapable of doing. 
It is well to reiterate here what critics of Q-methodology often 
forget, that the intention of this procedure is not to amass a number 
of facts statistically attributable to a certain proportion of the 
population, but to gain an understanding of the attitudes which are 
represented in the population in whatever numbers. It is, therefore, 
ideally an exploratory technique. 
Because experimenters steeped in objective scientific research 
design often fail to appreciate this distinction, it is a point on which 
they tend to attack Q-methodology, without attempting to follow the 
rationale through to its logical conclusion. 
Kerlinger (1967) appears to be representative of this attitude 
when he criticises Q on grounds divorced from the rationale of the 
methodology, apparently for no other reason than it does not conform to 
his preconception of a conventional research design: 
One can rarely work with sufficiently large sample 
in Q. It is not a method well-suited to cross-sections 
or large sample purposes. One does not draw a random 
sample of persons for study with Q. While Stephenson 
argues the point vigorously, there is no escaping the 
inability of the investigator using Q to generalize to 
populations of individuals. (p. 594) 
Kerlinger seems to be oblivious of the fact that his objections are 
to matters which Q was intentionally designed to avoid. These criticisms 
would be valid if one were trying to employ the technique to determine 
the percentage of housewives in the country who would want to buy 
washing powder "X", or vote for candidate "Y", but the purpose of 
Q-methodology is not to make proportional generalizations to populations, 
110 
but to isolated groups of people who hold similar attitudes about an 
issue, and from this, to work towards a qualitative, not quantitative, 
understanding of the structure of public opinion, or even of a segment 
of public opinion, on that issue. If, once the attitudes are known, one 
actually wants to know how many people have these attitudes, it is a 
relatively simple matter to conduct a standard R-type study using the 
understanding one has gained from the Q-sorts to know what questions 
to ask. 
In a subsequent essay on Q, Kerlinger (1972) produces another 
criticism of the methodology, but once again, if he were careful to 
choose a procedure to suit his problem, he criticism would be irrelevant: 
The usual possibility associated with R-methodology 
of administering several normative measures to 
large samples and then using various forms of multi- 
variate analysis is not feasible with Q-methodology. 
One cannot administer two or three Q-sorts, as one can 
administer two or three tests or scales, to the same 
persons and then correlate results, even if a large 
sample were obtained. The difference between Q and 
R methodologies is here profound. [11 (p. 12) 
The fundamental assumption in Q-methodology is that everything is 
central to the individual and that people will be correlated and not 
tests. Nor is there any reason to want to correlate tests if the 
methodology is properly applied. 
Furthermore, Stephenson (1967) has argued that the objective of 
Q-methodology is not so much to test people, as to explore the ideas 
about which they are thinking. Kerlinger modifies his position slightly 
in a lengthy footnote to the above, when he says in part: 
... I must confess that, convinced as I am of Stephenson's originality and scientific and 
technical competence and the importance of Q 
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in scientific behavioral research, I still find 
it hard to understand certain points he makes. 
For example, in The Study of Behavior he says, 
'Our main thesis ... is that a theory should be 
worked at by way of singular testable propositions' (1953, p. 182... ). 
Some of the difficulty may be due to a mixture of 
levels of discourse. Stephenson seems to put more 
emphasis on the testing of what he calls singular 
propositions that are derived from theory than on 
testing general theory. If this is so, then perhaps 
the difficulty is at least partially resolved ... 
(Kerlinger, 1972, pp. 12-13) 
Whittenborn (1961) and others have also criticised Q-methodology for 
what they see as an inability to generalize from the Q-population to a more 
general population. 
We do not know what population the individual or individuals 
under scrutiny represent. Stephenson (1953) seems to feel 
that this really does not matter as long as he can assume 
that there are other similar individuals somewhere. He 
calls ducking this practical issue testing a 'singular 
proposition'. (p. 136) 
The issue of "generalizability" in Q-methodology was discussed 
earlier in this chapter; basically, in Q one is not trying to 
generalize to large populations in the statistical sense. 
One of the areas in which Q. -technique comes in for a great deal of 
criticism is over the use of a fixed quasi-normal distribution in the 
sorting procedure. Many would argue that different individuals might 
prefer different shaped distributions. (Cronbach and Gleser, 1954) 
Both Brown (1968) and Nunnally (1970) have pointed out that studies 
comparing both fixed and flexible distributions indicated that in the 
end, the shape of the distribution, within certain limits, does not 
make much difference to the results of the study. Nunnally also argues 
in favour of the quasi-normal distribution rather than some other shape 
because, "(1) so many things in nature are distributed approximately 
that way and (2) it fits in with the statistical methods applied to the data". 
(p. 499) 
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In a review of The Study of Behavior (Stephenson, 1953) Cronbach 
and Gleser (1954) conclude that: 
Stephenson's proposals are not ready for adoption except 
by sophisticated investigators who can trace his 
reasoning and evaluate the specific methodologies for 
themselves. It is imperative to discourage students of 
personality and social psychology from copying Stephenson's 
designs as he presents them. p. 330) 
Stephenson (1954) in a reply to the review pointed out that his intention 
in writing the book was not to provide aQ "cook-book", but that 
.. e the ideas I write about are for sophisticated 
investigators to ponder over. But a beginning has 
to be made somewhere, and, in spite of Q's twenty 
years of history, I regard this book as a bare 
beginning. (p. 331) 
Stephenson goes on to suggest that the cause of part of the 
difficulty his reviewers have with the book stems from their being 
involved in an "impossible search for 'constant' conditions", while 
he says "I learned long years ago to stop looking for 'constant' 
conditions. My reviewers still have to take this plunge". (pp. 332-333) 
People do not behave like atomic particles, and it seems that one 
has to have been a physicist before becoming a psychologist to appreciate 
that. In this section I have examined the major criticisms published of 
this methodology and all of them have been seen to fail. Indeed, I 
hope that the reader will be as surprised as I was at the disassociation 
of thought in much of this criticism. 
CHAPTER IV 
DESIGN OF THE RESEARCH 
This chapter contains a description of the design and execution of 
the research study on which this dissertation is based. The study 
consisted of two parts and these will be discussed separately. 
The first problem was to discover what different attitudes went to 
make up British public opinion about the Common Market. Q-methodology 
was chosen for this part of the study, and a Q-sample of one hundred 
statements was developed and given to seventy-five individuals. 
In the second part, the intention was to determine what effect the 
attitudes elicited by the Q-sorts had on judgement of information about 
the Common Market. To do this, fifty of the Q sample statements were 
presented again, each accompanied by an eleven-point scale on which the 
individual could indicate whether he felt the person who made the state- 
ment supported or opposed British membership of the Common Market. 
The chapter ends with a critical discussion of the research. 
1. ATTITUDES ABOUT THE E. E. C. - 
Q-METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of the first part of this research was to discover 
what the attitudes were which made up British public opinion about the 
Common Market in the summer and autumn of 1971, and who held them. 
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Kelman (1965) has argued that the usefulness of public opinion 
studies about foreign affairs hinges on their ability to elucidate 
"moods" in the general population which may be shared and thus acted 
upon by the decision-making elite. "Public opinion studies become 
more directly relevant if - as is increasingly true - they focus in 
whole or in part on certain elite groups". (Kelman, 1965, p. 14) 
It was argued in Chapter II that the gatekeeping function of 
opinion leaders " was decisive in determining the nature of the 
pool of information available on which the public could draw in forming 
their attitudes about an issue. The first step in understanding this 
process is to discover the nature of the attitudes held by these leeders. 
The attitudes of the elite"were especially germane to the Common 
Market issue, particularly in the early days of the campaign, when the 
polls consistently indicated that a large percentage of the population 
had "no opinion" about British entry. Janis and Smith (1965) report 
that, "When the topic of a communication is unfamiliar to the 
audience ... studies have shown that factual material can produce 
major changes in political and social images". (p. 212) The attitudes 
of the"elite may very well determine the "factual material" which 
becomes available. 
For this reason, it was decided to place the emphasis in this 
study on the "opinion leaders" who appeared to play a predominant 
role in the campaigns for and against British membership in the 
Common Market. Secondary to this consideration was the desire to 
discover to what degree their attitudes about the issue were shared 
by the "ordinary" people in the country whose opinion they were 
supposed to lead. 
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The Problem of Method 
There were a number of possible choices of research design. Some 
authors such as Newcomb (1943) and Newcomb et. al. (1967) employed a 
straightforward questionnaire design for their research. With this they 
were able to chart attitude change which persisted over time, but, as 
they themselves admit, they were not able to show the "crucial causative 
factors" for this change. For their technique to be useful, it would 
first be necessary to have discovered the more precise nature of the 
attitudes involved, and to do this a more sensitive instrument is needed. 
As we saw in Chapter II, Hyman (1973) felt that a questionnaire 
could be perfected by building into it such things as rating scales, 
TAT's, story completions and other projective techniques, thus affording 
a blending of what he considered to be rigorous scientific procedure with 
more "sensitive psychological methods". Yet it was argued that this 
proposal would fail on at least two counts; first in the difficulty in 
standardising the results of the projective techniques when applied in 
a large scale study. Furthermore, as Knutson (1972) argued, the 
present state of knowledge about the use of projective techniques only 
renders them useful for specific questions rather than more general 
exploratory research. The second drawback to these proposals is that 
the mere belief that one has standardised one's techniques, and is 
therefore employing a scientific tool forms no protection against bias 
in the research design and analysis. Only by recognising that subject- 
ivity is an integral part of all human thought, can it be incorporated 
and used successfully in the research design. The ability to generalise 
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from such a large scale study is useless unless one knows what the 
answers actually mean to the individuals who made them. Therefore, a 
criterion in the search for a research technique is the ability not to 
neutraliSe, but rather to capitalise upon the subjectivity inherent in 
all such endeavours. 
Many researchers choose one of the numerous attitude scaling 
techniques to study attitudes, finding in one type or another something 
which appeals to them personally. Whilst many of the techniques share 
an advantage in their relative ease of administration and statistical 
analysis, they all share an inherent disadvantage: each of the items 
on these scales, whether they be attitude statements or bipolar 
adjectives, receives an absolute rating from the individual performing 
the test. Thus the scales can be used to discriminate between the 
performances of different individuals. It is therefore impossible to 
obtain from these tests a comparative meaning of the items within 
an individual, so that the relative significance of the items to 
him inevitably goes unexamined; it cannot be otherwise. 
Each of the four major types of scales also has more specific 
problems due to the pecularities of its construction, administration 
or analysis. In what often are referred to as differential scales 
(Selltiz, Jahoda, Deutsch and Cook, 1966) which consist primarily of 
the various scales developed by Thurstone (Thurston, 1927,1931; 
Thurstone and Cave, 1929), the individual chooses one or two items 
which locate his position on the topic being studied. The statements 
used in Thurstone scales are assigned a value according to ratings 
given them by groups of judges; yet, as was shown in Chapter II, the 
117 
attitude of the judges very likely influenced their judgement of the 
position of the statement. Thus, the score achieved by the subject 
taking a test is only an indication of his attitude in relation to the 
attitudes of the judges. It also is difficult to interpret the meaning 
of the score which is formed by taking the mean of the items an individual 
chooses. Whilst the mean may be the same for two individuals, the variation 
in standard deviations could indicate different view points. Again, this 
cannot be known from the test. 
A second type of attitude scales are sometimes called summated 
scales and are represented by the Likert type scales (Likert, 1932). In 
this method of scaling, the individual indicates his agreement or 
disagreement with each statement on the scale, and his position is 
calculated by taking the sum of the scores of each of his responses. The 
drawbacks to this type of scaling include not only the difficulty in 
interpreting the position of individuals with the same scores but different 
standard deviations, but also the fact that the Likert is an ordinal scale 
which makes it impossible to indicate the degree of favourableness towards 
an issue of one individual in relation to other individuals. 
Cumulative scales are those in which, as the name indicates, the 
items form a cumulative series. The theory behind these scales predicts 
that an individual with a certain attitude will react favourably to all 
items on the favourable side of the point he chooses on the dimension 
being measured, and unfavourably to all the items on the other side of 
that point. The score for the individual is then formed by counting 
the number of items to which he is favourable. His attitude is thus 
defined by the relationship of the items in the scale to each other. 
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Because these scales are supposed to be unidimensional, they are not 
very useful for attitude research involving more complex issues. In 
any case, whilst the scale may be found to be unidimensional for one 
type of individual (Stouffer et. al., 1950), it is not necessarily 
unidimensional for all people. 
A variation of attitude scaling is the semantic differential 
developed by Osgood, Suci and Tannembaum (1957). It is designed to 
measure the meaning of a concept for an individual in terms of bipolar 
adjectives which appear at opposite ends of seven point rating scales. 
These scales are chosen to represent what Osgood et. al. call the 
evaluative, potency and activity dimensions of the attitude. The 
individual's responses are plotted in three dimensional space, each 
axis representing one of the three components. One of the problems 
with this procedure lies in justifying the relationship of the meaning 
of the scales to the concept. For example, if an individual rated 
first a politician and then the Common Market on strong-weak scales, 
the meaning of his use of the scale might be quite different for each of 
the two concepts, although the results would give us. no indication of 
this. It is also impossible to know whether the scales provided to 
define a concept are the ones which any given individual in a study 
would actually choose to define his semantic space. 
The conclusion for this present research from the preceding 
discussion is that the most useful design would be one which would 
allow an individual most freely to indicate his attitude, with the 
least amount of bias imposed by the technique. 
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It was felt that Q-methodology provided the technique which best 
met all the desirable criteria mentioned in the discussion of other 
techniques: it allows an individual to choose the terms in which he 
will define his attitude, and to indicate which terms are less important 
or are meaningless to him; once the statements are sorted one can ascertain 
through factor analysis which people do or do not share a common attitude. 
In Q, one has a method in which responses can be compared within 
individuals. Nunnally (1970), argues that in relation to other 
comparative methods, 
The Q-sort ... is a useful compromise between two needs: (1) the need to have precise differentiations made 
between stemuli, as is done in the method of pair compari- 
sons, and (2) the need to have comparisons made between 
the members of large sets of stemuli ... 
(p. 449) 
This latter need becomes cumbersome - indeed impossibly time consuming - 
in the methods of pair comparisons. Q-methodology also has the advantage 
over pair comparisons that the individual sorting the cards will not fall 
into the response sets or styles often associated with absolute rating 
techniques, thus giving Qa higher retest reliability. 
Once it was decided that a Q-sort would be the most appropriate 
approach to the study of British attitudes about the Common Market, 
the question whether to build some assumption about the nature of the 
attitudes into the Q-sort still remained. Because at the time of its 
execution there had been no other psychological study of these attitudes 
reported in the literature, the research of necessity was to be of an 
exploratory nature. The review of the political psychology literature 
in Chapter It revealed a marked ambivalence in the results of studies 
in which an attempt was made to relate personality factors such as 
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authoritarianism, dogmatism etc. to political ideology. For this 
reason it was decided to use the Q-sort strictly as an exploratory 
tool rather than to build in a personality theory which, while 
possibly appealing, might mask some potentially more important 
factor. 
In the remaining portion of this section, the specific design 
and administration of the Q-sort will be discussed. 
The Q-Universe and Q-Sample 
The first problem in a Q-method study of attitudes is to 
generate a Q-universe, or concourse, of opinion statements about 
the issue to be studied from which the Q-sample can be drawn. 
As Stephenson (1972, c) suggests, this can be done "conversationally", 
and this was the approach taken here. 
Because the emphasis was to be on the attitudes of 
opinion leaders, it was principally with this type of person 
r 
121 
that interviews were sought, and simply, they were asked 
to talk about their feelings on the issue. 
Eleven in-depth interviews were completed. A list 
of the individuals who participated appears in Table II, 
and the transcripts of the interviews are found in Appendix 
A. The people who were interviewed, as well as those wbodia 
the actual Q-sorting were assured that they would remain 
anonymous, and therefor?, they are identified only by their 
occupation, and the place and date of the interview. 
People were chosen for the interviews in several ways. 
Those who directed campaign groups were approached after 
their activities were reported in the press, with an attempt 
to obtain a balanced representation from all of the sides. 
Interviews were sought with the academic sources to gain 
a historical and legal perspective, while the Naval Officer, 
who had completed a training course on the Common Market, 
was included to tap military opinion. It will be appreciated 
that these people are hardly typical of the "man in the 
street". However, statements of "opinion leaders" were 
sought specifically to see if the "ordinary" people in the 
study would identify with statements made by those who 
claimed to speak for them. 
All of the interviews were tape-recorded with the 
permission of the person being interviewed, but the tape- 
recorder and microphone were kept out of sight in an attempt 
to establish an informal, conversational atmosphere in which 
the person would feel uninhibited. The author tried to be 
as non-directive and unobtrusive as possible and allowed 
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the individual to dwell on the aspects of the issue which 
interested him, or about which be felt most strongly. Most 
of these interviews lasted about an hour. 
These interviews were supplemented by self-referrent 
opinion statements from a number of booksl to ensure that 
as broadly representative a Q-universe as possible was 
obtained. 
From these sources, over two thousand subjective state- 
ments were taken, and each was typed on a three inch by 
five inch index card. Then these cards were allocated by 
subject matter to categories dealing with defence, nationalism 
and national sovereignty, politics, social welfare, 
economics, general statements (such as, "I'm tired of hearing 
about the Common Market", and "I think we're being asked 
to take a giant leap in the dark onthe Common Market 
issue"), and opinion about foreigners. 
These categories were not used as a rigid system of 
classification, but as a means of simplifying the sorting 
and culling of an otherwise unwieldy number of statements; 
not were there an equal number of statements in each 
category. The people interviewed tended to talk about 
certain aspects of the issue more than others and these 
proportions were reflected in the Q-sample. For example, 
sixty percent of the statements in the Q-sample discussed 
1 Camps (1964); Gladwyn (1966); Haines (1957); Mackay 
(1961); Mayhew (1967); Mayne (1962); Middleton (1963); 
Shanks and Lambert (1962). 
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the Common Market in political or economic terms, while only 
three percent of the statements dealt with defence and five 
per cent with social welfare. 
The statements cards in each of the categories were 
divided further into pro-Market, anti-Market and neutral 
piles. These piles were examined individually and the clearest, 
most representative statements were chosen from each pile. 
The winnowing process continued until only one hundred and 
fifty statements remained. 
These statements were given to. two patient independent 
judges, one who favoured British entry into the Common 
Market, and one who opposed it, and they were asked to 
indicate whether they felt each statements to be pro-Market, 
anti-Market or neutral, and to set aside any statements they 
felt to be ambiguous or confusing. They discussed their re- 
actions to the statements with the author, and using these 
comments as a guide, the final Q-sample of one hundred statements 
was chosen. These statements appear in Appendix B. 
The Population Sample 
The seventy-five individuals who would do the Q- 
sorting were chosen to fit into one of two main groups- 
opinion leaders and ordinary people. These groups were each 
divided into two more specific groups, giving a total. of 
four categories. The opinion leaders groups was made up 
of an expert and a special interest group, while the ordinary 
people were divided into "uninformed" white collar and 
"uninformed" blue collar groups. An attempt was made to 
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maintain a balance of pro-Market and anti-Market subjects 
in each of the four groups, but this was not always 
possible in practice as the persuasion of an individual 
often was not known until the interview was completed. 
It was also difficult to obtain an equal ratio of men to 
women, especially in the expert and special interest groups, 
although this imbalance reflects the disproportionate 
representation in the wider population of the country. 
However, it must be remembered that in Q-methodology this 
is not a serious matter as the object is not to make 
statistical generalisations to the population, but to examine 
the attitudes represented in or across different 
groups.. With the exception of one sixteen-year-old student 
who was working actively in the campaign for the Common 
Market in his school, all of the individuals in the study 
were of voting age. 
The "Expert" group was composed of individuals who 
were actually experts in some field related to British 
membership of the Common Market, or those whose pronounce- 
ments on the issue generally would be regarded as being 
authoritative. The former group consisted of such people 
as diplomats and politicians who had special responsibilites 
for E. E. C. affairs, the European editors and correspondents 
of large newspapers, and the advisors on the E. E. C. in large 
corporations. The other part of the Expert groups was 
made up of some politicians whose "expertness" was the 
result more of interest than of information. 
Individuals with a "Special Interest" in the E. E. C. 
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were farmers, fishermen, executives in import-export firms 
or large multinational corporations, small businessmen and 
individuals working in one of the groups campaigning for or 
against British membership in the E. E. C. These people 
ordinarily would not be considered to be opinion leaders 
on other issues, but were highly visible and active in the 
"Great Debate". 
The "uninformed" groups of ordinary people were made 
up of individuals who had no particular interest on the 
Common Market, or special interest in the resulting British 
membership or non-membership. However, this does not mean 
that they had not been exposed to information about the 
Common Market in the press of other media, or that they 
necessarily were not experts in some other field. 
As it was not the intention of this research to enter 
the debate on what characteristics distinguish the working 
from the middle classes, the criterion of manual labour, 
skilled as well as unskilled, as opposed to clerical workers 
was used as the dividing line between the blue collar and 
white collar groups for the purpose of this study. Unemployed 
married women were classified by the occupation of their 
husbands. 
Table 3. shows the numerical breakdown of the four 
groups, while Appendix C gives a complete list of the 
individuals. 
The Q-Sorting 
The testing for this project was conducted between 
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July and October, 1971. This was timed to coincide with 
the nearly saturation coverage on the issue in the news 
media and intensive campaigns by the British Government 
and private bodies, both for and against membership, to 
inform the public about the E. E. C. leading up to the vote 
on British membership taken in the House of Commons on 
October 28,1971. The author personally administered all 
of the Q-sorts. As this involved journies as far removed 
as Cornwall and Cambridge and numerous points inbetween, 
the full five months were needed to find and interview all 
seventy-five individuals. 
After filling in a short demographic questionnaire 
(Appendix D), the individual was given the deck of Q- 
statements which was arranged randomly. He first was asked 
to read each statement and to make a preliminary sorting 
by placing it in one of three piles depending on whether he 
agreed, disagreed or had no feeling either way about it. 
When the basic separation was completed, the individual had 
to begin to work through the piles and sort the statements 
according to his feelings to fit the fixed Q-sort distribution 
which is shown in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 Q-SORT DISTRIBUTION FREQUENCY FOR 100 
STATEMENTS 
MOST AGREE NEUTRAL MOST DISAGREE 
+5 +4 +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 
FREQUENCY 46 10 10 12 16 12 10 10 64 
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To facilitate the sorting process, each individual was provided 
with a long piece of paper marked with the value and frequency of 
each of the categories which appeared on the Q-sort grid in the 
answer sheet, so that he could lay the cards out on the paper in the 
proper pattern. 
Individuals were encouraged to take as much time as they wanted 
and were allowed to go about the sorting in whatever manner they 
wished. The average time taken to complete this Q-sort was one hour. 
When the sorting was finished, the card numbers were entered on 
the answer sheet, and the individual was asked to comment on any of 
the statements about which he felt particularly strongly, and to 
discuss any area which he felt should have been covered by the 
Q-sort but was not. These replies were also recorded on the answer 
sheet. 
Analysis of the Q-sorts 
The Q-sort data were put in integer form and were submitted to 
factor analysis using Stephenson's on Q-factor analysis programme 
at the University of Missouri. This programme gives a centroid 
factor solution followed by a Varimax rotation of the factor matrix, 
and estimates of the factors for the Varimax solution, ending with 
a table of correlations between the factors. 
The Varimax solution of this programme produces seven factors and 
in this case, six of the seven had two or more significant loadings 
on them. In Chapter III the arguments of Cattell and Foster (1963) 
that all computer rotations should be visually "polished" by hand 
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rotation, and of Stephenson (1972) that three or four factors are all 
that should be "carved out" of a well planned study for interpretation 
were presented. Following this advice, five further rotations of the 
Varimax solution were done by hand. As the Varimax rotation is 
orthogonal, it was decided to do orthogonal hand rotations also. This 
was so as not to introduce the risk of error associated with the 
assumptions one must make about the data in oblique rotations. These 
orthogonal rotations were Factor 3 against Factor 5, Factor 1 against 
Factor 4, Factor 2 against Factor 5', Factor 1' against Factor 6, and 
Factor 1" against Factor 2e. The final factor matrix was made up of 
the new factors 1"', 2"t 3'P 4's 5" and 6' . Factor 41 had three signi- 
ficant loadings but all were confounded with Factor 1"' , and Factor 5" 
had only one significant loading, so neither was studied further. 
Therefore, so as not to confuse the reader with double primes and 
non-consecutive factor numbering, the factors appearing in the table 
of rotated factor loadings in Appendix E were renumbered as follows: 
Factors 1"', 2"and 3' became Factors 1,2 and 3; Factor 6' became 
Factor 4. These were the four factors which were analyzed. Factor 4' 
became Factor 5 and Factor 51 became Factor 6. These two were not 
analyzed for the reasons explained above. 
Stephenson's criterion of 'simplest structure' was discussed on page 104. 
In practice, this involves rotating towards a solution with three or 
four usable factors guided by the rubrics of statistical simple 
structure (also discussed in Chapter III), whilst keeping an eye on 
the psychological sense of the study. 
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With the data for this study, first all the significant factor 
loadings were circled on the Varimax print out and the confounded 
loadings noted. A different colour pencil was used for each factor, 
so that throughout the hand rotations one could keep track of all the 
significant loadings on all the factors, and not just on the two being 
rotated. Next the pro-anti Market self-rating from the judgement data 
was checked for the individuals with significant loadings to determine 
whether factors were pro or anti Market. 
Knowing with which factors to begin rotating is a function both of 
long practice and of trial and error. In this case, the first rotation 
was Factor 3 against Factor 5. The individuals on both factors with 
a significant loading were anti-Market. Factor 3 had several near 
significant loadings which looked as if they could be strengthened by 
"pulling" it away from Factor 5, and this proved to be the case. 
When rotating by hand, the factor loadings of the two factors in 
question for each individual is plotted on a very large sheet of graph 
paper, with one factor represented by the perpendicular axis and the 
other by the horizontal axis. The plot of individuals with a signi- 
ficant loading on any of the factors was circled with the colour of 
that factor, so that when rotating to strengthen a factor one did not 
do it in a way that would confound the new significant loadings with 
significant loadings on one of the other factors. When the new location 
of the axes was decided upon and drawn in, the new factor loadings were 
read off using strips of the graph paper as a ruler. 
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The next rotation was between pro-Market Factors 1 and 4. One of 
the significant loadings on Factor 4 was confounded with Factor 2 and 
another with Factor 1. Here the attempt was to strengthen Factor 1 and 
reduce Factor 4 to as many near zero loadings as possible. This 
proved to be the least tidy of all the hand rotations, but when attempts 
were made to plot other factors against Factor 4, the results were less 
satisfactory, so this solution was accepted. It did strengthen Factor 1 
and reduced the number of significant loadings on Factor 4 to three, all 
of which were confounded with Factor 1, effectively removing Factor 4 from 
consideration as a factor. 
The next rotation was Factor 2 against Factor 5. Factor 2 was the 
strongest anti-Market factor and was further strengthened by this 
rotation, whilst Factor 5 was reduced to one significant loading, and 
thus removed from consideration as a factor. 
Factor 1 was then plotted against pro-Market Factor 6. These two 
factors were better defined by pulling them apart, and Factor 6 was 
increased to eleven significant loadings, three of which were confounded 
with Factor 1. 
The final rotation was between Factors 1 and 2. This was done 
because there were a number of negative significant loadings on 
Factor 1 which had positive significant loadings on Factor 2. By 
rotating the axes, the number of subjects confounded between these two 
factors was reduced. The original Varimax solution produced 70 signifi- 
cant loadings, eight of which were confounded, but these were spread out 
over six factors. The final solution resulted in 66 significant loadings 
consolidated on four strong factors. 
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Nev factor scores were calculated for each statement on the final 
four factors by computing the average of the scores given to the 
statement by the individuals on the factor. These new factor scores 
were used to form the composite Q-sort for each of the four factors. 
The method for obtaining a composite Q-sort is explained on page 1016 
of Chapter III. 
2. SOCIAL JUDGEMENT 
In the second part of this research, the purpose was to 
see what, if any, was the relationship between the attitudes 
about the Common Market found in the first part and the 
judgement of information about this issue by the people who 
have those attitudes. In light of suggestions from previous 
research in social judgement, it was also the desire to discover 
if the individual's sense of involvement in the issue had any 
bearing on his judgement. To do this, fifty of the statements 
from the Q-sample were selected to appear with an eleven-point 
equal interval scale on which the individual could judge the 
statement. This new sample was divided equally between pro- 
Market and anti-Market statements, and an attempt was made 
to choose statements from both extreme and more moderate 
positions on both sides. 
The statements were typed into the test booklet in 
random order, with the scale appearing below each state- 
ment. The extremes of the scale were labelled "Extremely 
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pro-Market" and "Extremely anti-Market". 
When an individual had finished the Q-sorting, he was 
asked to read each statement in the judgement section and 
to imagine that he had heard it made in a speech on 
television or radio, and to indicate on the scale what 
he thought that person's attitude to be about British 
entry to the Common Market. 
At the end of this section, there was a statement 
on which the individual could rate his own feelings about 
British membership in the E. E. C., and five statements 
with an appropriately worded scale on which he could 
indicate how involved he felt in the issue. The full 
instructions for the judgement section of the research and 
the statements which were used appear in Appendix D. 
Summary 
In the first part of this chapter it was shown how a 
Q-sample of one hundred statements was drawn from a number 
of in-depth interviews and from books, and then given to 
seventy-five individuals to be sorted according to a forced 
distribution grid to model their attitudes about 
the Common Market. In the second section the use of 
fifty of the Q-statements to test the individuals judgement 
of information about the issue was explained. 
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3. CRITICAL DISCUSSION OP THE RESEARCH 
As with any research project, hindsight reveals aspects of the 
work which might have been better approached in another fashion. 
Criticism from readers also produces ideas of how they (also with 
hindsight) might have done the study. Therefore this autooritique 
is appended to examine some of these points. They will be discussed 
in three sections pertaining to the Q-study, and one section dealing 
with the analysis of the social judgement study. 
Choice of Statements 
The first point at which bias might have entered the study was 
in the choice of statements for the Q-sort, and this selection 
process in turn had several stages. 
Indepth Interviews: The statements for the Q-sort were drawn in 
large part from eleven in-depth interviews. While Stephenson argues 
that one in-depth interview can be sufficient to generate a concourse 
of statements about a topic, others might argue that many more would 
be needed. In the end, it was decided that the eleven interviews 
which were with four anti-Market, five pro-Market and 2 neutral 
individuals had produced a sufficient range of opinion. This view 
was substantially upheld in the survey of the current literature on the 
subject, although statements were also drawn from this literature to 
ensure that all aspects of opinion were covered. However, at the 
time of these interviews, I was relatively new to this country and did 
not then fully appreciate the depth of linguistic divisions between 
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classes here. I now would like to have had interviews with working 
class individuals so that their statements might have been included 
in the Q-sort. Whilst the range of views was amply expressed by the 
experts who were interviewed, the language in which they did so was 
probably considerably different from that of the man on the shopfloor. 
It is difficult to say whether the language of the statements used in 
the study materially influenced the outcome, but it could very well 
have been more interesting if interviews from the other end of the 
class spectrum had been included. 
Choosing theStatementst Because of the danger of bias creeping 
into the study with the choice of statements to form the Q-sort, 
several safeguards were employed at this point. The statements were 
divided into topics and for each statement chosen from a topic 
representing pro-Market opinion, the attempt was to find an anti-Market 
statement to balance it. This was not necessarily a polar opposite 
statement, however, because different people talked about the Common 
Market in different ways and terms, and it was necessary to preserve 
these differences to make the Q-sort an instrument sensitive to the 
nuances of the debate. To make certain that these statements were 
really representative of the views I judged them to be, I asked 
independent self-confessed pro-Market and anti Market judges to sort 
statements into pro, anti and neutral piles, and to comment on any 
statements which they felt were ambiguous. Armed with these comments, 
I then made the final selection of the final one hundred statements. 
The nature of some of the statements may seem odd to readers unfamiliar 
with Q-methodology: some were longer than what one expects to find in 
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an ordinary rating scale, others were double-barreled. This was 
intentional. The longer statements appear as they were made by 
the person being interviewed. People cannot always express their 
opinions in neat, crisp forms tailor made for conventional psychologists. 
The aim in Q is for people to express their opinions in conversational 
terms with which other people are most likely to identify. The length 
of the statements did not seem to perturb any of the respondents, with 
the possible exception of a few of the blue collar subjects. In fact 
on the whole, the reverse was the case. Time and again throughout the 
testing, muttered comments such as "precisely: ", "this is how I feel", 
could be heard from many of the subjects. The double-barreled state- 
ments also served the more subtle function of eliciting nuances of 
opinion which might otherwise be lost in more bald straightforward 
statements. People were asked to react to statements as a whole, 
but because in Q, statements are studied in the context of their place- 
ment in the Q-sort and not in isolation as in other techniques, the 
meaning of a double-barreled statement to the individual is readily 
apparent. 
In any future study involving a mixture of people of different 
education levels, it would be useful to devise a Q-sort with perhaps 
fifteen or twenty fewer statements. The one hundred statements of 
this study were sorted easily in about an hour by the majority of 
subjects, but they gave a few of the blue collar subjects something 
of a struggle to do in under two hours. Whilst there is no time limit 
imposed in Q-sorting, this is an awful lot of time to ask of someone. 
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Choice of Subjects: The aim in the choice of subjects for this 
study was to have four more or less equally balanced groups; one of 
experts, another of people with a special interest, one of uninformed 
white collar and another uninformed blue collar. The balance was 
fairly equal in the first three groups, but was not as well achieved 
in the fourth. This was due to the high refusal rate in this group, 
and my limited contacts in this group, whose introductions were rapidly 
exhausted. I was also not fully atuned to the gradations within this 
group. I now would like to have included in this study workers from 
heavy industry (which is uncommon in Bath, where I was living at the 
time). I also would like to have had in the study more than one 
journalist from the popular press. It was readily apparent when 
interviewing the journalists in this study, that their personal 
opinions did not necessarily coincide with the opinions of the 
newspaper for which they worked, but if statements in more ordinary 
terms had been obtained it would have been interesting to see if the 
journalists of the tabloid press modelled their attitudes in the 
language of their own newspapers, or in that of their colleagues of 
the elite press. 
Factor Analysis: It might be suggested by those not familiar with 
the theory behind Q-methodology that, because the study was attempting 
to examine two groups - opinion leaders and their followers - the 
Q-sorts for these two groups might have been factored separately 
rather than together. This is not done because of the danger in so 
doing of bending the data to fit the theory, whereas if all the subjects 
are factored together, people with similar attitudes will come up on the 
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same factor, irrespective of theory, thus giving not only a better 
chance of making discoveries about the nature of the data, but 
ensuring that the theory can be disproved if needs be. 
There is, of course, the danger of bias creeping into the 
performance of hand rotations. The best safeguard against bias at 
this stage is the awareness that it is possible. But it is also important 
to distinguish between good psychological sense and bias. The psychologist 
should be willing to take what is undoubtedly a subjective decision in 
the interest of getting the most information possible from his data. 
Social Judgement Study: In Chapter I it was proposed as one aspect of 
this research to study the social judgement of opinion leaders because 
of their gatekeeping function in the flow of information to the general 
public. When the Q-sorts were analyzed, each factor did not turn out 
to be composed solely of leaders or followers. From the point of view 
of both Q and public opinion theory, this was no bad thing, as one 
wouldn't necessarily expect all opinion leaders to have clearly 
different opinions from all followers. But from the point of view of 
studying the judgements made by leaders and followers, some might 
think that it presented a problem. Again, this was not the case 
because the Q-study provided insights about the nature of public 
opinion on the issue, and by following the guide given by the Q-factors, 
one obtained a clearer understanding of social judgement which would 
not have been possible if the division had been made artificially 
between the leaders and the followers. To my mind, this illustrates 
one of the chief attractions of Q-methodology. 
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In the actual rating of statements, none of the four factors 
used the ten and eleven rating categories (Extremely against 
British entry) as much as the one and two (Extremely pro British 
entry), which may suggest that there were more statements which 
actually were more extremely pro, and in any future study, an attempt 
should be made to redress this balance. 
CHAPTER V 
THE Q-FACTORS 
In this chapter the results of factor analysis of the 
Q-sorts and the demographic information obtained from each 
of the people in the study first will be examined for all 
individuals. Then, a more detailed appraisal of each of 
the Q-factors will be made. 
I. THE POPULATION SAMPLE DATA 
The intention of this study was to have a population 
sample which was fairly evenly divided between opinion 
leaders and the uninformed people whose opinion was supposedly 
being led-so that similarities and differences in their 
attitudes about the Common Market could be studied. 
In practice, the division of the sample into the two main 
groups was nearly equal, with fifty-two per cent of the 
individuals classified as opinion leaders and forty-eight 
per cent as ordinary "uninformed" people. 
The categories within the opinion leader group were 
also nearly equally represented. Twenty-seven per cent of 
the individuals in the study were "expertst' and twenty- 
five percent were in the "special interest" category. The 
breakdown in the uninformed group was not quite so tidy. 
While thirty-one per cent of the total population sample 
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were in the "white collar" category, only seventeen per cent 
of the individuals were in the "blue category". This was 
due in part to the fact that this latter group had the 
highest interview refusal rate in the sample. 
Taking the population sample as a whole, with its 
intentional bias towards opinion leaders, it is not 
surprising to find that forty per cent of the individuals 
had University level education, and that seventy-two per 
cent were men. The average age for the sample was forty- 
four years. Conservatives made up forty-three per cent 
of the sample, followed by Labour supporters with twenty- 
five per cent and the Liberals with thirteen per cent, while 
twenty per cent of the individuals indicated that they had 
no political party preference. 
A breakdown of the demographic data for the whole sample 
is given in Table 5. A"summary Table of the 
demographic data 
for the four factors appears in Appendix 
C. 
2. THE Q-FACTORS 
When the seventy-five Q-sorts were submitted to 
factor analysis, the Varimax solution produced six diffuse 
factors. These factors were plotted against each other in 
five pairs and the axes were rotated by hand to produce a 
solution with four strong factors. In this final solution, 
fifty-six of the individuals emerged with a significant 
factor loading, in this case . 40 or higher, on one of the 
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Table 5 
DemocTra, )'Ii_c T)a. ta 
All subjects 
Total subjects 75 
Classi- fication 
TJniviE'orinecl white collar 23 31 
TTnin_rorrc? ed blue collar 13 177' 
Special interest 19 25i 
. x, -)(--rt an , 'kutbority 20 27'. 
Average sel f'-ranking F. 4 
Average a(e 44.4 years 
emale 21 28;, 
i: ale 54 72;; 
Political ; arty supported 
Conservative 32 43', ' 
Labour 19 25 
Liberal 10 13% 
No party 14 19% 
7ducation 
Flementary 13 17% 
Secondary 19 25% 
Technical and training college 13 17% 
University 30 40; 
Newspaper 
Times 22 29 
Guardian 21 26% 
Telegraph 28 37% 
Express 6 8% 
Mail 8 11% 
Financial Times 12 16% 
Mirror 2 3% 
Observer 1 1% 
All National Dailies 9 12% 
Infrequent or none '] 
Local Newspaper only 1 1% 
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four factors. Of the remaining individuals, ten had 
significant factor loadings on more than one factor and 
therefore could not be considered on either, and nine indi- 
viduals had no significant loading on any factor. The 
hand-rotated factor loadinggappear in Appendix E. 
The Q-sort material can be best approached by 
examining it factor by factor. 
Factor 1- Strong Europeans 
Factor 1 was very strongly in favour of Britain be- 
coming a member of the Common Market and possibly guiding 
itsdevelopment in the direction of a unified federal state. 
When asked to rate their own position on British member- 
ship in the Common Market, this factor gave an average 
rating of 295 on the eleven point scale where one was the 
most strongly in favour of British entry. Rating themselves 
on their. involvement in this issue, this factor indicated 
that they on average felt only moderately involved, with 
a composite score of 3.0. 
Demographic Data. The demographic data for Factor 
1 is given in Table 6, and a short profile of each of the 
individuals on the factor is provided in Table 7. 
There were twenty-nine individuals with significant 
loadings on Factor 1. One of these, however, was a 
negative loading which means that the agree-disagree ends 
of this anti Market person's Q-sort were the reverse of those of the 
pro-Market individuals on the factor. As this one anti- 
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Table 6 
Jeirtoofra 2hlc rata. 
'actor 1 
Total subjects 23 
Class i ic at ion 
Unin orine_C' white collar 7 25 
TTninfornned blue collar 2 7° 
C7 ; (I ci:. l interest 7 
experts an,, 3 Authorities 12 
Average self-rankinc, T 2.5 
Average ae 35.7 years 
Feinale 6 21; 
? Sale 22 
Political Party SL; -)orted 
Conservative 7 25°' 
Labour 11 ^`' 
I. beral 177' 
"o , arty 5 175 
nducati (D "I 
7-i en ei tart' 2 7 
^eCO. " art' 5 17 
Technical or traini, z, - colle e 3 11: 
` 
T; nivcrsity 19 64°' 
TTeý, 1 ^paä er 
Tines 5 54' 
^uar'ian 15 54% 
Telo;; ra? ýý 11 30 :, 
^x7re, s 0 0 
r ail 4 14% 
"7_nanria1 Times J 2% ,/ 
1'i trot 1 % 
All national dailies 21% 
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Table 7 
? ro ýe Of LLlbjorts, , actor 1 
2- -uro; eaý1 I. oý o1nF? iýt ca, v) i jn \'or1 er, age 20, male, conservative, 
: '. T.? ublic school education, reads Daily Telegraph and Daily Fail, 
ioajor sources o j^ i o1 -ornati_on are ie spapors c_nd 7-uroi eah 
I'ovennent literature. 
5- TTrlivcrsi_ty scholar (history), age 20, finale, ro political 
a"`': iliation, c. irect grant school and university, reads the 
'"uar(lian, major source o in orrnanon is tue news, a2cr. 
`ý - Politician and i' fustri alist, aDe 52, r onse_rvative, Public 
school and military collerTe, reads Telecra-D}h and Times, 
rnoCt important source of information is work for and li. ter- 
a_ture . 
From the Conservative Group for ^uro-c. 
10 - export tales Nana(er, a. gre 35, male, Conservative, Public 
c. I. school ant university, reads 7inancial Times, Telegraph 
and Nail, major source of information about T, ^^ is television 
and frequent travel abroad. 
11 - National newspaper editor, age 39, male, Liberal, Public 
7 school and university, reads the Times, rinancial Times 
and Guardian, major sources of information are British 
dele0ation for 77C negotiations and the , rC ^oinuuission. 
12 - Senior women's tutor at college of education, age 55, female, 
U-" Labour, Independent school and N. Ed., reads guardian, most 
important source of information is newspapers. 
13 - Retired teacher, nethodist local preacher, local opinion 
U-t' leader, age 77, male, party with best candidate, Public 
school and university, most important source of information 
is government literature on 777, reads Nail. 
18 - Housewife and part-time lecturer, age 44, Female, Liberal, 
U T7 Grammar school and university (Ph. D. ), reads Times, newspaper 
is most important source of information. 
21 - National organizer of pro-Europe organization, politician, 
r age 40, male, Labour, Grammar school and university, reads 
Guardian and Times, most important sources of information 
is reports coming from the EEC and direct contacts with 
Brussels. 
22 - University lecturer (politics), age 29, male, Labour, Grammar 
school and university (Ph. D. ), reads Times and Guardian, 
most important sources of information are books, direct 
contacts in Europe and British and foreign newspapers. 
23 - Company proprietor, age 51, male, conservative, Public 
S. I. school, reads Telegraph and Financial Times, most important 
sources of information are newspapers and personal contact. 
24 - Local newspaper journalist, age 30, Conservative, male, 
U-W Public school, reads Mail, most important source of 
information is newspaper. 
S. I. = special interest U -W = uninformed white collar 
E= expert II-B = uninformed blue collar 
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26 - Newspaper political correspondent, age 39, male, Labour, 
Public school and university, reads all the national 
dai_l, i_es, major sources of information are news; apers and 
2ersonal contacts in FTC. 
28 - TTewsj a; er Common Market editor, ace 38, female, Labour, 
Public school and university, reads most of the national 
daailies, most important source of information 4s journalist 
work within the ^^r. 
30 - Printer's reader and city councillor, ace 55, male, Labour, 
central school, reads Guardian, most imp ortanit sources of 
'_ rorrnat7 on are political party meetings and Tr c es Counci i. 
^1 - , lectr _cian 
Sor ;; as works, age 51, male, Labour, Primary 
n T' ax 
_ 
technical >c 
s!, nol, reads T"' , il, of 
is televi si 
:3- Company expert on "PC affairs, 26, female, Labour, Beni oý 
Secondary and university, reads Guardian and Times, most 
im octant source of information is 777C working; ; a; ers (i r 
original languages). 
34 - Housewife and chairman of local Liberal association, age 
S. T. 75, female, Liberal, High School and domestic science 
colle_ge_, reads Times, most important source of in-format-1-on, 
is newspapers. 
43 - 2n^ flying officer, age 24, male, independent voter, Grammar 
T? -T' school and military college, reads Guardian, most important 
source of in? =ore anon is personal contact abroad. 
50 - Housewife, age 37, female, no political party, Grammar school 
U-'"' and university, reads Telegraph, most important source of 
information is British White Paper on rEC and television. 
52 - school student and local chairman of 
Young Liberals, age 16, 
S. I. male, Liberal, Grammar school, reads the Times, most 
important sources or in. Porlrtation are meetings organized by the 
Liberal party and the European I; oveinent. 
57 - croup computer and management services controller, age 49, 
S. I. male, Conservative, Public school and University, reads 
Times and Financial Times, most important sources of informatio, '. 
are contacts with EEC firms, personal contacts and 
government sources. 
61 - Shop foreman, age 47, male, Labour, Elementary school, reads 
U-B Mirror, most important sources of information are union 
meetings at work and television. 
67 - Schoolmaster, chairman of schools committee and lecturer 
S. I. on Common Market, age 36, male, Conservative, Public school 
and university, reads Times and Telegraph, most important 
sources of information are European Movement booklets and 
Conservative Party publications. 
69 - Television political bureau 
(chief), age 44, male, Labour, 
E State school and University, reads Guardian and ^inancial 
Times and most other national dailies, most important source 
of information about the EEC comes from reporting on it and 
personal contact. 
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-, 7ý _ T'eýýsf)aper (1J ; lo; i: at-c corres; oný'e? ýt a: -ýd ný_, - COrz'ESi undent, 
ace 29, male, Tabour, Grammar sc'aoo1 any, university, reads 
all the national (aill_es, most irn2c. ortant sources or 
in1for=oat on are l)aýrsonlal contacts ancl livinc. 
in the r"" 
waile re, )ortin it. 
71 - ? \Tewspal)er r corresi ondent, age 37, male, liberal, 
ärarnmar school, reads all the national (Ia 1_ cis, ; root 
i'7ty)Ortal'1t sources of 1_? Lcorit; atlon are personal co-,,, tact 
in 'Irussels. 
75 - Dip1o? rat and member of the British 77H` negotiations r' male no political party, -, Y? _T. iJtiar 
sc'iool a'1dl Uvl: '_ve ity, reads Ti nj es by c ioic ' and most 
}l td on l (''_aili(- ° nos important sources o ? 2ormý, Lio 
are direct contracts in Bru. ýsse_ls. 
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Market individual could not be considered to constitute a 
significant factor on her own, her material was not 
studied further. 
Of the remaining people, twenty-two were men (seventy- 
eight per cent of the factor) and six were women. The 
average age of the people on Factor 1 was 36.7 years, 7°7 
years younger than the average for the population sample as 
a whole. 
This factor was made up predominantly of opinion 
leaders who accounted for sixty-eight per cent of the factor. 
Twelve of them were experts and seven were in the special 
interest category. In the Uninformed group, there were 
seven individuals from the white collar category, while only 
two were in, the blue collar category, These latter two 
were both skilled labourers, one a shop foreman and the 
other an electrician. Therefore, the factor as a whole 
represented not only opinion leaders on the Common Market, 
but the more privileged classes generally. 
The educational attainment of the individuals on 
Factor 1 was even greater than the high educational level 
of the sample as a whole. Eighteen people (sixty-four 
per cent of the factor) had attended University, and of these, 
three had advanced degrees. Whether or not they had been 
on to University, seventy-five per cent of the factor had 
been to a public, direct grant or grammar school. 
Although Conservatives out-numbered members of other 
political parties in the total sample, thirty-nine per cent 
of the individuals on t his factor reported a preference for 
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the Labour Party, while twenty-five per cent of the people 
said that they voted Conservative. Five individuals said 
that they were Liberals and five had no political affiliation. 
The amount of information to which this factor is 
exposed daily is exceptional. Six of the informants said 
that they read all of the major national newspapers every 
day in the course of their work, and ten others read at 
least two national newspapers daily. The general personal 
preference of the factor was for The Guardian and The 
Times with fifteen readers each, followed by the Telegraph 
with eleven readers and the Financial Times with nine. 
1 
Three individuals on Factor 1 read at least one European 
newspaper on a regular basis. 
However, in spite of the high newspaper readership, 
ten of the individuals on this factor listed personal 
contacts in Europe as their main source of information about 
the E. E. C. One person was a member of the British delegation 
which negotiated the terms for British membership, and seven 
people, all of whom were journalists, said that they re- 
ceived their information directly from this British 
delegation, and from the various official bodies within the 
Common Market as part of their work in covering Community 
news. 
1. As some of these people read more than one of these 
newspapers, the total number of readers here is 
greater than the number of people on the factor. 
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Three people on the factor felt that their business 
contacts in Europe gave them their most useful information 
about the Common Market, and one person had the unenviable 
task of reading the E. E. C. working papers in their original 
languages, and analyzing them for her firm. 
Material and meetings organized by one of the three 
major political parties (and all three were mentioned at 
least once) were the major sources of information used by five 
individuals, while only two mentioned finding material 
from the British Government's massive information campaign 
helpful. 
Eighteen of the people (sixty-four per cent of the 
factor) said that they travelled abroad often, while only 
one person on the factor had never been abroad. 
To summarize the characteristics of this factor, the 
people are predominantly opinion leaders and if they come 
in the uninformed group, they tend to be "white collar". The 
factor consists mainly of men, manyof whom have University 
educations, and a very comprehensive knowledge about the 
Common Market. The factor is widely travelled, well informed, 
and prefers to read The Guardian and The Times. Although 
there is a tendency towards Labour, political party preference 
does not appear to be an important factor. 
The Composite Q-sort for Factor 1. The full composite 
Q-sort for Factor 1 is found in Table 8. The numbers in the 
table correspond with the statement numbers given in Appendix 
B. The four statements with which the factor most agreed and 
152 
the four with which they most disagreed are given in Table 
9. 
The individuals who were on Factor 1 were above. all 
pragmatists, but they were also committed Europeans. They 
saw the choice facing Britain, not as one of whether or 
not she would remain independent, but with which group of 
countries she would choose to work. They felt that because 
of her economic decline, Britain was not politically 
sovereign, and could only hope to safeguard her own interests 
and to exert an influence in the world if she became part 
of a greater union. To this end, they felt that, 
The E. E. C. in its present form may not be 
the best of all possible communities for 
us to join in the best of all possible worlds, 
but it is the only unit open to us which 
looks like meeting our requirements. (State- 
ment 46, rated +5) 
The E. E. C. appealed to this factor because they thought 
that in terms of development, the economic and political 
systems of the member countries were broadly similar to those 
of Great Britain, and that the Community had progressed far 
enough to show that it was a feasible concept. They also 
saw the Common Market as a good first step towards a political 
union in Europe. 
Although, given the example set by France, they did 
not feel that membership in the E. E. C. would "cause Britain 
to lose her national identity, impair her sovereignty, 
weaken her institutions or injure her heritage, " (Statement 
65, +4), they did think that it was the only practical 
way to deal with outdated nationalism. 
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7! ý DT 
lomnosite_ "-Ort 
7 actor I 
-5 -4 -? -< -1 Ci2? 4 
34 9( 53 10 77 
o r 22 33 
38 ý_ 0 94 94 1ö 60 58 59 
4!? 7 5 66 3S 56 3 100 31 
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Table 
ro'iýEct 7'F r' ,n =)i Ca r ytc ý'iil ýtS "actor 1 
+5 
4. The Li de of t'i common 1"ar'cet issue is >; at over 
as bei-z; j a question of deciding whether we are goi. na 
to be i: w eýýendent or not, whereas in fact we have ro 
choice. --e ore i_, i _- pct 
de: )ýrc'_ Zt on other_ cooo, tr-_es 
and we have to choose }_ýettiveFn different kinds off' 
de,, enldence. So tale choice r acinc us in a lot o" , vays 
is one of with countries we shall Flo thin, s 
together. 
46. ^'he 1 rr, " i ýI its ; resent four! may not be the best 
of all possible comn. iinities - or us to jouu in t-'ie best 
of all possible worlds, but it is the only u--tit oT3en 
to us which looks like rileetinv our reauireT, ieents. 
ý. The ^^C has already I>roc, ressed far enough to show that 
the whole concept is entirely feasible and that it is 
the only practicable way of coping with out-dated 
nationalism. 
31. "urope cannot make its full contribution unless the 
77C is enlarged to include Britain. 
-5 
34. There will be tremendous upheaval and massive 
unemployment if we join the Common Market. 
62. The Common Market would be incompatible with our way 
of life. 
88. The Common Market countries are perhaps the last group 
of countries with which I would want to merge our 
national institutions. 
93. what worries me most is that in the Common Market our 
sovereignty would have to be completely abandoned, 
submerged. 
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They felt that Britain would play an important role 
in the leadership of Europe, and only with her help could 
the E. E. C. hope to make its full contribution to the world. 
This factor trusted and respected Britain's Continental 
neighbours, and felt that they would make good partners for 
Britain. They professed to believe strongly that, 
The suggestion that people in 
not as other Europeans is one 
dangerous and unacceptable of 
against entry. It has lain bi 
much thinking in this country 
(Statement 52, +4) 
Britain are 
of the most 
all arguments 
hind far too 
since the war. 
Although the political aspects of the Common Market 
debate were the most important to this factor, they also 
felt that the economic advantages of joining the E. E. C. were 
well worth having. They believed that membership of the 
Community would be good for Britain in buying and in selling 
and did not foresee it causing either upheaval or unemploy- 
ment in the country. They warned, however, that, 
It would be disastrous for England to go into 
the Common Market and remain of the opinion that 
no other measures are necessary to improve her 
economic performance. (Statement 6, +3) 
This factor also felt that the high level of modern 
technology in British agriculture would ensure that the 
industry "has nothing to fear and much to gain from the 
Common Market entry". 
Overall, the political aspects of Community membership 
were most important and most favourable to this factor, while 
they rejected most strongly statements which presented a ne- 
gative view of the economic prospects of Membership. They 
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also strongly objected to statements which were derogatory 
to other Europeans. Finally, the invitation to join the 
Six was seen as "Britain's last chance to play a role, perhaps 
the most important one, in the leadership of Europe". 
(Statement 91, +3) 
Factor 2- Anti-British Membership, Pro-Commonwealth 
Factor 2 came out strongly against British membership 
of the Common Market, and on average rated themselves 1092 
on the eleven point scale on which eleven was the position 
most unfavourable to British membership. This score was 
calculated without including the self-rating of one of the 
people on the factor. This was necessary because in con- 
versation he indicated that he was absolutely opposed to 
British membership and was working to prevent it, but even 
though he was re-assured of anonymity, he was afraid to 
commit himself to paper as being anti-Market, "because of 
my position", and therefore rated himself neutral. This 
factor felt only slightly more involved than did Factor 1, 
and rated themselves 209 on the questions about personal 
involvement. 
Demographic Data. The demographic data for Factor 2 
appears in Table 10, and a short profile of each of the 
individuals on t he factor is provided in Table 11. 
There were fifteen people who had significant loadings 
on Factor 2, but one of these had to be invalidated when 
it became apparent that he had confused the instructions in 
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the second part of the test with those in the first part. 
Of the remaining individuals, nine were men (sixty-four 
per cent of the factor) and five were women. The average 
age for the factor was 47.2 years, which was 2.8 years 
older than the average age for the sample as a whole. 
The factor was equally divided between opinion leaders 
and uninformed people, but unlike Factor 1, only two of the 
opinion leaders were experts while the majority were in the 
special interst category, and of the uninformed individuals, 
the majority were blue collar while only two were in the 
white collar category. 
Eight Conservatives dominated the factor, accounting 
for fifty-seven per cent of the individuals. They were fol- 
lowed by four people who gave no political party preference, 
while there was only one member each from the Labour and 
Liberal parties. 
Nine of the individuals on this factor attended a 
grammar or public school, and three of these went on to a 
technical or training college, and three to University 
(twenty-one per cent of this factor, compared to forty per 
cent for the total sample and sixty-four per cent of Factor 
1). The education of the other five members of the factor 
was classified as "elementary", which was described by them 
variously as "elementary", "ordinary", "village", "Church 
of England" or "secondary modern" school. The classification 
is not intended to imply that these people did not remain at 
school until attaining the school leaving age (although a 
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Talilcý 10 flen, o ranhic Data 
"actor 2 
Total subjects 14 
Classi '? 
_cati or Uninformed white collar 2 14'/% 1Jnin_^orrned blue collar 5 35 3i ecial L' terest 5 35fl 
x; er. t 2 14" 
Average sell-rating 10.2 
Average ace 47.2 years 
? ernale 5 35_, 1Tale 0 64I' 
Political party 
Conservative 8 c, 57 Labour 1 7 Liberal 1 
Jo -party 4 28% 
Fduca tion 
'ler, lentary 5 3 ýýf Secondary 3 21% 
Technical or training college 3 21 % 
University 3 21 % 
TTewspapers 
Times 1 7 Guardian 0 
Telegraph 4 28 
, Xnress 4 2ß 
Mail 1 7 
^inancial Times 1 
Mirror 1 7 All national dailies 
No newspaper or infrequent 4 2 g°ß 
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Table 11 
Profile of Subjects Factor 2 
2- Chartered Accountant, age 24, male, Conservative, Public 
U-W reads the Times, newspaper is most important source of 
information about the EEC. 
15 - University lecturer and director of anti-Market group, 
E lectures on European politics, age 29, male, Conservative, 
Public school and university (M. Sc. ), reads the Financial 
Times, most important sources of information are books 
and contacts abroad. 
16 - Secretary of anti-market group, age 30, female, Conser- 
S. I. vative, Public School, reads Telegraph and Express 
infrequently, important sources of information are M. P. 's 
and non-government publications. 
20 - University lecturer 
(economics), age 29, male, Labour, 
E Grammar School and university (Ph. D. ), reads all the 
national dailies, most important sources of information 
are newspapers and personal contacts. 
29 - Retired teacher, spends great deal of time writing to 
S. I. people about the Common Market and organized local Keep 
Britain Out Campaign, aged about 65, female, Conservative, 
Grammar school and university, reads Telegraph and Express, 
most important sources of information are leaflets from 
the Safeguards Campaign and the Keep Britain Out campaign. 
35 - Harbour master, age 63, male, Conservative 
(but says he'll 
S. I. quit if the Tories take Britain into Europe), Grammar 
school, reads the Express and Mail, most important sources 
of information are the pamphlets of the Open Seas Forum. 
40 - Lorry driver, age 59, uncommitted voter, male, Elementary 
U-B school and Navy training, reads Telegraph and Express, 
most important sources of information are newspapers. 
47 - Housewife, age 68, Conservative, female, Ordinary school, 
U-B reads the Express, most important source of information 
is the Express: 
48 - Housewife, age 30, female, no party affiliation, 
U-B Secondary Modern school, reads Sunday Mirror, most 
important source of information is television. 
56 - Small farmer's wife, age 41, female, Conservative, 
S. I. Grammar school and domestic science and music colleges, 
no newspaper but often listens to the radio, most 
important source of information is the radio. 
60 - Retired Naval Officer, about age 61, male, Conservative, 
Grammar School and advanced Navy training, reads 
Telegraph, most important source of information is the 
newspaper. 
65 - Car park attendant, age about 50, Liberal, male, Village 
U-B school, reads the Mirror, most important source of 
information is the newspaper. 
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66 - Retired carriage hand, age 68, male, Independent voter, U-B Church of England school, no newspaper, television is 
most important source of information. 
68 - National secretary of a fisherman's organization, age 
S. I. 45, male, no party affiliation, Grammar school and 
College of Navigation, Telegraph reader, most important 
sources of information are personal contacts with 
Government ministers, M. P. 's, civil servants. 
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couple indicated that they had left before), but was used 
to provide a category for the people who indicated that they 
did not continue their education beyond the school leaving 
age, which for most of these people was fourteen years. 
This factor showed a newspaper preference for the 
Daily Express and The Telegraph, with four readers each. 
Only one individual said that he read all of the national 
newspapers every day. The Mail, The Times, The Financial 
Times and The Mirror also had one reader each. Four 
individuals (twenty-eigth per cent of the factor) did not 
read any newspaper. 
This factor relied most heavily on newspapers as their 
most important source of information about the Common 
Market. However, one of these people said that he did not 
feel that his newspaper provided enough of the sort of 
information he wanted. He was countered by another subject 
who reported that she was against the Common Market because 
her newspaper (The Daily Express) provided a special reason 
everyday why one should be against British membership. Of 
the rest of the people in the factor, two obtained most of 
their information through direct contact with "interestedt' 
Members of Parliament or Civil Servants, and two relied on 
television. One individual preferred books for his infor- 
mation and one the radio. 
The people on this factor had not had a great deal of 
contact with foreigners. Seven of them (fifty per cent of 
the factor) had never travelled abroad, and only one said 
that he often went abroad. Six individuals said that they 
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had been abroad either ""occasionally+" or "seldom"". 
In summary, this factor was predominantly Conservative, 
and equally divided between opinion leaders who tended to 
be either workers in the campaign against British membership, 
or associated with fishing and farming interests. The 
factor was slightly older than the average for the sample, 
so the people would tend to be in their late forties, rather 
than mid-thirties as was the case for Factor 1. Factor 2 
was neither as well educated not as well informed as Factor 
1, and the individuals did not often travel abroad or have 
contact with other Europeans. 
Composite Q-sort for Factor 2. The composite Q-sort 
for Factor 2 appears in Table 12, and Table 13 gives the 
four statements with which the factor most agreed and the 
four with which they most disagreed. 
The stand of this factor against British membership in 
the Common Market was characterized by their belief that 
Britain's true role was in the leadership of the Commonwealth. 
This was accompanied by a strong undercurrent of condescension 
for and mistrust of Continental Europeans especially the 
Germans and the French. 
They felt that to go into Europe would be to reject 
their "kith and kin" in the Commonwealth, which they regarded 
as not only a viable, but also a more acceptable and more 
natural alternative to membership in the E. E. C. They 
argued that the key to Britain's position in the world was 
her worldwide (that is, Commonwealth) market. They did not 
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feel that the cause of her economic decline stemmed from 
anything inherently wrong with this set up, but was due to 
industrial strife in the country. They felt that if there 
were "more co-operation and understanding between management 
and the labour unions, this country could be great again 
economically without the Common Market". (Statement 94, +3) 
Although they said that they recognized that Britain 
had declined economically, they did not accept that this had 
caused a concomitant decline in her political sovereignty 
or independence. Thus, they did not feel that it would be 
the end of Britain's role as an important state if she 
did not go into Europe. Therefore, to them, to join the 
E. E. C. would mean robbing the British people of their freedom 
of action, which they felt to be "a reactionary step which 
would remove power a giant step away from the people". 
(Statement 73) 
This factor feared that once inside the E. E. C., if 
things started to go wrong, there would be nothing the 
British Government or Parliament could do about it, and 
the E. E. C. commission would not be sympathetic to British 
interests. Britain then would lose her national identity, 
have her sovereignty impaired and her institutions 
weakened. On the domestic front, they felt that membership 
in the Community would mean a lost of the British standard 
of social priorities and health care which they valued. 
They maintained a strong faith in Britain's role as a 
major world power due to her position at the head of the 
Commonwealth, and disagreed most strongly that, "Perhaps a 
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Table 13 
Strongest Agree and Disagree Statements Factor 2 
+5 
18. For Britain to turn its back on the Commonwealth and go 
into Europe I feel would be a totally wrong decision. 
89, The Treaty of Rome would rob future generations of 
their freedom of action and this is something that 
should never be forced through the British Parliament. 
82. The French and German farmers, with much less 
efficient farms than ours, need an outlet for their 
surplus products, and they intend to make us pay for 
them. 
95. Going into Europe is too costly for Britain. 
-5 
58. The whole structure of the agricultural industry, the 
scale of the enterprise, the quality of British farming 
and their grasp of modern technologies leaves no doubt 
that the industry has nothing to fear and much to gain 
from Common Market entry. 
42. I can't see any argument whatsoever for Britain not 
going into the Common Market. 
54. I don't think that the Commonwealth has anything to 
offer us as an alternative to the Common Market. 
13. Perhaps a graceful and comfortable decline into 
international impotence is what we really want. 
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graceful and comfortable decline into international 
impotence is what we really want". (Statement 13, -5) 
On the other hand, this factor wanted it to be made 
very clear that they were not against the Common Market itself, 
but were merely against Britain joining it. They thought 
that the Treaty of Rome and the institutions which it 
established were perfectly good enough for the French, 
Germans and Italians who designed them, but they were not 
good enough for the British people: 
The Common Market would be incompatible 
with our way of life. (Statement 62, +3) 
If we enter Europe we will be abandoning 
more than any other nation. (Statement 
67, +3) 
The E. E. C. 's invitaion to Britain to become a member 
was regarded with some suspicion. The factor was "not 
convinced that the countries already in the Common Market have 
made anything like the amount of progress they like to give 
the impression they have". (Statement 99, +4) Nor were 
they convinced that the concept of a united Europe was even 
an entirely feasible one. They did not believe that it 
would ever be possible to have a single functional European 
parliament because "the different member states don't work 
a parliament in the same way". (Statement 92, +3) What 
seemed to worry them most in this area was that "the French 
and German farmers, with much less efficient farms than ours 
need an outlet for their surplus products and they intend 
to make us pay for them". (Statement 82, +5) As a result 
of this, they feared that the British agricultural industry, 
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even in spite of its technological superiority, would suffer. 
One of the main arguments this factor used against 
British membership was that it would be too costly for 
Britain. To a somewhat lesser extent (rated +3) they felt 
that "The prospect of a sharp increase in food prices is an 
adequate reason for staying out of the E. E. C. " (Statement 
76) 
Basically, they saw the Common Market as an exclusive 
club for big business men, bankers and international 
financiers, to the detriment of the ordinary people who will 
be made to suffer for the further gains of the already 
wealthy. 
In terms of defence, they did not envisage any achievement 
of an E. E. C. based defence community over what had already 
been done by NATO. 
The depth of this factor's antipathy to Germany which 
seemed to lie behind a number of their arguments against 
British membership, was summed up in Statement 87, rated 
+3: 
The British people knew in the '30's that 
war was the only way to combat the cruel 
terror of Nazi Germany, and have freedom for 
their own people and the people of Europe, 
and they certainly are not going to sit 
down under a small section of German 
dominated Western Europe now. 
Factor 3- Socialists against the Common Market 
Factor 3 rated itself moderately strongly against 
British membership in the Common Market with an average 
rating for the factor of 9.2. However, they did not feel 
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that the issue would make much difference in their daily 
lives and rated themselves 5.4 on the involvement questions - 
nearly neutral. 
Demographic Data. The demographic data for Factor 
3 is given in Table 14 and a short profile of each of the 
people on factor 3 is given in Table 15. 
This was the smallest and most homogeneous of the 
four Q-sort factors. There were four individuals on the 
factor, all of whom were men. It was also the youngest 
factor with an average age of 26.5 years, nearly eighteen 
years younger than the average for the total sample. 
All four of the people on Factor 3 had attended a 
Public School and all had been or then were currently enrolled 
at Cambridge University, although there was twenty-one years 
difference in the ages of the eldest individual and the two 
youngest. All of them had read history or history and 
economics. Two of them were still undergraduates, one was 
a Research Fellow and one was the economics editor of a 
national newspaper. However, they were not mutual 
acquaintances. 
None of these people was a member of a political party, 
but two supported the Labour Party, while the other two 
expressed socialist beliefs but dissociated them from any 
party labels. 
Although the factor listed a prodigious amount of 
diverse weekly reading material, they sharedapreference for 
The Times and The Guardian with two readers each. Their 
169 
Table 1. a 
Derro r : )c2i_c i; st& 
^'htal subjects 4 
"lasýificat 
. on .. ýýý_te collar, uninrorrr+er' 7f., 
Flue collar, un; n_Eorrred 0 
1p ecial -viterest 0 a 
7x )ert 1 2" 
Average sel F-ranking 9.2 
Avera(e age 26.5 years 
^emale 0 0 
pale 4 100 
Political party 
0onEzervative 0 0 
Labour 2 fl 5 
Liberal 0 0 
Mo party 2 50;, 
education 
^lementa. ry 0 0 
Secondary 0 0 
Technical or training college 0 0 
University 4 1oo 
Ne-ý7spa, per 
Times 2 50 
Guardian 3 75 
Telegraph 1 25" 
,. 7x; ress 0 0 
0 0 
Financial Times 1 250' 
Mirror 0 0 
All national dailies 0 0 
Observer 1 25°' 
170 
Table 15 
Prorile of Fuhjects ^actor 3 
4- University student (history), age 20, male, no party 
a ili ation, Public school and university, reads Times, 
newspapers anj personal contacts and travel in ?: uroDe 
anq 1r _ca are most important sources of it ? ornation. 
7-7,1ivers ty research fellow (historyl, ade rn. ale, 
no party ajoFiliation, Public school and university, 
read Ti piles an, 1 Chseerver, rilost iw portailt sourCc: s oP 
in orration are newspapers and discussions with 
colleacuos. 
27 - newspaper economics editor, age 4E1 , 'Hale, Labour, Public school and university, reads Guardian, ^inancial 
T nes am Telegraph, most >ortant sources of irýio_r lna do 
are 77^ visits and ; ublications, tT. K. ex; erts and books. 
74 - Univers ty student (history and economics), age 20, iitale, 
Labour, Public school and university, reads the Guardian, 
most important sources of information about the r^, C. are 
personal contacts and listening to radio (subject was 
in Africa during the sumriter of 1971, so radio was 
principal source in this period). 
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sources of information about the Common Market were also 
varied. The editor got most of his information from experts 
on the Common Market in the United Kingdom. One person had 
spent most of the summer of 1971 in Africa and had had to rely 
on the BBC World Service for his information. The other 
two people felt that they got most of their information 
from their newspapers, and discussions with friends, colleagues 
or family. All of the members of Factor 3 were widely 
travelled and all read and spoke at least one foreign 
language, and sometimes read European newspapers. Two had 
lived abroad, one in Nigeria and Tanzania, and the other in 
Holland, France and Swaziland. 
The person typified by this factor would be male, in 
his twenties, with a University education. He would be a 
socialist, who read a large number of books, periodicals 
and newspapers and who had travelled extensively abroad. 
Composite Q-sort of Factor 3. The composite Q-sort 
for factor 3 appears in Table 16 and the four statements 
which were most agreed with and the four most disagreed with 
are given in Table 17. 
This factor stressed that it was not only against 
British membership in the European Economic Community, but 
also did not approve of the institution itself. 
They regarded the Common Market as a big businessmen's 
Club, with a membership of the rich and powerful, who 
sought to preserve and enhance their positions, to the 
detriment of not only the ordinary man in the street in 
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Table 17 
Strongest Agree - Disagree Stateulents Tactor 3 
+5 
50 One of the things that bothers me is that the debate on 
British entry into the Common T, arket has been concentrates' 
too ; auch on the short-term economic problems. 
100 Political stren; j tri and econo: nic strength are very 
closely connected. Britain isn't i oli ti_cally sovereign 
now and 'hasn't been for some time because of her 
economic decline. 
49 I suspect that the impetus is already slipping in the 
Coimnon Harket. 
6 It Woulj be disastrous for ^ngland to (-To into the 
r orn mon I-: arket and remain of the opinion that no other 
measures are necessary to improve her economic 
er orrnance. 
-5 
9 The political arguments are overwhelmingly in favour 
of British entry into the Common Harket, simply because 
the alternative would be to submerge ourselves in an 
economic and political relationship with the United 
States. 
4 The 771' has already progressed rar enour-'h to show that 
the ý. +, ýlole conce; t is entirely feasible and that it is 
the only ; -t, acticable way of coping with outdated 
natiodalisr, l. 
26 'rive p rob' e, i co? ý es back to how we can best safe;, ruarcý our 
interests overseas and our national interests. I think 
the only way we can do it is with closer grouping with 
our ruropean neighbours whose economic and political 
systems in terms of development are broadly similar to 
our own.. 
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The Common Market is a retrogressive 
organization that is serving to intensify 
the polarization of resources in a world 
where the sheer demands of population are 
making siuch polarization not merely un- 
fortunate but fatal. (Statement 33, +3) 
Even in its own terms, with which the factor did not 
agree, these people did not consider the Common Market to be 
an economically conceived unit and gave as an example of this 
its "continual failure ... to produce a coherent and equitable 
agricultural policy". (Statement 72, +4) Furthermore, they 
suspected that what impetus there was inside the Common 
Market was already beginning to slip, and that the countries 
already in the E. E. C. had not made the sort of progress they 
liked to give the impression they had. 
Although they do not regard the Common Market as a 
compassionate society where the social priorities were right, 
they did think that in manyrespects, social service benefits 
were a great deal higher there than they were in Britain. 
They did not believe that the Soviet Union would 
attack Western Europe militarily, whether or not NATO had 
conventional or nuclear weapons, but they did fear that the 
integration of the Six in the E. E. C. would mean a hardening 
of the divisions between Eastern and Western Europe. As a 
result, they argued, the more integrated West Germany became 
in the Common Market, the less likely it would be that she 
could ever be re-united with East Germany. 
The whole campaign for British membership in the Common 
Market was viewed askance by this factor. First of all, 
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they thought that the debate had centred too much on the 
short-term economic problems, and that the decision to join 
the community was being made in "terms of criteria which 
were effectively twenty years out of date". 
They also feared that the decision to take Britain 
into Europe would be used as an excuse to dodge decisions 
which should be taken by Britain herself: 
Euro-mania is a typical disease of leading 
politicians for whom the thought of moving 
awkward economic decisions to institutions 
in Brussels where they are well insulated 
from democratic process is understandably 
attractive. (Statement 12, +4) 
They went on to warn that shirking responsibility in this 
manner would not be good enough: "It would be disastrous for 
England to go into the Common Market and remain of the 
opinion that no other measures are necessary to improve her 
economic performance". (Statement 6, +5) 
The factor strongly agreed with the idea that Britain 
was not then politically sovereign because of her economic 
decline, and would have to decide, not whether or not she 
wanted to be independent, but the kind of dependence or 
inter-dependence she wanted with other countries. However, 
they did not think that the failure of Britain to join the 
E. E. C. would spell her down fall or conversely, that member- 
ship would mean automatic national salvation, and they laid 
the blame for these beliefs squarely on the doorstep of the 
British press. 
In fact, they feared that British membership of the 
E. E. C., "would raise a barrier against the future extension 
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of socialism". (Statement 10, +3) 
What they would prefer would be some form of world 
government and they would rather work in that direction than 
to tie "ourselves to the small rich man's club of Western 
Europe". (Statement 69, +3) But meanwhile, "Perhaps a 
graceful and comfortable decline into international impotence 
is what we really want". (Statement 13, +4) 
Although this factor was opposed to the Common Market 
itself as an institution which operated for the benefit 
of the rich, they made very clear that they held no animosity 
for the European people themselves. They though of Britain 
as a European country and strongly rejected any slurs on the 
present performance of Germany and France in terms of their 
roles in World War II. 
Factor 4- Timid Pro-Market Factor 
Factor 4 was only moderately in favour of British 
membership in the Common Market and the individuals on the 
factor gave themselves, on average, a self-rating of 3.8. 
They indicated that the issue was only marginally important 
to them with an average involvement score of 4.5. 
Demographic Data. The demographic data for Factor 4 
is given in Table 18 and a short profile of each of the 
individuals on the factor appears in Table 19. 
Of the eight people with a significant loading on the 
factor, six of them were women (seventy-five per cent of the 
factor). Calculating the average age for this factor 
involved a little informed guess-work as several of the ladies 
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49 - Hlaval electrical engineer, age 42, male, Conservative, 
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51 - Large far(, mer's wife, aoe about 47, Female, Conservative, 
S. I. grammar school, reads i'iail and Telegra; T1, most important 
sources oF ini ormnati_ov? are radio, the press, farm 
publications and local meetings for and against entry. 
63 - House\\;; _ 
^e, age 47, fenmale, Independent voter, FiFemueyntary, 
LT-B school, only source of information is televisio-l. 
64 - Housewife, age 37, femi(ale, Independent voter, Secondary 
U-T3 r: odern school, only source of information is television. 
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were reticent to reveal an exact figure; "over twenty- 
one" is not a particularly helpful reply in the case of a 
matron known to have grandchildren. However, the average 
age for the factor was approximately 44 years, about the 
same as the average for the total sample. 
Six of the people on this factor were in the un- 
informed group (seventy-five per cent of the factor), and 
four of these were in the white'collar category. Of the 
two people in the opinion leaders group, one was an expert 
and the other was in the special interest category. The 
former was a Royal Navy Electrical Engineer who had special 
training and responsibilities concerning the Common Market. 
The latter was the wife of a large farmer who was very 
active in her community. 
Five of these individuals had attended a Grammar or 
Public school and two had gone on to University. One lady 
said that she had attended an art school and two ended their 
education at the elementary level. Three of the people had 
never been abroad, two had lived in the United States, and 
one, because of his father's employment, had lived in five 
foreign countries and often travelled abroad. On the whole, 
however, the factor only went abroad ocassionally or not at 
all. 
The factor was predominantly Conservative (six indiv- 
iduals, seventy-five per cent of the factor). The two 
women who were not Conservative said that they were independent 
voters. Of the regular newspaper readers, three preferred 
0 
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The Telegraph, one read The Telegraph and The Mail, and two 
read The Times. Two of the women did not read any news- 
paper regularly. 
Half of this factor said that television was their 
most important source of information about the Common Market, 
while two people preferred their newspaper and one the 
radio. The Naval Officer had been sent on a training 
course about the European Community and felt that this had 
given him his most important information. 
In summary, this factor was made up mainly of 
Conservative women in their mid-forties. With the exception 
of two men on the factor, the education of all its members 
ended at the secondary level. The factor as a whole was not 
particularly well travelled, and most of its members got 
their information about the Common Market from the television. 
The Composite Q-sort for Factor 4. The composite 
Q-sort for Factor 4 appears in Table 20 and the four 
statements with which the factor most agreed and the four 
with which it most disagreed are given in Table 21. 
This factor was very concerned about the state they 
felt that Britain was in and what could be done about it: 
A definitive decision as to the role 
Britain will play in the world must be made 
sometime in the near future because our govern- 
ments cannot continue in this sort of political 
limbo. (Statement 57, + 5) 
They did not feel that the problem was one of a decline 
in British sovereignty parallel to an economic decline, 
but rather one of an undefined malaise in the leadership 
of the country, and a complacency in the people. The cure 
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for this, as the factor saw it, "is a very big challenge, 
and once the challenge is placed before the people, then 
ultimately it will have an invigorating effect". (Statement 
11, +5) 
Although they began with a disclaimer on their com- 
petence to judge the effects of British membership of the 
Common Market, this factor thought that, given the alter- 
native that 
American business in Europe is within the 
next five years going to become the third 
industrial power in the world unless Europe 
can unite to take over the operation her- 
self. (Statement, 19, +3), q 
it was the only course open to Britain which would safeguard 
her interests at home and overseas. "The maintenance of the 
Commonwealth today seems to demand a strong Britain in a 
strong European Community". (Statement 20, +3) 
They stressed, however, that European unity must be 
built on a mergence of and a dependence on national sov- 
ereignties rather than their eradication because, "it's the 
most powerful bond people have invented yet". (Statement 
38, +3) The factor felt that because of the strong sense 
of sovereignty and national history in the countries of 
Europe, they would form a unique political union which would 
provide for and sustain their national differences. 
They were confident that once in the Common Market, if 
something started to go wrong, Britain would have the right 
to raise the issue in Brussels and could expect to receive 
satisfaction as "the Common Market is run by skilled 
politicians who have always paid regard to the national 
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interests of the individual countries". (Statement 64, 
+3) 
On the whole, this factor felt that membership of the 
E. E. C. would ultimately be good for everyone in Britain 
in economic terms. They reasoned that although 
making sacrifices is not pleasant ... it 
would be dreadful to be blamed by your 
children in 20 years time for not joining 
the Common Market just because you would 
not pay a bit more for your butter. (State- 
ment 8, +4) 
However, theyfelt that it would be disasterous for 
Britain to believe that she could rely on the simple fact 
of Common Market membership to improve her economic perfor- 
mance, and they went on to warn that once in the Community, 
"we should have to abandon the idea that it is better to 
strike than to work or we will sink". (Statement 84, 
+5) 
This factor believed that the Russians posed a strong 
military threat to Western Europe and that there could only 
be stability between East and West "if Western Europe becomes 
strong and coherent enough economically and militarily to 
fill the vacuum in Europe itself". (Statement 83, +3) 
Confounded Subjects. A list of the confounded subjects appears 
in Table 22. 
Ten people in the study were confounded - that is, 
they had a significant loading on two factors and therefore 
could not be considered to be on either. Six of these 
individuals were in favour of British membership in the 
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T>>le 22 
? ro Hie, ýo ýFounýýed `=, ubjects 
i. v 9- Company Director, age 55, male, Liberal, Public school, 
S. I. reads Guardian, radio and television are most important 
sources of information about the Com ion Market, r self- 
rank. 
17 - Local Labour Party Organizer, age 37, male, Tabour, 
S. T. Crarmimar school and technical school, reads the ru. ar(dian, 
lists Tribune, New Statesman and Labour Party publications, 
ranks himself 11 on Market entry. 
19 - Clergyman, age 75, male, Labour, Private school, reads 
U-I"' Telegraph, newspapers and television are most important 
sources of information, ranks himself 3 on ý arket entry. 
32 - Company executive, age 52, male, Conservative, Public 
school, reads Thies and ''inancial Times, most important 
sources of information are ongginal (ocurnents and ^"r 
publications, ranks himself 5 on entry. 
54 - Production T-Manager, age 21, male, Conservative, reads 
U-" the Telegraph, Technical College education, news? =aper, '; 
are most important source of information on the T^C, 
2 self-rank. 
52 - Large ^ar; rer and Company nirector, aoe 52, male, 
Conservative, Grammar school and technical college, 
reads Telegra. p . and Dail, visits to Brussels andv 
National Tarmers' Union are most important sources of 
information, ranks himself 1. 
59 - retired, age 63, male, Labour, Ordinary school, no 
U-B newspaper, television is most important source of 
infornmati_on, ranks himself 11 on market entry. 
62 - Electrical engineer, age 55, male, Conservative, Public 
? T-ttT school and engineering college, reads Telegraph, television 
is most important source of information, self-rank 1. 
72 - Politician, 44, male, Conservative, Grammar school, reads 
r all the national dailies, discussions with people all 
over the world is most important source of information, 
ranks himself 11 on entry. 
73 - University student (law), age 20, male, no political party, 
U-T. ' reads Times and Telegraph, Public school and University 
education, father who works in TTC is most important 
source of information, ranks himself 3 on entry. 
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Common Market and four were against. All four of the 
anti-Market subjects had a significant negative loading on 
Factor 1 and a significant loading on Factor 2. Three of the 
pro-Market individuals were split between Factor 1 and 
Factor 5, which had only these three loadings so could not 
be analyzed. The other three pro-Market subjects had 
significant loading on Factors 1 and 4. 
Individuals with No Significant Loading on the Q-Factors 
A short profile of the individuals with no significant 
loading on any factor appears in Table 23. 
After hand rotation of the factors, there were nine 
people who had no significant loading at all. Whether 
in favour or against British membership in the Common 
Market, these subjects tended to rate themselves much 
nearer the neutral point on entry than did subjects who had 
a significant loading on any of the factors. On the whole, 
these people were also much less decided about the issue 
and did not feel themselves particularly involved. 
All three of the pro-Market individuals in this group 
gave themselves a rating of 5 (only slightly in favour of 
British entry). There was one neutral subject and the 5 
anti-Market individuals had an average rating of 8.6. 
Summary 
The factor analysis of the Q-sort data produced four 
distinct factors. 
Factor 1 had twenty-eight individuals who strongly 
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Table 23 
Profile, Subjects with To Sic; ylifi_cant Load-* 
14 - Journal editor, afje 53, reale, no political party, 
rrarr, rr. ar school and University e: 11. ucation, reads many 
netrspaýe_rs daily its several lajný. ýu, )ri, -ost 
important 
sources o^ information are the press and o Ei_ci_rl 1 
releases, rrmlcs h: _mse-1I 5 on mar? (, --, t entry. 
35 - ''armer, ate 47, male, r; ors(ý, rv, --. tive, ^ramnar school, 
. 7. rea('c t17c I, 'a . 
l, newspaper is : -ost ;T ýoý^týnt s; ýrce of i `i ^orr: at'_ýJ , ra-n""s Y1im Egli ^ on e. ry. 
3i- ar r, ýF, 1i le', Oohs 'r iz tiv , 
rccon ?? r ýs c1hrýol, 
ý. T. reads a local ne sp aý Er and Ti)Tes oricF \ýTF''P'ý \ý, 'F en it 
carries the a firicultural sup l. ýfýLent for w' ich %C. i_. e 
nj en m tervie ed , most 
i itt ortatn l source of at ion is 'armerst tTnion literature car the farm correS_DO1idest 
"or the Times, ranks himself 5 on entry. 
38 - Fanner, age 68, male, Liberal, Grammar school, reads t, ýe 
S. I. Guars' i a: ý, newspaper and television are the ? nos t 
i mportan? t sources of in_for nation, ranks himself 6 on 
entry. 
41 - Housewife, ace 55, Conservative, Public school and SR'' 
U-T diploma, reads Telegraph, ? dost important sources of 
information are newspapers and government pamphlets, 
ranks herself 7 on Market entry. 
44 - green grocer, acre 37, male, Conservative, Gram mar school, 
S. T. reads the nx; ress, most important source of information 
is the fruit trade paper and the Sunday Times, ranks 
himself ý, on entry. 
46 - Housewife, age 23, female, no political party, secondary 
U-B , nodern school and technical training, reads the Express, 
most important source of information is television, ranks 
herself 10 on Parket entry. 
53 - 'Welfare Officer, age 42, female, no political party, 
U-WW7 secondary modern and education courses, reads Telegraph, 
most important sources of information are newspapers and 
television, ranks herself 5 on entry. 
55 - Solicitor, age 28, male, Conservative, reads the Telegraph, 
U-7i Public school and University, most important sources or 
information are newspapers, ranks himself 8 on entry. 
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favoured British membership in the E. E. C. They presented 
a coherent set of reasons for wanting membership and a clear 
idea of what they expected it to do for Britain. While 
approaching the economic questions with pragmatic arguments, 
this factor hoped that ultimately strong integration in the 
Common Market would lessen blatant nationalism and lead to 
a federal state of Western Europe. 
The fourteen individuals on factor 2 were adamantly 
against British membership in the Common Market. They felt 
that Britain's role was at the head of the Commonwealth, and 
given more co-operation between unions and management, 
this arrangement was adequate to her needs. They stressed 
that they were not against the Common Market itself, as 
they thought it was quite good enough for the French, 
Germans and Italians, but they did not think that it was a 
suitable institution for Britain to join. 
Factor 3, with only four people, not only objected 
to Britain joining the E. E. C., but also to the Community 
itself. They saw it as a rich mans club, operating at the 
cost of the poor of the world and serving to intensify the 
differences between rich and poor. 
The eight individuals on Factor 4 expressed a general 
feeling of unease about the state Britain was in, but did 
not feel competent to say definitively what should be done 
about it. They thought that membership in the Common Market 
appeared to be the best solution for her problems open to 
Britain, so long as the Community evolved in a manner that 
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did not threaten her national sovereignty or the Common- 
wealth. 
There were ten confounded subjects who appeared on more 
than one factor, and nine individuals who did not have a 
significant loading on any of the factors. 
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CHAPTER VT 
ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL JUDGEMENT DATA 
In this chapter, the judgement of opinion statements 
about the Common Market by the individuals in the study will 
be analyzed. This will be done in two ways. First, differences 
and similarities in judgement will be sought between the Q- 
factors. Then the judgements made by all of the individuals 
will be studied to determine if their feelings for or 
against British membership, or their sense of involvement 
in the issue had any bearing on the matter. 
Seventy-three of the seventy-five individuals in the 
study completed the judgement part of the test correctly and 
it is their responses which will be considered% 
1. JUDGEMENTS MADE BY THE Q-FACTORS 
In the review of the literature on social judgement 
in Chapter II it was seen that several authors worked from 
the hypothesis than an individual's own attitude about an issue 
influenced his judgement of items about the issue. However, 
not all of these authors shared the same hypothesis about 
how and why the attitude does influence. This research will 
address itself only to the first hypothesis - the question 
if attitude is a factor in social judgement. 
In previous studies, all of the individuals "fort' an 
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issue have been compared will all of the individuals who 
have indicated that they-were "against" the issue. With the 
Q-factors, it becomes possible to make finer distinctions 
on the basis of an individual's total attitude . about 
the issue rather than merely whether he is "for" or "against! '.. 
In this section, the judgements made by the individuals 
on the four Q-factors were studied first by the Q-sort factor to 
see if there was any difference due to attitude alone. 
Following this, the factors were examined in pairs to try and 
determine if there were some characteristic other than the 
specific attitude expressed by the factors influencing their. 
judgement. - 
Judgements made by individual factors 
The first step in the analysis of the judgements made 
by the individual factors was to calculate the mean score 
given to each of the fifty statements by the individuals 
on each of the four factors. These means are given in 
Appendix F. 
The mean for each statement across all four factors 
was calculatel and these means also appear in Appendix F. 
A median split was taken on the means across the four 
factors to separate the statements which were judged to 
be "pro" Market from those judged to be anti-Market. This 
division came slightly to the pro-Market side of the scale 
on which six was "neutral", one was t"Extremely pro-Market" 
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and eleven was "Extremely anti-Market". The lowest 
rated anti-Market statements were number twenty-three 
and twenty-eight in the test booklet (Appendix D), both 
with a mean score of 5.7. These two statements were rated 
as slightly favourable to membership in the E. E. C., or neutral 
by all four factors. A third statement (number eight) included 
in the anti-Market group had a neutral mean score (6.4) across 
the four factors, but this differed from the other two 
borderline statements in that it was rated slightly anti- 
Market by Factors 1 and 4 (the pro-Market factors), neutral 
by Factor 2, one of the anti-Market factors, and slightly 
pro-Market by Factor 3, the other anti-Market factor. This 
split would appear to indicate that there were slightly 
more clearly pro-Market statements than anti-Market state- 
ment, although originally the intention was to have the 
same number of each. 
Scatter plots were made between each of the four factors 
to compare the mean scores given to the statements. These 
plots are given in Tables 24-29 and show graphically that all 
of the Factors rated pro-Market statements as pro-Market 
and anti-Market statements as anti-Market with the exception 
of the three statements mentioned previously. 
The next step was to determine if there was any dif- 
ference in the extremity of the ratings given by the dif- 
ferent factors. This was done by counting the number of times 
each of the eleven rating categories was used by each of the 
four factors. These numbers are given in Table 30 and the 
relationship between the four factors is shown by the bar 
TABLE 24 
STATEMENT MEANS 
















Scatter Plots Factors 1 and 3 
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graphs in Tables 31 through 36. 
Two things immediately become obvious when these 
Tables are examined. First, as was seen in the median split 
of the statement means, all of the factors thought there were 
more pro-Market than anti-Market statements, and all four 
factors gave relatively more extreme ratings to the pro- 
Market end of the scale than they did at the anti-Market end. 
The second thing to emerge from these comparisons of 
ratings was that two factors gave more extreme ratings at both 
ends of the scale than did the other-two, and these factors 
did not divide along pro-anti lines. Pro-Market Factor 1 
and anti-Market Factor 3 gave very similar ratings to the 
statements, both using categories 1 and 2 twenty times, and 
categories 10 and 11 ten and thirteen times respectively. 
On the other hand, anti-Market Factor 2 and pro-Market 
Factor 3 both made much less use of the categories at the 
two extremes of the scale. Factor 2 placed fifteen statements 
in the first two pro-Market categories, while Factor 4 
used these categories thirteen times. At the other end of 
the scale, the difference between these two factors on the 
one hand and Factors 1 and 3 on the other was much more pro- 
nounced. Factor 2 rated four statements as extremely anti- 
Market and Factor 4 used these categories only once. 
Comparison of Ratings by Q-Factors 
In order to test for any significant difference in the 
extremity of ratings used by the different factors, it was 




^requency of T ati. n j Category Use 
FACTORS 
7at'n(-1 1 2 3 4 
Category 
1 4 2 7 3 
2 16 13 13 10 
3 4 7 3 10 
4 2 3 3 1 
5 0 2 1 2 
1 2 2 3 
7 4 1 2 4 
3 5 2 9 
ii 4 7 
10 10 4 10 1 
11 0 0 3 0 
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TABLE 31 
FREQUENCY OF CATEGORY USE 
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TABLE 32 
FREQUENCY OF CATEGORY USE 
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TABLE 33 
FREQUENCY OF CATEGORY USE 
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TABLE 34 
FREQUENCY OF CATEGORY USE 
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TABLE 35 
FREQUENCY OF CATEGORY USE 
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TABLE 36 
FREQUENCY OF CATEGORY USE 
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would represent his over all rating pattern. This was done 
by taking the sum of the ratings given to the twenty-five 
pro-Market statements and subtracting it from the sum of the 
ratings of the anti-Market statements. This was always a 
positive number as the anti-Market end of the scale was 
numerically higher. This was termed the A-P score. These 
scores were used in a one-way analysis of variance with 
planned comparisons. In these comparisons, Factors I and 
3 were contrasted with Factors 2 and 4. Factors 1 and 2 with 
Factors 3 and 4, and Factors 1 and 4 were contrasted with 
Factors 2 and 3. The results of this analysis of variance 
using the SPSS programme (Version 6.0) is shown in Table 
37. 
Here, the only significant difference found was when 
pro-Market Factor 1 and anti-Market Factor 3 were contrasted 
with anti-Market Factor 2 and pro-Market Factor 4. 
A second score was obtained for each individual by adding 
the sum of the ratings given to 
the sum of the ratings given to 
This was called the A+P score 
of variance was done using this 
were significant in this test, 
given in Table 38. 
the pro-Market statements to 
the anti-Market statements. 
and the same one-way analysis 
score. None of the contrasts 
the results of which are 
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TABLE 37 
ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE WITH PLANNED COMPARISON 
USING A-P SOGRE 
VALUE S. ERROR T. VALUE D. F. T. PROB. 
CONTRAST 1 52.4 2397 2.2 49 "032 
CONTRAST 2 10.9 23.7 "46 49 "648 
CONTRAST 3 -18.8 23.7 -079 49 "432 
CONTRAST 1= Factors 1 and 3 vs. Factors 2 änd 4 
CONTRAST 2= Factors 1 and 2 vs. Factors 3 and 4 
CONTRAST 3= Factors 1 and 4 vs. Factors 2 and 3 
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TABLE 38 
ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE WITH PLANNED COMPARISON 
USING Ä+P SCORE 
VALUE S. ERROR T. VALUE D. F. T. PROB. 
CONTRAST 1 096 1614 "06 49 0953 
CONTRAST 2 18.3 1614 1.1 49 268 
CONTRAST 3 -5.4 16.4 -"33 49. "743 
CONTRAST 1= Factors 1 and 3 vs. Factors 2 and 4 
CONTRAST 2= Factors 1 and 2 vs. Factors 3 and 4 
CONTRAST 3= Factors 1 and 4 vs. Factors 2 and 3 
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`, 
2" JUDGEMENTS MADE BY ALL INDIVIDUALS 
In this section, the judgements made by all seventy-three 
individuals, irrespective of whether or not they appear on 
a Q-factor, will be analyzed. Here the intention was to see 
if the simple indication of being for or against British 
membership in the Common Market, or the feeling of involve- 
ment in the Common Market issue would have any influence on 
the individuals judgement of statements about the issue. 
It was a relatively simple matter to divide the 
individuals into pro-Market and anti-Market groups. This was 
done on the basis of the rating they gave themselves on the 
question "please rate your own opinion on British entry into 
the Common Market". (Question 51 in Test Booklet, Appendix D) 
Everyone with a rating of one through five was put in the pro- 
Market group and everyone with a rating of seven through 
eleven was placed in the anti-Market group. The few individuals 
who rated themselves "neutral" on the issue were placed in 
one or the other of the groups according to the attitude 
they expressed in the Q-sort. There were forty-four individuals 
who rated themselves pro-Market and twenty-nine individuals 
indicated that they were anti-Market. 
It was slightly more difficult to divide the people 
into high involvement and low involvement groups. This was 
done on the basis of their responses to the last five items 
in the Test Booklet which dealt with weir feelings of involve- 
ment in the issue. An involvement: score was calculated for 
each individual by taking the mean of the ratings given to the 
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five questions. The problem of dividing the individuals 
on the basis of this score arose from the fact that while 
the range of the scores was from 1.0 to 10.2, all but five 
of the people rated themselves between 110 and 5.8. Event- 
ually, it was decided to make the division between high and 
low involvement mid-way through the 390 category so the 
division came between the four individuals with a score of 
3.2 and the three people with a score of 3.4. These two 
groups could perhaps better be termed the high and not so 
high involvement categories although the division is probably 
more reasonable than it would appear at first glance. The 
testing was done at a time when the Government and the mass 
media were daily telling people how important the Common 
Market issue was to everyone in the country and how much it 
would influence everyone's daily life. Therefore there was 
probably a certain amount of social stigma attached to the 
negative end of the scale. In the end, there were forty 
people in the high involvement group and thirty-three in the 
"low" involvement group. 
To test for the influence of attitude and involvement 
on the judgement of individuals, a two-way analysis of 
variance of attitude by involvement was done using the Ä-P 
score of each individual. The analysis was first performed 
by hand using the method for unequal cell distributions des- 
cribed by Edwards (1970). The treatment means for this 
analysis are given in Table 39 and the results of the 
analysis of variance are shown in Table 40. In this analysis 
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'7able 39 






Pro Var. ket Anti Market Suu o 
Nears 
Involvemeizt 3.2 3.2 ;. ý 
low 
Involvernert 3. I'D 2.7 5.7 
Sum Oi 





Analysi§ o-P Variance 
After EDWARDS. USING 
A-p SCORES 50 
source of `Tar_i_ance cif !, -el-in ý ýuýrc 
ttiti). (l e1.11) P- .7 
Ins, -OlzrýTi'ný L1 .11 -1.7 
YT1 . 02 .7 
^rrý1, t, ° . , 73 
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there was a significant difference in judgement between 
individuals in the high involvement and low involvement 
groups. 
This analysis was repeated using the more appropriate 
SPSS (Version 6.0) programme for analysis of variance, but 
this failed to show any differences between groups using 
either the A-P scores or the A+P scores. The results 
of these analyses are given in Tables 41 and 42. 
Summar y 
The results of all of the analyses done on the judgements 
of statements about the Common Market made by the indiv- 
iduals in this study appear to indicate that the simple desire 
for or agiinst membership in the Common Market, or the 
feeling of involvement in the issue do not significantly 
influence judgement of the issue. However, the analysis of 
variance with planned comparisons did show a significant difference 
when the judgements made by Factors 1 and 3 were contrasted with 
those made by Factors 2 and 4. The possible reasons for this will 
be discussed in the next chapter. 
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TABLE 41 
TWO-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
SPSS PROGRAMME 
USING Ä-P SCORES 





ATTITUDE 1 101518 "86 1.0 
INVOLVEMENT' 1 4105.4 3.5 "06 
ATT. X INV. 1 2086°8 1.8 "18 




ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
SPSS PROGRAMME 
USING 7+P SCORES 




ATT X INV 
RESIDUAL 
1 189.9 "42 1.0 
1 426 *8 "95 1.0 
69 664.7 1.5 1.0 
69 450.8 -- 
CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION 
In the first part of this chapter, the Q-factors will 
be compared and the implications of their composition and 
nature will be discussed. This will be followed in the 
second part by a discussion of the results of the analysis 
of the judgement of items about the Common Market given by the 
individuals in this study. 
2.. DISCUSSION OF THE Q-FACTORS 
The factor analysis of the Q-sort material produced 
two factors (1 and 4) which were favourable to British 
membership in the Common Market, and two factors (2 and 3) 
which opposed membership. Yet, while the people in the two 
factors of each persuasion had reached -a-similar stand on the 
specific question of British membership, their general 
approach to the issue and the nature of the ultimate outcome 
they desired were quite different. In this section, the 
factors will be examined first in pro-market and anti-Market 
groups. Then the differences and similarities between the 
two groups will be discussed. Finally, the cross-persuasion 
grouping of Factors 1 and 3, and Factors 2 and 4 which emerged 
from the study will be discussed. -and-the possible reasons for 
xy 
their similarities will be explored. 
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Pro-Market Factors 1 and 4 
The two factors favourable to British membership in 
the Common Market, Factors 1 and 4, while both agreeing that 
membership would be beneficial to Britain, represented two 
distinct types of people who wanted membership for different 
reasons, and who had different views of the way in which 
the E. E. C. should evolve. 
Factor 1 was made up predominantly of very well 
educated men who were in their mid-thirties, widely travelled 
and who had had a great deal of personal contact within the 
Community countries. More than half of the factor were 
classified as'opinion leaders, and sixty-one percent of these 
were in the "Expert" group. Fifty-six per cent of the 
factor supported the Labour or Liberal parties, while only 
twenty-five per cent said that they voted for the Conservatives. 
In contrast, Factor 4 was composed principally of women 
who were in their middle to late forties. They had a much 
lower educational level and very little personal contact 
in Europe. Seventy-five per cent of the factor were in the 
"Uninformed" category. All but two of the people on this 
factor said that they supported the Conservative party, and 
these two said that they were "independent'" voters. 





FACTORS 1 AND 4 
RANKING STATEMENT 
+4 26 "The problem comes back to how we can best 
safeguard our interests overseas and out 
national interests. I think the only way 
we can do this is with closer grouping with 
our European neighbours, whose economic and 
political systems in terms of development 
are broadly similar to our own". 
+3 58 "The whole structure of the agricultural 
industry the scale of the enterprise, the 
quality of British farming and their grasp 
of modern technologies leaves no doubt that 
the industry has nothing to fear and much 
to gain from Common Market entry". 
+3 3 "The Common Market would be good for us in 
selling and good for us in buying". 
+3 64 "The background fear that if we join the 
Common Market and things are going wrong, 
we shan't be able to put them right is unf- 
ounded. What I think people forget is that 
the Common Market is run by skilled 
politicians who have always paid regard to 
the national interests of the individual 
countries". 
-5 34 "There will be tremendous upheaval and massive 
unemployment if we join the Common Market". 
-5 62 ""The Common Market would be incompatible with 
our way of life". 
-3 71 "The Common Market campaign is an unholy 
alliance between the politicians of different 
parties, between big noises on television 
and the press". 
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for Factors 1 and 4. There were several points on which 
these factors agreed. They both felt that an early decision 
as to Britain's future role was very necessary because they 
did not think that the Government could continue to operate 
in a "political limbo". This decision would have to be 
about with which countries Britain should choose to work 
in order to safeguard her interests. They concluded that 
the Common Market would satisfy Britain's requirements best 
because the member countries were similar to Britain in terms 
of size and development. They saw the 1971 bid for membership 
as Britain's last chance to play a role in the leadership 
of Europe. Rather than fearing domination from Brussels, they 
felt that Britain would be in a position to protect her 
national interests if things started to go wrong. Neither 
factor felt that the E. E. C. would be incompatible with the 
British way of life, or that membership in it would endanger 
the British social services. They did not think that the 
Common Market was operated solely for the benefit of the 
already wealthy, or that it would cause a weakening of the 
position of the poor. 
On the economic side, both factors felt that any short- 
term hardships incurred by membership would be adequately 
recompensed by the long term benefits, and these would be 
good for all aspects of the British economy. They predicted 
that the British agricultural industry's high technological 
level would not only make it equal to competition fron abroad, 
but would help British farmers to surpass their Continental 
counterparts. These factors did not foresee membership in the 
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Common Market causing upheaval, unemployment or hardship for 
workers in Britain. 
Areas of Difference. There were several major areas 
of difference between the two factors. These included 
the question of sovereignty and nationalism, the future of 
the Common Market, alternatives to membership, and Britain's 
role in the Commonwealth, and attitudes about foreigners. 
Attitudes about Foreigners. The most pronounced difference 
between the two factors lay in the opinions they expressed 
about foreigners. Factor 1 was very internationalist in its 
outlook and strongly rejected statements which. were condes- 
cending or derogatory to other peoples or nations. Factor 4, 
on the other hand, contained staunch British nationalists 
who expressed a certain amount of mistrust of other Europeans. 
Factor 1 rejected the idea that Britain was "not a part 
of Europe", and felt that this was a dangerous concept 
which had been behind too much British thinking since the last 
war. Factor 4, however, indicated that they always had had 
the feeling that they were not a part of Europe, and therefore 
did not find this to be a particularly harmful idea. 
On the question of their opinion about Continental 
Europeans, Factor 1 strongly disagreed (rated -4) with the 
statement "As a Briton I must say I don't trust the Con- 
tinentals. In two world wars one has seen the European allies 




The composite score for Factor 4 on this statement was 
zero. However, two individuals on the factor actually placed 
it in the +4 category, and most of the factor gave it a 
slightly "agree" or slightly "disagree" ranking. The same 
pattern was true for three other statements, 53,78 and 87, 
all of which were in some way derogatory or condescending to 
the-Germans or French. All three of these statements were 
placed in the -3 pile by Factor 1, while the composite score 
for Factor 4 was either zero or minus one, indicating that 
some of the individuals in the factor had agreed with them while 
others did not strongly disagree. 
Sovereignty and Nationalism. Another area in which 
there was a marked difference between the two factors was on 
the question of sovereignty and nationalism. To begin, Factor 
1 did not feel that at that time Britain was completely 
sovereign, or indeed that she had been so-for some time because 
of her economic decline. Factor 4 not only felt that 
Britain was politically sovereign, but also that any merger 
with the Common Market should be on the basis of preserving 
and using that sovereignty. 
Factor 1 also saw the Common Market as a useful, practical 
way of dealing with "outdated nationalism", while Factor 4 
felt that Britaish nationalism was something which should be 
protected. 
It was important to Factor 1 that membership in the Common 
Market should lead to a political union of some description 
in Europe, whereas Factor 4 . 
did not want to see any sort of 
union which would jeopardize British sovereignty. 
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Factor 4 looked on membership in the Common Market 
as a means of putting Britain in a stronger position to 
protect the Commonwealth whilst this argument was not im- 
portant to Factor 1. 
Alternatives to the E. E. C. Factor 1 felt that the 
political arguments were overwhelmingly in favour or British 
membership in the Common Market because the alternative as they 
saw it was to submerge Britain in a close relationship with 
the United States. Factor 4 strongly disagreed with this, 
arguing that Britain was politically sovereign, and had her 
relationship with the Commonwealth to fall back on if she 
did not get into the Common Market. 
Two other statements highlighted the difference in the 
attitude and type of the people on the two pro-Market factors. 
Both were placeä in the +5 category by Factor 4 who were 
principally Conservatives from the "Uninformed" groups. 
In contrast Factor 1, the majority of people on which had 
either Labour or Liberal sympathies and some expert knowledge 
about the Common Market, placed these statements in the zero 
category. They were Statement 29 which said that it was inept 
for anyone to claim to have an opinion about the Common Market 
unless he was an expert because the issue could be seen from 
so many sides. The other statement was number 84: 
If we join the Common Market we should have to 
abandon the idea that it is better to strike than 
to work or we will sink. 
Finally, on what they appeared to take as a point of 
information, Factor 1-felt that, "Social service benefits are 
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actually a great deal higher in many respects in the 
Common Market than they are in 'Britain'. Factor 4 strongly 
disagreed with this statement. 
Summary of Pro-Market Factors. In summary, the two 
pro-Market factors both began from the position that Britain 
was in need of something to improve her economy and to safe- 
guard her interests. They both saw the Common Market as the 
best option open to Britain that looked like fulfilling 
those needs. 
From this common ground, however, the view of the two 
factors about what should happen once Britain was in the 
E. E. C., and their attitudes about their prospective partners, 
diverged. 
Factor 1 was international in outlook and felt that 
because of Britain's economic position, she was not completely 
politically sovereign and therefore Britain should look for a 
position of interdepedence with other countries in which 
she could both take and contribute. This factor looked for 
a political union of some sort to grow out of the economic 
cooperation in the Common Market, and hoped that in time 
this would make the baser forms of nationalism obsolete. 
In contrast, Factor 4 was made up of nationalists, who, 
while looking towards the E. E. C. as an economic expedient, 
maintained a staunch belief in the need to preserve British 
sovereignty, and did not want to become politically involved 
in any organization which would demand a surrender of sov- 
ereignty. They also expressed a certain degree of mistrust 
of the Continental members of the Common Market. 
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Anti-Market Factors 2 and 3 
The two factors which opposed British entry to the 
Common Market, Factors 2 and 3, not only held that view for 
distinctly different reasons, but were composed of almost 
antithetic people. Factor 2 was strongly against membership 
in the Common Market and gave themselves an average self- 
rating on the issue of 10.2. This factor also had the highest 
involvement rating of the four factors with an average 
score of 299. In contrast, the people on Factor 3 rated 
themselves as being moderately against membership itself with 
an average score of 902. They indicated that they had only a 
slight feeling of involvement in the issue and rated them- 
selves on average 5.4, the lowest of the four factors. 
Factor 2 was failry evenly divided between "special 
interest" opinion leaders and '? blue collar', uninformed people. 
More than half of this factor said that they supported the 
Conservative Party, and had only one representative each from 
the Labour and Liberal ranks. The rest of the factor said 
that they had no political party preference. 
The education of thirty-six per cent of the individuals 
on Factor 2 ended at the "elementary" level, and only twenty- 
one percent of the factor had gone to University. Half of the 
people on Factor 2 said that they had never been abroad and 
only one said that he often travelled outside Britain. Most 
of this factor relied on their daily newspaper or television 
for their information about the Common Market. 
The people on Factor 3 presented a very different picture. 
Three of them were in the Uninformed "white collar', group 
227 
and the fourth was an "expert". All of these men said that 
they either supported the Labour Party or had socialist 
views which they distinguished from those of the Labour 
Party. They had all been or were then enrolled in University, 
were widely read and travelled, and each spoke at least 
one foreign European language. 
Concensus Statements. The consensus statements for 
the two anti-Market factors are given in Table 44. There 
was, in fact, very little on which these two factors agreed, 
except for their shared scepticism of what the Common 
Market had and would accomplish, and their desire that 
Britain should not be a part of it. 
Neither group thought that it would be the end of 
Britain or her future as an important state if she did not 
get into Europe. They did not believe that the only alternative 
to membership would be an economic and political relationship 
with the United States. These factors did not embrase the 
"cold shower" theory which held that a big challenge would 
wake the British people up and therefore improve their 
economic performance. They both believed that it would be 
wrong to assume that membership of the Common Market would 
be a sufficient remedy for Britain's economic problems. 
Factors 2 and 3 agreed that the Common Market was itself 
a big business men's club and not in the interest of 
"ordinary" people at all. They were not convinced that it 
had made the sort of progress it like to give the impression 




FACTORS 2 AND 3 
RANKING STATEMENT 
+4 37 "I don't think it will be the end of the 
United Kingdom or our future as an im- 
portant state if we don't go into the 
Common Market". 
-5 42 11I can't see any argument whatsoever for 
Britain not going into the Common Market". 
-3 11 "The British people have been so complacent 
and so sheltered for such a long time that 
what is needed is a very big challenge, 
and once the challenge is placed before the 
people, then ultimately it will have an 
invogorating effect". 
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a "'compassionate"' society which had its social priorities 
in the right perspective. 
These factors did not hold the Common Market to be a 
suitable means for dealing with "outdated nationalism" 
(although for different reasons which will be explored later 
in this section), and did not see it as a good first step 
towards political union in Europe. 
Areas of Difference. The first thing which differen- 
tiates these two factors was their basic approach to the 
Common Market itself. Factor 2 indicated that they were not 
against the Common Market, but were just against Britain 
joining it. Factor 3 was against not only Britain joining 
the Common Market, but objected in principle to the aims 
and practices of the organizations itself. Their argument 
was that it served to increase the disparity between the rich 
and poor nations of the world. The statement, "I'm not against 
the Common Market, I'm just against Britain joining it", 
(Statement 27) was ranked +3 by Factor 2 and -3 by Factor 3. 
However, their disapproval of the intentions of the 
Common Market did not prevent Factor 3 from believing that 
social service benefits were in fact a great deal higher 
in many respects in the Community than they were in Britain. 
Factor 2 did not share this opinion. 
Sovereignty and Nationalism. There was a marked 
difference between the attitudes of the two factors over 
the whole issue of national sovereignty. Factor 2 took a 
nationalist stand and argued that Britain was a wholly 
r 
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sovereign state and in the Common Market this sovereignty, 
which should be valued and protected, instead would be 
impaired. Signing the Treaty of Rome they felt would rob 
future generations in Britain of their freedom of action, 
and it would take away the power which of right belonged to 
the British people and Parliament. Another thing to which 
Factor 2 objected in the Common Market was the "written 
constitution and alien laws" which they felt were suitable 
for the Continental Europeans but not for the British people. 
Factor 3, on the other hand, had an international 
outlook. They did not believe that Britain was politically 
sovereign because of her economic decline and that she was 
already dependent on or interdependent with other countries. 
So, as they saw it, the choice was one of with which countries 
Britain should choose to work. They did not feel that signing 
the Treaty of Rome would take any more of Britain's indep- 
endence than any other trading agreement, and argued that it 
was simply a treaty like any other - if it worked against 
Britain's interests, then whe would have the right to do 
something about it. Factor 3 reasoned that there was no 
evidence to support the idea that Britain would lose her 
national identity on joining the Common Market any more than 
Germany and France had lost their when they formed it. 
Attitude to Foreigners. Another area in which there 
was a distinct difference between the two factors was in their 
attitudes about foreigners. Factor 2 felt that the Common 
Market would be incompatible with the British way of life, 
whereas Factor 3 did not. 
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Factor 2 timidly acknowledged (ranked +1) that they had 
"always had the feeling that we're not a part of Europe". 
(Statement 40) They felt strongly that because "British 
people knew in the '30's that war was the only was to combat 
the cruel terror of Nazi Germany", (Statement 87, +3), they 
would not be willing to join an organization which they 
considered to be dominated by Germany. The factor also thought 
that, "It seems almost impertinent for the French to ride so 
high again after their humiliation in the last war". (State- 
ment 78, +2) 
The people on Factor 3 strongly d`n. Sagreed with all of 
these statements, and although they were against membership 
in the Common Market, and even the institution itself. They 
thought that 
The suggestion that people in Britain are not 
as other Europeans are is one of the most 
dangerous and unacceptable of all arguments 
against membership. It has lain behind far 
too much thinking in this country since the 
war. (Statement 52, +2) 
Economics. The economic side of the issue got much 
most consideration from Factor 2 than from Factor 3. In 
fact, Factor 3 was concerned that the debate about joining 
the Common Market had centred far too much on the short- 
term economic problems and it was not ont he economic advantages 
or disadvantages for Britain that they based their case against 
the Common Market. Factor 2, on the other hand, felt very 
strongly that going into the Common Market was too costly for 
Britain, and that the prospect of a major increase in food 
-I. 
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prices was an adequate reason for staying out of the 
Community. 
Defence.: On the question of defence, Factor 3 
thought that it was nonsensical to imagine that the 
Russians would attack Western Europe militarily, whether 
or not the West had nuclear or conventional weapons, and 
that a strong European defence Community would not contribute 
to East-West stability. Factor 2 disagreed with this position 
and indicated that they felt that some sort of deterrent was 
needed to defend Western Europe from the Eastern Bloc 
courries. 
Alternatives to the Common Market. As an alternative 
to membership in the Common Market, Factor 3, perhaps a 
little tongue in cheek, suggested that possibly what was 
really wanted was a "graceful and comfortable decline 
into international impotence". (Statement 13, rated +4 by 
Factor 3) Factor 2 objected very strongly to this proposal. 
They thought that close links with the United States would 
be more palatable than joining the Common Market, an idea 
which Factor 3 dismissed out of hand. Factor 2 thought that 
Britain could be commercially great again if there was 
greater understanding and co-operation between industrial 
management and the trades unions. 
Summary of Anti-Market Factors. Although the anti- 
Market Factors 2 and 3 shared several superficial opinions 
about the Common Market, principally -a scepticism about 
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the amount of progress it had made, there was little 
substantial common ground between them. Factor 3 objected 
to'the Common Market on principle, as well as to Britain 
joining it, but were highly sympathetic to fellow Europeans 
as people and objected to disparaging statements about thei. 
Factor 2, on the other hand, thought that the Common Market 
was a good way of keeping the Germans and French from each 
other throats, but did not th ink that it was an organization 
which was good enough for Britain. Factor 2 thought that 
better labour relations in Britain would solve her economic 
problems without joining the Common Market. 
Cross Persuasion Factors 
In some respects, pro-Market Factor 1 and anti-Market 
Factor 3, and pro-Market 4 and anti-Market Factor2 had more 
in common with each other than they did with the factor 
with which they shared their respective persuasions on the 
Common Market issue. 
Factor 1 and Factors 3. Demographically, the individuals 
on Factors 1 and 3 had a great deal in common. Both of 
these groups of individuals were very well educated, con- 
versant with the literature about the E. E. C., and had travelled 
extensively abroad. Most of them had personal contacts 
within the Common Market. The people on these two factors 
also tended to be younger than those on the other two factors. 
Their views of British sovereignty, and how it would 
be affected by the Common Market were strikingly similar. 
Both factors felt that Britain was neither completely sovereign 
---. d 
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not completely independent because of her economic decline, 
and that the real choice facing her was not whether she 
would be independent, but with which countries she should 
choose to work. These people thought that the Treaty of 
Rome would operate just like any other treaty and if it 
worked against British national interests, Britain could do 
something about it in Brussels. They did not think that 
Britain would be signing away her national identity, any 
more of her sovereignty, or the right of the British 
Parliament and courts to protect her interests or citizens 
by joining the Common Market. 
The other major topic on which these two factors were 
in substantial agreement was their attitude to foreigners 
and the countries of the Continent. Both factors stronoly 
rejected slurs on the French and German national characters 
and the implications that their roles in the last two world 
wars could be used as a yardstick for their present and 
future behaviour. These individuals felt that Britain was 
a part of Europe and that the argument against entry that 
the British were different and better than other Europeans 
was a dangerous one. 
On the economic and social side of the question, the 
factors felt that the Common Market debate concentrated too 
much on short term economic problems and that social service 
benefits in the E. E. C. were in many respects higher than they 
were in Britain. 
Factor 2 and Factor 4. The people on Factors 2 and 4 
235 
also had much in common. They tended to be older than the 
average for the entire sample, and were less well educated 
than Factors 1 and 3. These people did not travel abroad 
very often, were less well informed about. the Common Market 
and tended to rely on newspaper or television for their 
information. The majority of the people on Factors 2 and 4 
were Conservative supporters, while the people on Factors 
1 and 3 tended to be Labour voters. 
The similarities in the Q-sorts between Factors 2 and 4 
were less clear cut than those between Factors 1 and 3. Both 
Factor 2 and 4 were inclined to believe that even though 
Britaini, was in a certain amount of economic difficulty, she 
still maintained her political sovereignty and it would not 
end her future as an important state if she did not get into 
the Common Market, nor did they think that her economic straits 
would put Britain "at a permanent disadvantage" if she did 
go in. 
Neither Factor thought that the political argument 
that Britain should enter the Common Market because the only 
alternative was a close relationship with the United States 
was a reasonable one, and neither wanted a "comfortable 
decline into international impotence" as an alternative. 
Both factors were sceptical about the amount of progress 
the countries already in the Common Market liked to give 
the impression they had made, and did not see it as a com- 
passionate society where the social priorities were right. 
Finally, neither of these factors thought that it was 
a "load of nonsense" to imagine the Russians would attack 
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Western Europe if the countries of the West did not keep 
t heir defences up. 
Discussion and Summary of the Q-Analysis 
Out of the one hundred Q-statements there were two with 
which all four factors agreed to some extent: 
6 It would be disästerous for England to go 
into the Common Market and remain of the 
opinion that no-other measures are necessary 
to improve her economic performance. 
(Factor 1, +3; Factor 2, +4; Factor 3, +5, 
Factor 4, +4) 






things that bothers me is that 
on British entry into the Common 
been concentrated too much on the 
economic problems. 
+2; Factor 2, +2; Factor 3, +5; 
+4) 
Everyone seemed to agree that Britain was in economic 
difficulties and that discussing the issue of short range 
cost-benefit would not solve the problem. The ultimate 
desired solution was different for each of the four factors, 
whether they thought that the first step should or should 
not be membership in the Common Market. 
Factor 1. Factor 1 thought that Britain was not 
completely sovereign and independent, largely due to her 
economic difficulties since the last war. 
These economic problems meant that Britain, while 
remaining a sovereign nation on paper, was financially 
dependent on other nations, and therefore in fact had a certain 
limitation placed on her political options. For them, the 
Common Market presented an attractive solution in which 
Britain would receive economic support from the financially 
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more secure countries. of the Common Market and in return 
would contribute to the organization what the factor felt 
was a greater experience in leadership and world affairs. 
This mutuallys beneficial relationship would be a means 
by which the nations of Western Europe could work together 
without the hindrance of self-defeating petty nationalism. 
Within this set-up the factor felt that Britain's lagging 
industrial capacity would eventually catch up with the more 
profitable industries in other Common Market countires, and 
while there would be financial stringencies in the early 
years, these would be recompensed later when the countries 
in the E. E. C. were able to build up a strong, integrated 
economic and political framework. They did not feel 
that this would cause the nations of Europe to become 
more inward looking, but father would "open up new opportunities 
for a united Europe in the world as a whole". (Statement 
23, +3) 
Factor 2. Factor 2 thought that while Britain was in 
economic difficulties, she had lost neither her political 
sovereignty nor her independence, and they did not approve 
of sacrificing either for what they saw as a nebulous promise 
of economic reward. They held that Britain's most advantageous 
position was as the leader of the Commonwealth and that this 
role should be maintained and strengthened. These people 
saw bad labour relations as the cause of Britain's economic 
problems. Therefore, they were certain that if there was 
greater understanding between workers and management, these 
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problems could be solved without becoming involved in a 
relationship with the Continental Europeans whom they did 
not trust and from whom they felt aloof. 
Once the industrial disputes were taken care of, the people 
on Factor 2 believed that Britain would be much better off 
outside of the Common Market where she could negotiate 
free trade agreements throughout the world which would be 
more beneficial to the large British import market, than being 
limited to the European trading area. 
Factor 3. Factor 3, while acknowledging Britain's 
difficult economic straits, did not approve of Britain being 
part of a strong industrial power bloc, either inside or 
outside the Common Market. The people on this factor were 
in favour of international co-operation but not in any form 
which would further benefit and strengthen the rich countries 
of the world, while making the poor countries proportionally 
even poorer. They felt that not only would an economically 
and politically integrated Western Europe work against 
Third World countries, but would sharpen the divisions 
between Eastern and Western Europe. 
The factor indicated that they would favour some forms 
of world government or co-operation in the future in pref- 
erence to anything which would enforce or strengthen the existing 
world divisions. 
They did not think that Britain was completely sovereign, 
nor did it particularly bother them, and they would not 
mourn a further abnegation of her role as a world economic and 
political power. 
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Factor 4. Factor 4 did not believe that Britain's 
economic difficulties had eroded her political sovereignty or 
her role as a world leader. Although these people felt 
that joining the Common Market was the best alternative open 
to Britain, they wanted this membership to be on terms which 
would not jeopardize her national sovereignty. They did not 
want the Common Market to evolve into a federal state, and 
stressed that any form of political union must be of a nature 
which would preserve and protect Britain's national inst- 
ituitons and identity. The role they seemed to want Britain 
to play vis a vis Europe in the Common Market appeared to 
be cast in a similar mould to that of her relationship with 
the Commonwealth. The people on Factor 4 did not completely 
trust the Continental Europeans and thus would not feel com- 
fortable in any relationship which might subject Britain to 
control from Brussels. 
This factor, like Factor 2, thought that Britain's 
economic decline could at least in part be blamed on industrial 
strife and emphasized that they thought that in the Common 
Market the British workers would have to adopt the idea that 
it was better to work than to strike or the country would 
"sink" . 
Socialists and Conservatives. In attempting to analyze 
the characteristics of these four factors, it is tempting 
to attribute the division between Factors 1 and 3 anti 
Factors 2 and 4 to party political attitudes, and to call 
the former group Labour and the latter group Conservative. 
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This would be too crude, and in any case, not completely 
accurate. 
Factor 1, while being made up of more Labour voters 
than Conservatives in this particular sample, nevertheless 
expressed its attitude about the Common Market, at least 
partially, in terms of opinion statements made by Conservative 
politicians, and there were several influential Conservatives 
and. -Liberals on the factor. Party political persuasion 
is evidently not a sufficient or even necessary condition 
to distinguish people on this factor from those on the 
other factors. 
Factor 3 appeared to espouse a politically estranged 
socialist ideology and while two of the people said they 
support the Labour Party, it would be difficult to imagine 
finding a member of the Manifesto Group in this factor. 
The socialists (Labour and otherwise) on Factors 1 and 
3 both support international co-operation, and recognize the 
interdependent nature of nations in the modern world, What 
would appear to separate them is how these interrelationships 
should work. The socialists on Factor 1, who all associated 
themselves with the Labour Party, were of the social demo- 
cratic school and saw advantages both of scale, of production 
and of enhanced state control in the Common Market. The 
people on Factor 3 contrasted sharply, for while they shared 
a desire for similar social ends, they felt that far from 
being a means to those ends, the size, bureaucratic insensitivity 
and introspection of the Common Market ultimately would defeat 
them. 
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In the case of Factors 2 and 4 on which Conservatives 
predominated, again, one also finds Labour, Liberal and non- 
aligned voters on Factor 4, which was very conservative with 
a small as well as a capital "c". However, political party 
politics may have played a certain part in separating the 
Conservative sheep from the goats in Factors 2 and 4. 
Of the four factors, Factor 2 had the most extreme self- 
rating-in either direction on Common Market membership, and 
the highest involvement score. The Conservatives on the 
factor, several of whom were working in the campaign against 
the Common Market, were in the position of not only working 
against the official policy of their party, but doing so 
when their party was in office. Therefore, one would expect 
them to be people who felt very confident of and committed to 
their position and willing to buck against authority. 
Factor 4 was the most timid of the four factors with 
the lowest self-rating in either direction on membership, and 
a considerably lower involvement score than Factor 2. They 
shared with Factor 2a similar attitude about sovereignty 
and nationalism, which might, if taken to its logical conclusion, 
rule out full and mutual co-operation in a body on the 
present lines of the Common Market. However, the Conservatives 
on Factor 4 may be the party's sheep who did not want to 
turn against the flock, and therefore became "convinced" 
of the benefits of joining the Common Market. They seemed to 
have resolved what would otherwise be conflicting positons 
(i. e. joining the Common MS ket on one hand and maintaining 
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British independence on the other) by developing an image of Britain's 
projected role in the Common Market which paralleled her role as head 
of the Commonwealth. This seems a plausible explanation in the light 
of Verba's (1967) findings in a study of U. S. attitudes to the war in 
Viet Nam. Probing below the surface of a statistic that 61% of people 
studied supported President Johnson's policy, he found that it was in 
fact the institution of the presidency that was supported, rather than 
the policy itself. 
Two-dimension theory of attitude structure. Eysenck (1954) argued 
that the single authoritarian - non-authoritarian dimension was not 
sufficient to explain the structure of attitudes, and that a two-dimensional 
theory was necessary. His two dimensions were made up of two factors, one 
which he called radicalism-conservatism (R factor) and the other which he 
called tough-minded - tender-minded (T factor). His work has attracted 
severe methodological criticism (Christie, 1956 a, b; Rokeach and Hanley, 1956), 
and in the end, did not prove conclusively (as was his aim) that Communists 
(formerly cali. Jfascists of the left") were "tough-minded". The criticisms 
aside, his dimensions do not appear to be helpful in explaining the 
division of the four Q factors into the two groups. While Factors 2 and 
4 do lean towards the conservative side, Factor 1 of the other group has 
enough Conservatives on it to make it difficult to argue that it is on the 
radical end of the spectrum. The "tough-minded - tender-minded" dimension 
is even more problematic, and there is no evidence in the data to suggest 
that this would be a fruibf'u1 avenue for further study. 
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Leaders and Followers. The factor analysis of the Q-sort data 
produced factors which were not pure examples of either leaders a trr 
followers. Far from being an unfortunate aberration, in fact this is 
probably a good representation of what public opinion is like. There 
is nothing in the public opinion literature to suggest that attitudes 
held by opinion leaders should be different from all of their followers. 
On the contrary, one would suspect that if the dynamic nature of public 
opinion proposed by Kelman and Bloom (1973) which was discussed. in 
Chapter II is correct, then the interaction between opinion leaders and 
the°elites'from which they are often drawn and the general public, would 
be reflected in shared attitudes within some groups. This, indeed, 
appears to be the case when the Q-sort data is examined. Factors 1 and 
3 were made up for the most part of elite leaders and in most cases 
"elite'followers. They were discussing the Common Market in language and 
concepts that the general public would not always readily understand or 
identify with. In pragmatic terms, these teade. *6 were the people who 
generally were seen as having the most to gain by Common Market member- 
ship, even though Factor 3 was very much against membership. It is 
diel r+cý 
clear that the anti-Market opinion leaders in Factor 2nlec. the anti- 
Market followers opinion on Factor 3. The terms in which they chose 
to structure their attitudes were quite different. Rather, the followers 
and one opinion leader on Factor 3 shared not only their attitude, but 
similar educational levels, socio-economic levels, and political 
persuasion. Factors 2 and 4 again contained leaders and followers 
sharing the same attitude, but who discussed the issue in less esoteric 
and generally more readily understandable terms. The opinion leaders in 
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these two factors tended to be from the special interest rather than 
from the expert category, and either came from one of the anti-Market 
campaigns or represented farming and fishing interests. Factor 4 is an 
interesting case in that its opinion about whether Britain should be in 
the Common Market is probably the least stable of the four and the most 
likely to change if the movement against membership in the Common 
Market within the Conservative party becomes stronger. They seem to 
be influenced by the position that an institution (the Conservative 
Party) which they support advocates., rather than by the language or 
reasoning used by the''elite''expert opinion leaders of that institution 
(who appeared on Factor 1). They were only just persuaded that Britain 
should join the Common Market, and would probably be much more comfortable 
if the Conservative Party adopted the opposite view. Support for this 
proposition came in a recent follow-up interview (Cambridge, 1978) with 
one of the then uninformed white collar members of the factor. He is 
now an M. P. and not only strongly opposes continued British membership 
of the Common Market, but swears that he was never in favour of it. 
It would seem that political memories are conveniently shorts 
2.. ANALYSIS OF JUDGEMENT 
The results were given in Chapter 6 of the tests . one on the 
scores derived from the judgements about the opinion statements 
(which appear in the test booklet in Appendix D) made by the individuals 
in the study. Previous studies about social judgement examined in 
Chapter II have suggested that an individual's own attitude, or his 
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involvement in the issue, or in the case of accentuation theory, the 
combination of his attitude and the judgemental dimension, would have 
a significant influence on his judgement of statements about the issue. 
The two-way analysis of variance (of attitude by involvement) of 
the results of judgements given by individuals in this study failed 
to demonstrate a significant effect for either attitude or involvement. 
Then the judgements made by the individuals on the Q-factors were 
studied using a one-way analysis of variance with planned comparisons. 
The hypothesis is that if attitude about membership of the Common 
Market alone were sufficient cause for judgemental effects, then the 
comparison of pro-Market Factors 1 and 4 contrasted with anti Market 
Factors 2 and 3 should have produced a significant difference. But 
this was not the case. Likewise, there was no significant difference 
when the two Factors with the highest involvement scores (1 and 2) were 
contrasted with the factors with the lower involvement scores (3 and 4). 
However, analysis of variance showed that the cross persuasion Factors 1 
and 3 gave significantly more extreme judgements as indicated by their 
k -P scores when contrasted with Factors 2 and 4. 
Why should these results differ from previous studies? The 
explanation would appear to be at several levels. Accentuation theory 
holds that extremity of judgement is a product not only of an individual's 
own attitude, but also of the nature of the scale on which he is asked 
to judge a statement. To expand the last point, it suggests that an 
individual will give more extreme ratings when the statements with 
which he agrees can be judged in positive rather than negative terms on 
the judgemental scale. Osmond and Mower White (1977) reinterpreted the 
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dimensional salience in accentuation theory to mean not the scale 
dimension on which a statement was rated, but the aspect of the attitude 
to be judged. Thus if one aspect of the Common Market issue was more 
important to an individual than another, he could be expected to give 
more polarized ratings to statements related to that aspect of the issue. 
In this study, the scale used with all the statements was labelled 
"Extremely pro British entry" at one end, and "Extremely anti British 
entry" at the other. Obviously, being opposed to British membership had 
positive connotations for the anti Marketeers, whilst being in favour 
of British entry had positive connotations for those who were pro-Market. 
Thus it can be argued that the dimensional salience of scale was roughly 
equivalent for both pro and anti subjects, and one should not expect to 
find effects from it. 
Turning to the question of different aspects of the issue being 
more important to different individuals, one possible explanation of the 
significant difference in ratings found between Factors 1 and 3 and 
Factors 2 and 4 could be that the language and terms in which the 
statements were posed were more salient to Factors 1 and 3 than to 
Factors 2 and 4. Certainly when examining the Q-sort data, Factors 1 
and 3 were pitching their albeit opposing arguments on a different 
plane from that employed by Factors 2 and 4. 
However, the explanation for the differences between these two 
sets of factors may be somewhat more straightforward. In the case 
of Factors 1 and 3, in many instances the people were in daily contact 
with large amounts of information about the Common Market, and the ones 
who were not were, on the whole, well educated and widely read. In 
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particular, the journalists on these two factors were constantly forced 
to make judgements about Common Market information as a part of their 
work. If these people were accustomed to seeing relatively factual 
material about the Common Market which they could judge in the light 
of their own experiences on the Continent, then exaggerated statements 
of opinion, which some of these statements undoubtedly were, probably 
would seem more extreme to them than to the people on Factors 2 or 4 who 
were less well-travelled, less acquainted with the factual material 
and often only exposed themselves to literature published by one or 
other side of the campaign. 
Whether this pattern of judgement of the more extreme rating by 
better informed people would remain the same in other circumstances, 
one cannot predict from these data. It is certainly a question which 
deserves further investigation. This is especially so because previous 
studies have used subjects who were all members of the same or similar 
institutions, such as a secondary school or university where their 
educational level and, to a less predictable extent, their knowledge 
about a topic would be roughly equivalent. 
For our present study, however, we can say that the elite opinions 
of both followers and leaders represented by Factors 1 and 3 does see 
opinion statements as more extreme than does the more general opinion 
found on Factors 2 and 4. Factors 2 and 4 were, after all, defining 
their own attitude to some extent in terms of the more chauvinistic 
and prejudiced statements which Factors 1 and 3 rejected the most 
strongly. This again raises doubts about previous studies in which 
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all subjects in favour of an issue were placed in one category 
and all subjects against, in another, This study clearly shows 
that this practice can mask otherwise significant effects. 
More sensitive means of assigning subjects to conditions in 
a study must be employed before much confidence can be placed 
in the theory which is extruded from them. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS 
At the beginning of this dissertation, it was argued that the key 
to understanding the process whereby the decision was made to take 
Britain into the Common Market lay centrally in the attitudes of apinio n 
leeöers. These attitudes therefore form the core of the study both 
because of their intrinsic interest and their wider importance. One of 
the functions of the"eliteu and the opinion leaders drawn from it in the 
formation of public opinion was their role as gatekeepers through which 
information was filtered before reaching the general public. So the 
dissertation attempts to discover if and how these attitudes influenced 
the way in which these gatekeepers judged information about the 
issue, judgements which in turn had material effects on political actions 
(the study of which exceeds the present brief). 
Q-methodology was chosen as the appropriate technique to investi- 
gate these attitudes, and a sample consisting half of opinion leaders 
and half of uninformed individuals was selected. In the second part of 
the study, the subjects were asked to judge fifty of the opinion state- 
ments from the Q-sort on an eleven point equal interval scale. 
Factor analysis of the data produced four distinct factors. Factor 1 
was a strong pro-Market factor made up primarily of opinion leaders 
and followers who, if not all members of the'elite, were at least much 
better informed than most people. They expressed their attitude in terms 
and concepts with which the general public probably would not readily 
identify. Yet this was the language in which a great deal of the Great 
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Debate was conducted. Factor 4, the second pro-Market group expressed 
their attitude in very different, and mildly chauvinistic terms. It 
would appear that their attitude was not so much influenced by the 
arguments of the+elite`opinion leaders of Factor 1, as by the official 
pro-Market position of the Conservative Party. They adopted the 
prescribed position of the party they supported, but expressed opinions 
not likely to be conducive to a happy marriage with the Common Market. 
The individuals on this factor are the most likely to defect to the 
anti-Market ranks either if, or when, their experience inside the 
Common Market proves unsatisfactory, or if the leadership of the 
Conservative Party changes its mind about Europe. There are already 
indications that some of the people on this factor are becoming, or 
have become, anti-Market. In a future study those individuals who 
did become anti-Market would be most likely to appear on anti-Market 
Factor 2, with whom they shared strong views on British sovereignty 
and nationalism. 
Factor 2 was divided equally between opinion leaders and followers 
but this time, instead of being primarily composed of the eelite, nearly 
three-quarters of the followers were working-class. The opinion 
leaders themselves were more likely to be representative of farming or 
fishing interests than the politicians, big businessmen, 
journalists and diplomats who were the opinion leaders on Factor 1. 
This factor is most representative of anti-Market opinion in the country 
at large, matching most closely the anti-Market opinion described by N es enc) 
JowellIxim). 
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The argument against the Common Market made by Factor 3 was quite 
different - indeed alien - to that of Factor 2, and again, it was in 
elitist terms not likely to be understood or shared by the general 
population. 
In a future study it would be interesting to include more 
journalists, academics, theoiQticians, and politicians from the left 
wing of the Labour Party who were under-represented in this sample. 
Although this is too small a sample from which to make generalisations 
(and, indeed, this was not the intention in the study), Factor 3 would 
appear to represent a left-wing intellectual elite opinion group, 
similar in composition to the elite of Factor 1 who also base personal 
attitudes on abstract concepts, concepts rather detached from the mass 
of anti-Market opinion. 
Whilst this study has not had empirical findings about British 
attitudes to the Common Market as a prime goal, indications in that 
regard are present, and are potentially most important. This Q-study 
has illuminated and exposed attitudes - those of Factors 3 and 4- 
which were not picked up in an R-type study 
(Hedges and Jowell, 1971). 
In the R-study, tests were factored (instead of people, as in Q- 
methodology), and then lumped together under either a pro or anti Market 
label. 
On the methodological and theoretical side, Q-methodology has been 
shown in this study to have avoided the pitfalls of attitude scaling 
discussed in Chapter IV9 and produced a sensitive understanding of the 
issue without landing in the coding quagmire of projective techniques. 
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The analysis of the judgement material from the second part of this 
study failed to show any significant direct effect for attitude or involve- 
ment in the extremity of ratings. However, when Factors 1 and 3 were 
contrasted with Factors 2 and 4, there was a significant difference in 
the extremity of ratings. Two possible explanations for this were 
discussed in Chapter VII. The first was related to the Osmond, 
Mower-White (1977) interpretation of accentuation theory which suggests 
that more extreme judgements would be given by an individual to aspects 
of an issue most salient to him. It could be argued that the language 
and concepts of the statements were more salient to the'elite'individuals 
on Factors 1 and 3, and therefore they gave significantly more extreme 
judgements. However, until one had opportunity to re-test using the 
more"elite"statements with the addition of statements made in more 
ordinary terms, as proposed in the Critical Discussion of the Research 
in Chapter IVY then I prefer a second explanation which commonsense 
suggests. 
This is that the better educated, better informed and more 
widely read and travelled individuals of Factors 1 and 3 simply saw 
exaggerated statements of opinion as exaggerated statements of opinion; 
whereas Factors 2 and 4, who were less used to handling factual 
material on the subject, were using some of these statements to define 
their own attitude and thus would not see them as quite so extreme. 
This would suggest that two levels are operating here: amongst better 
educated and informed subjects, the statements are being judged against 
factual material, whereas amongst less educated subjects, own attitude 
may be having an effect. There are here important implications for 
previous studies about social judgement besides those discussed in Chapter VII 
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relating to the educational homogenity of their subjects. In these 
studies, the judges were divided into pro - anti groups. In this study, 
however, one sees that whilst there may be an effect for attitude, it 
is more subtle than can be accommodated by the pro - anti division. 
Here it has been shown that the significant difference in rating styles 
comes when pro and anti judges of one social and educational type are 
contrasted with pro and anti judges of another type. These differences 
only became apparent when the data were examined by Q-sort factors. 
Thus, it would appear that while the theory "proved" by many previous 
studies might be valid for certain educational or special groups, they 
should not be applied to other groups on the social and educational 
spectrum without further, more sensitive research. Furthermore, until 
more sensitive means are used to separate the judges in these studies, 
basing elaborate theory on the results seems a risky business at best. 
The first major test of nationwide public opinion about the Common 
Market after Britain signed the Treaty of Rome, came in the Common 
Market Referendum on June 5,1975. Again, a massive campaign was 
launched, and again pro-Market forces had the most money. 
The British electorate was asked to vote yes or no on the question 
"Do you think that the United Kingdom should stay in the European 
Community (Common Market)? " Sixty-seven per cent voted "Yes" in a sixty- 
five per cent turn out. However, these results may not indicate quite 
the substantial mandate that they appear to do and Butler and Kitzinger 
(1976) caution: 
Yet the verdict of the referendum must be kept in perspective. 
It was unequivocal but also unenthusiastic. Support for 
membership was wide but did not run deep ... The referendum 
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was not a vote cast for new departures or bold initiatives. 
It was a vote for the status quo. (p. 280) 
They go on to state: 
Just how the public saw the European issue is not 
fully clear. It is certain that few electors 
regarded themselves as recording a judgement on 
the success or otherwise of renegotiation ... The polls showed that the public lacked information 
and interest in such matters. C as renegotiation of the 
budget contribution or New Zealand butterj. The issue - 
as questions at meetings and in the 'phone-in' broad- 
casts all testify - was not how much the terms had 
been altered but whether Britain should stay in or 
get out. (p. 287) 
Although public opinion is fluid and thus the opinions expressed 
by the Q-factors will vary over time, the structure of these factors 
(the type of people on them) should remain fairly stable. Therefore 
several predictions can be made about the reactions to the referendum 
by the type of persons represented by each of the Q-sort factors. 
First, one would expect the opinion represented on Factors 1,2 and 3 
to maintain their respective positions vis ä vis the Common Market. 
However, as the anti-Market forces in the Referendum Campaign had 
highly visible champions from the left wing of the Labour Party in 
the persons of Benn, Castle, Foot and Helfer (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976), 
one might expect the otherwise timid pro-Market position of Factor 4 to 
solidify around the Conservative pro-Market banner on the simple argument 
that, , if that lot are against it, it must be a good thing". However, 
this is not likely to be a lasting phenomenon, and without the threat 
of the Labour stick, the enthusiasm of this factor is likely to wane 
rapidly. 
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Although the electorate voted to maintain the status quo, the 
attitudes represented by the Q-sort factors in this study give vital 
indications about how the people who hold them will adjust and react 
to Britain's continuing membership in the Common Market. 
The Common Market was conceived in the aftermath of the Second 
World War and brought to birth in a different age from the present. 
The era of the 1950's and 1960s, marked by unprecedented, sustained 
and coordinated growth in the West European economies and by the more 
or less solid cohesion of the NATO and Warsaw Pact blocs in European 
politics, is now past. The oil price rises of the 1970's put sudden 
restraint upon the steady growth of the EEC countries; at the same 
time, the beginnings of a gradual dissolution of the old bi-polar 
world balance of the super powers injected new and powerful strains 
into the Community structure. Loss of the lubricant provided by 
constant economic growth has led to more frequent and acrimonious 
disputes between member states, and especially between Britain, 
now well afloat on North Sea Oil and even more the odd man out, and 
the rest. 
Three of the four factors in this study expressed attitudes which 
were not conducive to a smooth transition and fuller integration in 
Community life. The way ahead will not be easy. 
APPEND ICE S 
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Appendix A 
The transcription of these taped interviews was edited 
in several respects. First, any material which might have 
been used to identify the speaker was deleted. Second, as 
it is the intention in in-depth interviews for the interviewer 
to interfere as little as possible, the "questions" were often 
reinforcing noises, raised eyebrows or gentle prods. These 
and more verbal questions were omitted. Third, several of the 
subjects tended to wander off on tangents unrelated to this 
dissertation and these excursions were not included. All of 
edited portions are indic^ted by dots. 
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Interview 1 Director of All Party Anti-Market Group 
London, September 23,1970 
"... Balance of payments has been the major problem 
for this country since the end of the war ... If joining the 
Common Market would help the balance of payments, then there 
would be strong arguments in favour of it, but everyone 
now admits that it would be bad for the balance of payments. 
It's admitted that the Common Agricultural Policy alone 
could lead to a drain of up to £670 million per year, so 
there is no doubt that it would damage the British balance 
of payments and we have to be extremely concerned about that. 
".... Issues like credit policy, the level of unemploy- 
ment, regional policy - all the things that are the bread 
and butter of British politics at the moment (would) be 
taken away from the Westminster Parliament and given to the 
Common Market authorities in Brussels. 
"... At the moment we run our own affairs. This is 
how it should be. This is the democratic way of doing it. 
If we joined, we should have four representatives, perhaps, 
or four votes. We would abandon democratic control of our 
affairs ... for example, the very influential Commission 
is not elected by anybody, it's appointed. It's not 
responsible really to any democratically controlled body. 
"... (If we joined the Common Market) we should give 
up the right to tax ourselves, someone else 
know what was good for us, and this would be 
in Brussels. We should have the value added 
we liked it or not. I think the majority of 
-people would oppose the value added tax, but 
the Common Market, we should have it whether 




if we joined 
we liked it 
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or not, and it would do no good writing to your M. P. saying 
I don't like it, because he'd probably say, neither do I. 
but these things aren't decided in Westminster, they're 
decided by the gentlemen in Brussels whose operations aren't 
open to public scrutiny. They meet in secret and the decisions 
they take aren't scrutinized by any democratically elected 
body at all. They are beyond our control. This would be 
extraordinarily bad for democracy and I think it would be 
bad for Britain. 
"... The national parliaments are being demoted. They 
will be like county councils, with limited control over 
certain issues and with certain powers delegated to them, 
but subordinate to the Brussels apparatus. 
"... The Six without the Eastern Bloc countries is not 
Europe and this is not uniting Europe at all. In fact, the 
Common Market has no right to the term Europe and it is 
quite nonsensical for people to talk about Britain joining 
Europe - either we are already part of Europe, which I have 
always understood to be the geographical -truth, or if we're 
not, we can't possibly join it. There are over two dozen 
countries in Europe and only six of them are in the Common 
Market, only a minority of the population is in the Common 
Market. It splits Europe between East and West. It hardens 
the division between East and West. How can you have a 
united Europe with Germany split with one half in the Common 
Market and one half in Comecon? ... EFTA will carry on 
without Britain, even if Britain will join, so the Common 
Market doesn't unite Europe. 
"In fact, the Common Market itself isn't very united. 
We talk about political unity in the Six. Where is it? ... 
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Now to have a common foreign policy, you would have to have 
a single foreign secretary. Are they ever likely to get 
that? I think not. A federation, if we look at political 
federations that have been set up, the oracles aren't too 
hopeful. If you have a state like the United States, it 
makes sense - one language, common law and things like this, 
but in the ancient nation-states in Europe it's very 
doubtful whether they would be willing to merge their 
identity at this stage. I hope we should get world 
government at some stage and I want us to work towards that 
and I certainly would be willing to surrender British 
sovereignty to some sort of world authority. I think we 
should work through the United Nations and bodies of this 
sort, but I'm not certain that I would want to abandon 
our tried and true democratic institutions in this country 
to the institutions in the Common Market. I think perhaps 
these are the last group of countries I would want to do 
this with. We want close friendly relations with them, 
and in fact I think we could have far better relations with 
countries like France as soon as we say we don't want to 
join the Common Market. It's trying to bulldoze our way 
in that has given us the worse relations with France since 
the Battle of Waterloo. In fact, British policy recently 
has been trying to mobilize the Five against France. We've 
been trying to incite the Germans against the French and 
I don't think this is leading to any unity at all, and I 
see no sign of the nation-state in Western Europe ending ... 
Why should we be mesmerized by this fraction of one part 
of Europe - countries of one race, one colour, run by big 
business through undemocratic institutions? 
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"... It's nice to know that the Germans and French 
aren't going to fight each other again, but it's no good 
fighting the last war over again ... IF there is another 
conflict, it will be between Germany and her Eastern 
neighbours, so the problems of European security cannot 
be dealt with without bringing in Eastern Europe. 
"The other major problem which probably in the future 
will be far more important than the East-West problem. This 
is what we might call the North-South problem - tensions between 
the rich countries and the poor countries, the black countries 
and the white countries. None of these issues can be dealt 
with by arrangements within one fraction of the West end of 
Europe ... We must look to the whole world as the place to 
solve our problems and therefore we don't see any advantage 
in submerging our identity in this particular group. 
"... The Kennedy Round was reducing tariffs on a world 
scale. This is excellent. Why don't we do this instead of 
having the Common external tariffs of the Common market ... 
The Common Market is a rigid, protectionist, discriminatory 
trading group, and it's working against the world order in 
trade, and it's working against GATT, and it's not working 
for world government. It's a disruptive thing. 
"... Now, the British Parliament can do anything it 
likes except to bind its successors ... each new generation 
that comes along can do things its own way without too much 
upheaval, without force or violence that we've seen in some 
other countries. This is our birthright. If we go into 
the Common Market, we lose that, because we accept the 
rigidities of the Treaty of Rome and all the regulations 
issued under it and this binds future Parliaments and future 
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generations and ... would rob them of their freedom of 
action and this is something that should never be forced 
through the British Parliament ... This is an alien idea to 
us and certainly we believe the people should give their 
assent one way or the other to it. 
11 ... If the Common Market is something we should be 
frightened of, it's certainly a thing we shouldn't join, 
because if we're frightened of it, it can't have good 
intentions. Certainly we can survive outside the Common 
Market because we'd be better off. At the moment, we 
import half our food and most of our raw materials. We 
buy them from the cheapest markets in the world. If we 
join the Common Market, we would be buying from the dearest 
markets in the world and would load onto the wrong side of 
the balance of payments something like £1000 million per 
year. If we keep out of the Common Market, we don't load 
this onto the balance of payments and so we would be better 
off outside the Common Market. 
"... I think our policy should be based on our national 
interest which is to import food and raw materials from the 
cheapest markets and have the widest possible free trade 
in manufactured goods. So we should support things like 
the Kennedy Round and we should offer industrial free 
trade on the same lines as EFTA to anyone who would join 
such an area on an open-ended basis ... To join the Common 
Market in some ways would be to commit suicide and the 
alternative to committing suicide is not to do so. " 
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Interview 2 Leider of Anti. -T: arket Loaýjue 
T3ri. rýý; e i ter, Somerset 
Cctober, 21 , 1970 
"T, c-I e (omrnon ? iarket fare(, uards Committee's five 
safeguards are based on the Labour Party's Brighton Line 
which is political double-talk to me. Tirhy not just come 
out and say you are anti-Market? 
"I'm a good European. I'm not against the Common i'arket, 
I'm just against Fritain joining it. I think that Trance 
and Germany should take each other by the hand, as well as 
Italy and the Low Countries. I have no quarrels with that, 
but I think they should join EFTA which is a free-trade 
organization without strings. Ir Britain joined the Common 
Market it would be the end of our independence. It would 
be incompatible with our way of life. What I'm opposed to. 
is a written Constitution, alien laws in which rigid 
institutions are set up, which are designed by Frenchman, 
Germans and Italians. They suit them but they don't suit us. 
We would be losing our sovereignty, it would be gone for 
ever, and what we would be creating for our children is 
the lot of being criminal separatists if they didn't like it. 
"The quarrel with the Black African states was designed, 
contrived, intended. Mr. Heath wasn't the first man to 
discover that South African politics were an ideal catalyst 
for destruction. Selling arms so openly, to provoke criticisms 
was necessary to produce the necessary quarrel to get rid of 
Black Africa. -I believe that the Conservative Government 
wants the right climate for surrender in Brussels, and the 
only way to do this is to so antagonize the British people 
that the very word Commonwealth is an absolute anathema to 
them. It is not an anathema to the average ^nglishman, who 
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in spite of everything that has been said, still has a deep 
affection for the Commonwealth. Every now and then it's a 
good idea to buck against the parties. 
ý` "There are nine daily morning newspapers and eight of 
the nine are pro-Market, the BBC tends to be pro-Market, 
and all sources of dissemination in the press tend to be 
pro-Market, with the exception of the Beaverbrook Press. 
But Sir Max Aiken and the Beaverbrook Press couldn't have 
done it by themselves. They are only reflecting an attitude 
of the British people. You cannot just push over a line of 
propaganda if it isn't capable of being reflected. Thatts 
why the Common Market campaign is failing. Despite all 
the propaganda, it just isn't going. There must be some con- 
-spiracy of money and power behind the campaign for the 
Common Market. I'm not a man for a world conspiracy theory, 
but there are numerous conspiracies going on all the time, 
and every now and then several of these grow together and 
form a large conspiracy. The merchant bankers would benefit 
from the Common Market. 
"The Commonwealth has not failed. The Australians in 
particular have begged us not to go into the Common Market. 
We should be loyal to our alliances, but our alliances should 
be flexible. Who knows who we should be allied to in thirty 
or forty years time, perhaps a contrite Russia! 
"By submerging ourselves forever in an institution from 
which we cannot escape, legally we should produce a form of 
democracy that is not as good as the form of democracy 
that we know and enjoy at the moment. I don't 
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like institutional government. Institutional government 
as it fares in Europe strikes me as being half way 
between democracy and autocracy, and if it's halfway 
between democracy and anything else, then it's not good enough 
for me and it's not good enough for the British people. 
They are pretty responsible and don't need to be governed 
by autocratic means. They've gone past that. 
"We have no guarantee that the (European) Parliament 
will have any legislative powers and a parliament that 
cannot legislate isn't worthy of the name. 
"To end the independence of your country in favour of 
a system which is all promise is not selling one's birth- 
right for a mass of pottage, it's selling one's birthright 
for a promise of a mass of pottage. I'm not in favour of 
surrendering what we've got for such a slim promise. 
"If they were all Anglo-Saxon in Europe, they would 
say, 'taxation without representation'. But do they? 
Have the Germans, Italians and French in history ever put 
their elective feet down and said that? I don't think so. 
I think that their parliaments have a history of being 
peculiarly undemocratic and also very revolutionary because 
of their inveterate habit of tying themselves to written 
constitution which can only be broken by revolution, 
whereas in the United Kingdom, no parliament can bind its 
successor. 
"If you look at the reaty of Rome, it's almost 
deceptively easy to read. You almost feel as if you under- 
stand it. But you don't really. It's written in plain 
English, but then afterwards, Continental judges write 
volumes explaining what it means, from what the people who 
wrote it say afterwards, and this isn't English law. 
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"i think it's imprudent for our politicians to attempt 
to take us into a European federal state which includes one 
half a state with a bleeding flank. The Germans of West 
Germany will never rest until they recover the lands they 
lost to the east. I don't say that West Germany will go 
to war to recover lost lands, but they might do. But they 
certainly would betray a federal state of Western-Europe 
if the Russians give them an opportunity of uniting with 
their brothers on reasonable terms. So it is possible to 
say that the lot of a Briton in a West European Federal 
State strong enough to challenge the USSR over their 
land frontiers is war or betrayal or possibly even both ... 
I don't see that anything will be achieved in a European 
Defence Community that cannot be achieved by NATO. 
"In a European Defence Community, the British soldier 
would not only be under the command of European generals, 
but also European politicians. Had this been true in 1940, 
there would have been no Dunkirk, we would have been forced 
to commit national suicide. Instead, we withdrew and in the 
end, we won. This sort of situation could present itself 
again 1F we were in Europe, and this time we couldn't 
witndraW. We are not Continental Europeans, and we would 
always eight against that last commitment, just as we 
withdrew the Spitfires and Hurricanes from France at the 
1a5'ý moIent. If a similar situation should arise, Britain 
mu5t 
habe 
the ability and the power to do the same thing 
agatin". 
"I don't think the average Englishman understands what 
the 
WO] 'community' means. If you look in the dictionary, 
gays it something like Family planning centres and maypoles 
267 
and things like that, but in the new language of 1970, I 
think the word means lack of segment or federal state in 
the making. I think we English ought to look right down 
the end of an inverted telescope at what is to be the end 
of this Common Market. It can only be a federal superstate 
and the first President must be a party politician in the 
first instance and the fount of all honour in the second. 
So power is not dispensed without dangers, and that is 
the danger as we see it. I think Disraeli said that no 
man has more than one reason for objecting to anything, 
and if there is only one reason, it is that power must one 
day be put into the hands of one man who will not be an 
Englishman. He will most likely be German or French and 
that is what most Britons balk at. 
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Interview 3 'Professor of International `'tur'ies 
hrid, e, October 23, lf'70 
"I don't think that _ ngland will get into the Ooiiu, ion 
Market ... I don't think that on this occasion it will be ;o 
much a veto on our Going in, ... but it will be the 
British reluctance to go in that will make the terms that 
are oFfered not quite good enough for us. 
"I'm not especially disturbed about that because in my 
opinion, both the advantages that will come fror, ýToing in, 
and the disadvantages of going in have been exaggerated by 
the two schools of thou, -ht. It's not the case that it w ll 
be the economic salvation of 'ngland if we join. on thEc 
contrary, whether or not we make a success of being a member 
will depend on our own measures to improve our own economic 
process. It would be disastrous for Tngland to go in and 
remain of the opinion that no other measures are necessary 
to improve her economic performance. 
"nn the political side, all the advantages ... and all 
the disadvantages ... are wildly exaggerated ... The people 
who are opposed to going into the Market on political grounds 
think it means a loss of sovereignty. The possibility that 
the Market can become anything remotely resembling a 
political organization, unit, in less than sixty years is 
negligible. 
11... It's very likely that the advantages and dis- 
advantages would be about equal. There would be much more 
friction with the United States, for example, politically, 
more with the Russians and just as much friction with 
Germany and prance as if we did not go in ... In my. o; inion, 
it would leave us in just about the same situation if we 
got in as if we didn't get in. The truth of the matter is, 
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I think, that a good deal o. " re-adjustment is renuired by 
Britain, both in economic perr=orrna. nce, and in its 
international political attitude, but these are itu. cb more 
long term and complicated matters than can be solved merely 
by the one step of coi_n(T into the I": arket. 
"^'he movement towards integration of the Six, or such 
other ''es tern ''uropean nations such that joie they :is 
diametrically incompatible with the re-unification of Germany. 
The irkore Geri any becomes intecrated in the "est, the more 
she has to accept that she can never r, -integrate ' st and 
rast ^erri, any. T'iey are moving in opposite directions. 
"Teere is not much likelihood of movement toward 
Western 7uropean integration, ever if we joined the Com: r, o. n 
Market, or even if we don't. On the contrary, chances oL L 
moving towards political integration becomes less as you 
increase the number of member states, particularly if you 
increase the cultural diversity of those states which you 
would do iC you added Anglo-Saxon and Celtic rngland to 
Latin and Teuton which are miles apart in the way they behave. 
There are people who think, for example, that there can 
be a single parliament. It is totally impractical to have 
a single parliament. The societies don't work a parliament 
in the same way. 
ý'... The fact that I don't think Britain will get into 
the Common Market doesn't disturb me. I don't think it will 
be the end of the United Kingdom or our future as an 
important state if we don't get in. Much would depend on 
the nature of the terms on which we got in because on the 
nature of those terms would depend the degree of 
manoeuverability that Britain would have leading the Common 
market. If certain terms were laid down, her chances of 
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leadinc. the rormýno ^ i"arks t would be very small. IF the 
terms were such as to include agreement to monetary union, 
which the Six want now, that would be a grievous economic 
set-back for rngland. "e should possibly become, without 
freedom to manipulate our currency, the backward area o 
the Common tzarket. 1 we had conditions entirely to our 
advantage, we might be able to shift the character of the 
Common Iarket in the directions we want it to go, but we 
should be one against six or rather two or three against 
six. 
"Unless the bargain is particularly advantageous, the 
British political situation is now such that probably no 
government could ; het it through. 
ýý... The key to the British position comes from the 
advantages of having a world market, not a ruropean market, 
and almost all the disadvantages of British trade come 
from the peculiar nature of Tngland, namely that it alone 
has to import more than it conceivably can export which 
makes its invisibles the most crucial part of its economic 
stability and its invisibles depend on the world and not the 
European Market, so there is no reason to think that if 
we didn't get in our economic prospects would be bleak. 
It's true that our national productivity is lower than 
that of many other nations, and it's true that we have got 
to cure that, but given any level of productivity, whether 
it is low as it is at present, or whether it is high as it 
could be, we are in no greater disadvantage in. a world 
pattern of trade than we would be in a Corcunon Market pattern 
of trade, and in many respects, we are at a greater 
advantage. 
'T^or some people, going into the Common Market has a 
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great advantage, for other kinds of people it has a great 
disadvantage. it would help ICI, but it wouldn't 
necessarily be good for England. It doesn't necessarily 
follow that because our big trans-continental firms would 
benefit that the economy as a whole would. 
11 ... Every single advantage gained by England by 
joining the Common market could be obtained by England 
without joining the Common Market by simply continuing 
further Kennedy Rounds and moving towards more and more 
reduction of tariffs. Now the reason why the Common Market 
is preferred by the Common Market to further reductions of 
tariffs is that the Common Market is a protectionist society. 
The one great economy in the history of the world that was 
never protectionist is Great Britain and the reason why she 
isn't protectionist is because of her very special position, 
because her early industrialization enabled her to create 
a greater density of population relative to her natural 
resources so that she cannot feed herself without imports 
to the extent of more than 30%. So it suits her to have 
free trade. But the fact that she is one of the biggest 
import markets in the world gives her a great deal of weight. 
People should pay to get into the British Market. 
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Intervi eNv 4 university tudent (Law) 
30,1"70 
"T don't think that the Oornmon Market should be 
thought of as a question of British sovereignty or otherwise. 
I don't t1iink Britain's political sovereignty would be 
compromised at all by not going into the Common Market. 
Certainly, there is no political sovereignty that has to 
be given up at the moment by entry into the 1omrnorn Harket 
because it's not at the moment basically a ; political 
organization, and in the future, if the states want to come 
more together politically, it will be a decision Britain 
will be able to take then. 
"Basically, I don't think the British people are going 
to, or would be able to face up to the sort of challenge 
that would be presented by the Common Market ... I think 
the British way of life, as it's called, is a very sheltered 
sort of thing. Britain has enjoyed a particularly priviledged 
position for a long time by virtue of having her empire to 
rely on. The British people have been cut off from direct 
competition or participation in things going on in ^urope, 
and I don't think they could face up to the sort of challenge 
that'would be presented. 
"I think Britain's role in Europe ought to be a continu- 
ation of her old colonial role. I think Britain should adopt 
a neo-colonial sort of approach. All of the EFTA countries 
are a great deal less developed than Britain is. They all 
stand to Britain more or less in the way some of her more 
developed colonies used, to stand in relation to her. I 
think Britain is much better equipped as far as business 
experience is concerned to carry on a dominant neo-colonial 
approach with regard to trade with the EFTA countries than 
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she is to carry oil- trade which involves direct competition 
with the more p ower. 'ul countries in the rest o' urope. 
"... It doesn't matter whether Britain joins the 
Common I4arket or not, 'because obviously, a lot of her 
policies, econo,. Ac and ofierwise, will have to be influenced 
to some extent by economic considerations, and economic 
considerations are not sorriethin over which Britain }ras 
con'1plete contr. ol. 
-F 
Britain doesn't (o into the ^ornmon Parket, over 'IT 
the next Few vear_"s, she will become weaker and weaker 
economically, in relation to the rest oP the countries in 
r'urope, and at the eng' of that time, being what they call 
the '; oor na n of 7, urope' , she will 
be in a less sovereign, 
position, both economically and politically, than she would 
be were she to join the Cor: wion Harket, sacrifice a certain 
amount of sovereignty and gain a great deal of economic 
streng, th. 
"Political strength and economic strength are very 
closely connected. I think Britain is not politically 
sovereign, and hasn't been for some time because of her 
economic decline, and she is influenced in quite a lot 
of subtle ways to a great extent by the United States. 
The United States does bolster Great Britain up quite 
considerably, so the choice is not between political 
sovereignty which she now has and the loss of political 
sovereignty which she would suffer by going into the 
Common Market, but between being bolstered up on one side 
economically by America, and on the other hand, gaining a 
certain amount of economic stability and economic 
independence from American by virtue of the Common Market. 
"I don't think the British people are in the right 
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frame of mind to face the challenc e of (-oinc into the t; o, nn on 
Market, or that they would be willing to stan<' up to it. 
I think if you look at Britain's record of co-operation 
as an equal partner with other countries in the past, she 
has always been extremely unwilling to co-operate 
as an equal partner, and found it difficult to co-operate 
because the British people have never quite cottoned on to 
the idea that anybody should be an equal partner of theirs. 
They always tend to take this paternalistic approach. T 
think that as far as urope is concerned, some or the 
grievances of the French that Britain wants to be the 
dominant member of the Common Market are justified. I 
think that the idea oF Britain being an equal member in 
the ronunon Market is confused in the minds of a lot of 
British people with the idea of Britain Going in and 
leading the Common Market forward, and I don't think this 
would be the case. h"'hereas with the ^^TA countries, the 
poorer countries of Europe, I think Britain can still 
assume a dominant role. 
"British industry and the export trade is very much 
geared to the colonial type of thing in which one large 
industrial country is dealing with a smaller, less developed 
country. It is not geared to free and equal competition 
with other large industrial countries. British business 
approach and British business practice is going to have 
to undergo a pretty radical change in order to compete in 
the Common Market situation. But it's generally assu; ned 
if the challenges are presented thus, British business 
will wake itself up and approach will become more competitive. 
I think it's very dangerous to assume that. I think that 
British business just might go under completely. I'm not 
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aware of a resolve in the British people to make the 
sacr * Dices neces 3ry to stand ur, to t? ie competition o' 
the Corn non t"arket. 7 think the ßritis?: i_ people have a 
pretty well-(evelol e3 ability to drop out of situý,, ti_ons;. 
" The only rational vloin one car^ take is that you 
are either anti. -con., iion ; arl<et, or you are pro-ý'on. noý 
l. Tarl<r t, no matter ýrht the costs. ui tat l terms ^oý 
aoirr i "t") the r; rtýýoý? Perl<et ire onl y' výýr. ys or t týrrýý 
ty ený th i7, ß . 13 tsical ly, can eileer t 
r'. Ort'11, 'ý_ý n Jo+ s_ _ . =tlly C1Y' 
if 
iLt 
matter if we are tnaýnsi_run iý tale be( inY1in by rather 
Unfair co d t1. on j try. T (on't think 
the ý) arties 
in )ow,, -2r should let the equability of terns be the final 
argument as to whether Britain does in or she doesn't. 
"British p eo; le have been so coliplacer, t arc' so 
sheltered ion such a long time that what is needed is 
a very big challenge, and once the challenge is placed 
before the people, then ultimately it will have an 
invigorating effect on the British economy, prestige and 
self-confidence in the world generally. I don't think 
anything like treaties should be taken too seriously 
though. If ever one country wanted to drop out of the 
Common Market sufficiently strongly, neither the Treaty 
of Rome nor the other countries could possibly prevent it 
from doing so. Treaties are only pieces of paper, they 
serve as long as they are convenient. 
"I think it possible that Britain could go into the 
Market, find it too much and either drop out or fade out. 
But, I think that would be a pretty bad jolt to British 
prestige and the national pride. But unfortunately, I think 
it is the very sort of thing Britain is very capable of 
doing. 
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"I t'iin1 this I: c. rket triinj-- is basically a V 
question o self-confidence, or lack of self-confidence 
or even : Hore 'basically, it'_ a question of fear. I think 
if people can be 2ersu,, (Ie(, that 3ritain will (Io well in 
the rotnmon ? ", arket, that will be more than enough Eor 
majority opinion and more than enouýýi for powerful opinion 
in the rovermment. " 
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Interview 5 Ttiversity Scholar (history) 
ra:, obr idle, October 30,1 570 
; 'The ''1ap1ia and r'elationshi Witi", the r, onura)nwe_alt17 
seeins to me to be an absolute farce, and the sooner it's 
finished, the better, an(-i certainly Britain's relationsIriip 
with , America which changes, sometimes to the ; oint of 
reversal with tue in administration. So Britain 
has jot to find some other relationship of some kin to 
wive the econm is hard "act that Britain is not as strong 
as it was, say, in the ? Tii_ra-ýýth century. `1TT. ", obviously 
has not proved too successful and is no real substitute 
for the Corn-ion T-'arket, and that is why three, four, five o" 
its members are trying to jet into the Coniii o-in i: arket. 
t You car, i use the old cultural ar'ciuii"terit 
(For fri tail joininv the T (), that T3ritain's place is with 
Europe. I don't think that really holds much water. 
"^resuinably, there will be enormous problems with 
countries like ,? ew Zealand which depend almost entirely 
on the British market. I don't seP how this problem with 
the Commonwealth can be resolved. Britain, as Heath sairl 
to Kaunda, has (ot to look after herself and can't ero on 
as a sort of vague welfare state to former colonies. I'm 
not suggesting by that that-Britain should give up all 
aid and so on, but certainly she should not carry on all 
this humbug about the Commonwealth. On that point, i 
think Powell is completely right. The Cojmiionwealth has 
no force whatsoever, either to Britain's benefit or to the 
benefit of the members. Why else do they turn to China 
for their financing. The annual farce of the Prime Ministers' 
conference is really a waste of time. 
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"I tlbink it's a tragic situation that we didn't do 
somet'Zi_} about going into ? 'uroae earlier when tole offers 
were there, partly because , people like '; den had a rather 
curious latter. -day iroperialist outlook on tnings, partly 
because those oli_i set like Churchill who originally 
mooted the idea of the (ourrcil of Furo; e were too olci and 
weak in their political parties, and partly because of the 
Labour Govermnent immediately after the war and the "little 
England" line toed by people like Bevan. It is the usual 
political situation: som. lethinc- wasn't done at the time, 
somethi: ig must be done now, and something has to be 
sacrificed because the decision wasn't made when it should 
have been. 
"S can'"t see any argument whatsoever for Britain 
not going into the Common T! arket. I think it is mad to 
try and take on dejOence burdens without other countries, 
to attempt things like Concorde on our own. "e've been 
shown in the last twenty-years completely incompetent 
to do things like that. (Going into the T^C) is just the 
obvious thing for Britain to do. 
"It's ridiculous to suggest that Britain has very 
much say on the budget. It has on relative elements, but 
the actual underlying actions are already not made by 
Britain on her own, so that kind of decision would just 
continue to be made outside of Britain, presumably by 
international bankers as it is already. 
0 
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Interviewaa G Director of All-Party Pro-14arket croup 
Tondon, December 15, 1`: 70 
"The Transport and General Workers Union and the 
Amalgamated ^nai. neerirg Union are idealogically opposed 
to enlarging the Community. They consider the Community 
as based on very aggressive free enterprise principles. 
Jack ? ones is convinced this is so, but he is on very bad 
ground, particularly when he cites the economies of France 
and Italy which are very much centrally directed by the 
government and there is a great deal of public ownership, 
and alt iong J_t's a mixed economy, it's a highly ag res ive 
one. The drift in- the ^"r is towards r neater control 
rather than 1^ss. Tut the Ce"7Sr is still Ex'T ressc ''drat 
? 3ri tai r. x 11 he joi_riný; n aggressive, abrasive ý. 
This __ a;; -J, _Y- 
th? cri ti s'. 1 tradi tie , of wc_lEar- a. i lo(-)'ý_inj 
after the speed of the slowest rather than the fastest, and 
what's ihap peni'lg on the Continent is similar to what's 
happened in the United States. They drew conclusions from 
this and T think they drew the wrong conclusions. T 'hiat 
they fail to recognise is that American investment is hi (-her 
in this country than it is on the Continent. But even with 
the high level of American investment, it hasn't brought 
American methods of management. I think they over-emphasize 
the'role of Foreign capital. The real thing is how you 
control Foreign capital. Apart from that, foreign capital 
is no less desirable than your own, it is a matter of how 
you control it. 
"So, as far as the trades unionists are concerned, 
it's a matter of getting home to them that they are joining, 
iP you like to use the current jargon, a compassionate 
society in rurope, where social priorities are right, and 
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schools, w? li are, ý)ensions and holidays have top priority. 
They are actually a great deal hiUher on the continent 
in so-ne respects, but they (the trar'F, unionists) c'onn' t 
believe this. So the `rohlý'r ýý? th t' e trail es unionist` is 
to expose a Pew myths, and get tbrou, h to the ordinary 
worker, because his leaders tend to be ; olitic_ally motivated 
people. 
"I$ you look at the Ford Company in Datenhain, the shop 
stewards there are a combination of Corrniunists, Trotskyites, 
Syndicalists and a few anarchists thron in for good measure. 
These people are really left wing, they're not just 
Communists, it's more varied than that, and the Coiiu; 1unists 
are the more responsible elements. These other people are 
totally irresponsible, but they are not representative of 
the people whom they represent, but they are militant, and 
they are good negotiators, and they do look after the interests 
of the people whom they represent. That's why they're 
elected, and they are elected. But it's wrong to believe 
that they necessarily reflect the political views of the 
people on the shop floor. `Je can do nothing with these 
ideologs. The more you argue with them, the more you. 
convince them that they are right. 
"Most of the people we have on our committee (z pro- 
market committee he was chairing) could be identified as 
belonging to the right-wing of the Labour Party. They 
(the "ideologs") could always point to these people and 
say, well, they're not socialists. 
"... But the TT-. 'U, -the structure there is authoritarian. 
It is possibly one of the most authoritarian unions outside 
the Soviet Union. It is controlled very much by the 
General Secretary ... (there followed here a long description 
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o2' the structure and : )ersoralities of the TG` LT) ... 1t is 
bitterly o; osecd to the Common Tiarkeet and totally lackinc- 
in comprehension of sorneth . nci so challenGin7.1_ t'zi32k the sc 
attitudes can chance and should' there be chance in the 
attitude of the leadership, the whole thing could swung 
the other way. 
"T'he views about trades unions are always based on the 
policy of the union, and this is more than misleading. 
There is a silent majority in the trades unions and we have, 
yet to discover what their views are ... 
"Host of my arguments For going into the Common Harket 
are political rather than economic. To use the Treasury 
jargon, the economic side really can't be quantified, but 
the arguments are "just" in favour, but not enough to het 
one wildly excited. But the political side is overwhel- 
mingly in favour of British entry, simply because the 
alternative for a country of our size and economic potential 
is to become absorbed in a special and very close economic 
relationship with the United States, an economic one 
which would lead to a political one. %hich would mean 
that we would be in danger of becoming a sub-contractor for 
the United States, and that wouldn't be terrible, I suppose, 
in terms of standards of living, but for a country that has 
had a thousand years of existence, in many respects it 
would be intolerable, particularly since many of us in this 
country don't think that the fount of wisdom is necessarily 
in "ashington. There is as much human frailty there as 
anywhere and it is much easier to put up with your own 
mistakes than other peoples. 
"And the (other) alternative is to go for something 
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like the 'Little Englander' policy, something like 
Switzerland or Sweden. The trouble is, our population 
is too large for that and we do have considerable interests 
outside of Europe which we couldn't maintain by ourselves 
as a 'Little Englander'. 
"For example, we have over £1,000 million invested 
in South East Asia, and we have interests in the Middle 
East. Without being able to look after those interests, 
I'm speaking commercially, not militarily, although there 
is aspect of the. military as well involved in this, but 
certainly from a commercial point of view, if we were 
unable to look after these interests, our standard of living 
in this country would decline very sharply. 
"So it all comes back to how we can best safeguard 
our interests overseas and our national interests, and I 
think the only way we can do it is with a closer grouping 
with out European neighbours whose economic and political 
systems in terms of development are broadly similar to our 
own. 
"The comparison is often made that the Americans speak 
the same language as we do, and have the same system of law 
as we do, and they have the same political tradition as ours, 
all roughly true. But on the other hand, the French tradition 
is very similar to ours, in spite of all the damage General de 
Gaulle has done to the parliamentary process, which was 
considerable. And also, General de Gaulle's style of government 
was as close as you can get to a totalitarian one, even if it 
was a tolerable one, that you can get in the Western world. 
Even so, their traditions are fairly democratic, and the Germans, 
since they got their new Constitution at the end of the war, have 
fairly got down the democratic road, ... so their political 
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system is based fairly much on a combination of the 
American and Tritish systems. I think in many respects, 
they've gotten the worst of both societies, but nevertheless, 
I think as time goes on, they'll alter that and move into 
a two-party system. Belgium is also a country firmly 
based on parliamentary government. So we have a lot in 
common with therm. But more important than that, ^rance 
and Cerrnany are middle powers, and we are a middle power, 
and so from that point of view, we have much more in common 
ther, ý. with then, and I think we stand a better chance with 
"The other one, of course, is geo-political, we're 
so close. we've always had the feeling in rngland that 
we're not a part of Europe. But that is nonsense when you 
look at the map. We've always looked upon ourselves as 
being in mid-Atlantic, but we are not anything like 
mid-Atlantic, we are too far north for that. 7e are really 
a , uropean continental power, and I think that meets our 
interest and that is why I'm a ^uropean. 
"If you sign the Treaty of Rome, as far as the British 
Parliament is concerned, it is a treaty like any other 
treaty. Certainly, if it worked against our national 
interests, we would have the right to do something about 
it in Brussels ... to say that the Treaty of Rome was so 
binding that you have to accept crippling policies simply 
because you have signed a piece of paper is rubbish. 
"I would not say that Britain would pull out if things 
got too rough. If the practice of the Common Market failed 
to produce the spirit of the Treaty of Rome, and it clearly 
did not work, there was no agreement over agricultural 
policy in the long run, that British consumers were paying 
for the cost of the French surplus, in those circumstances 
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if it went on for a considerable period of tirne, and we 
were not able, because or a line-up against us in the Common 
Market, to get our essential national interests considered, 
we'd have to use the French way. And there is no doubt 
at all that if one member (although perhaps not true of 
Belgium or Luxembourg), but certainly true of Britain, Trance 
and Germany, anyone of those countries decided to become 
disruptive, it could destroy the Common Market. So that 
is the defence mechanism, a bargaining tool. Tt could smash 
the whole thing up and it would be in nobody's inter "'t 
for that to nap; eil. T nless, of course, it suited z. Fiyone's 
interest to smash it 1d7, then they would s: liash_ it , r). 
", "e are not to produce under the Treaty )T "omo 
a Urti ted SLatos of rurope. I aria not a Federalist. ''. ere are 
people who are 2ederalists, but I'm not a federalist. I 
see the common Market as a pragmatic series of economic 
and political arrangements, corrunonly worked out, and meeting 
the interests of the greater majority, as it were. But it 
took 150 years for the United States to emerge as anything 
like the United States, and there is still some question 
as to whether that stage has been reached in the USA. 
"I see the Common Market developing in a federal 
direction, but not in the sense of the United States. I 
think the kind of federalism we are likely to get is that 
there will emerge a common currency, and at the moment you 
have a common currency, you have to have a common foreign 
policy to look after its interests, and a common defence 
policy. But my own reeling is that this is going to emerge 
very slowly and it is going to be very empirical. We are 
not going to have a president for Europe. will have 
a European Parliament, but it will be a parliament dealing 
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very ; much with economic, ; olitical and social issues. It 
will in. no way supersede the national parliaments. They 
will still control most of the legislation affecting the 
population. '17e will still have the monarchy. So these 
differences make it quite impossible to talk- about Britain 
being, reduced to the size of a State within the union like 
the United States. 
"It could mean that as Fastern and Central ^uro; e 
get more independence from the soviet Union, which looks 
like a prosepct, though a slender one, but one which the 
Russians will not be able to stop, these states will 
probably get an association with the ^onuion Market and 
there will emerge a distinctly new political situation, with 
new a;, proaches, and therefore adaptable institutions. I 
see no evidence of a closely knit third force with 
institutions that are centrally controlled from Brussels. 
In my judgement, at this moment in time, that would be an 
entirely undesirable development. I think we are going to 
produce something really quite unique. ''e will recognize 
that we are ^uropeans and that is no bad thing. 
"We have had two civil wars in Europe, we've been 
bitterly quarrelsome, and yet, if you look at the period 
prior to 1914, we had one hundred years of peace up to 1914, 
and that was based on a confederation. Sometimes this is 
overlooked, and I think we would be returning to a much 
closer parallel to that confederation, but this time it 
would be a much more co-ordinated affair. So this is not 
the first time Europe has experimented along these l=ines, 
but I think this is likely to be the most exciting and 
the most successful of these Federal movements. 
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TY1terview 7 7)1-rector o^a Party Office, T, pn 
Ja}JLiary 27,1971 
The nosition of the Zr'. tish press or the Common Market 
is not any ; roblerii from the ; oint of view of the -people 7,1(-, 
are )ro-Il r; on i'a. rket because they 'slave hach a constant 
record ()f' bei_ncý almost overwhelnwinc-ly pro theemselves from 
quite an early time ... The problem appears to, be that the 
Grass-roots of i }pion Inas cone sour, not the sophisticated 
press of ß_`1i on. 'Taybe it indicates the limitations of the 
med a, that's all, that people apparently are not swayer' 
just by what they real in the newspaper. I think most 
people are in^luenced a(-iainst the Common I. ar'cet by te 
fact that we haven't been let in twice, and nobody likes 
to be refuse,, membership of a club. 
"People usually talk about sovereignty, but partly 
its a bogus issue, partly not. The bogus side of it is 
that people, especially anti-T: arketeers, put it over as 
being, a question of deciding whether we are going to be 
independent or not, whereas in fact we have no choice. 
TTe are in fact dependent on other countries and we have to 
choose between different kinds of dependence or inter. - 
depencdence. So the choice facinc, us is in a lot of gays is 
one of with which countries we will do things together. 
"I happen to think we should get together with the 
other countries of Europe, especially because the defence 
position is going to change over the next generation and 
i think we have to get into a posture politically and 
economically over the next few years to sustain our self- 
defence. 
"I suppose over a long period of time, we will 
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pro'Dably become more like a unitary state in gestern 
^urope, but it may be a choice for cjrancchildren rather 
than this generation's choice. I'in a federal st in that 
rather long-term sense. 'here I find the federalist 
enthusiasm a bit irritating is where they consider that 
all the evils of the modern world are due to national 
sovereignty. I think that is absolute rubbish. It is 
obvious that war and all sorts of evils in the world came 
up a long time before we had. national sovereignty which 
is a relatively recent phenomenon. Now, I think we have 
clot to create a united ^uxrote on the basis of merging 
sovereignties and depend on our national sovereignty 
rather than try to decry it because it is the most 
powerful bond people have invented yet. 
"I see it(the Common Market) as a means of creating a 
freer economy in Britain. The free movement of goods, 
the free movement of factories, of production, to which 
one is committed' in the Common Market are more likely to 
take place. z'e are going to adopt a freer trade attitude 
than if we stayed outside. I think there would be much 
greater freedom in the economy if we joined the Common 
Market. This has a great impact on the political scene 
because I feel that a free economy is the basis of a free 
society. It would make the prospect of whole-hog socialism 
in this country very much less. The tendency is that when 
you get an autocratic sort of society, in that sort of 
environment it is very much easier to build up a socialist 
state. All sorts of monopolies, for instance, are much 
more effective within a national state. The same size of 
firm that would be a monopoly in a nation-state obviously 
would not be a monopoly on the T'uropea. n scale. It is 
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uhject 1ö co 7? tý_tion and -ýtill 




lC t;; 'lý iCitý_^ýP l`_; r'tmE'llcoS f'r? l SE= ?r ýýJiiý ýS tTIF? 3^e 
a'i economy wnic, ý is 'ree in the old-lashionc(I. lir, e, ra1 
sense that t1ieyT don't ; ersecute capi talists, then it does 
mean tct capital can 1iiýrate there if it is persecutel 
else, ý, here, and I think this means there is a very c'7_I_stiýlct 
limit put on socialist o peratiori in this country. 
"The %i(-. h de(-Tree o technology in this coup-try (higher 
per capital than in the other ^^C countries) will flourish 
if we co into the 3o; nmon Tiarket. TF we don't go into they 
Common Narket, I think we'll have to reduce the scale of 
these industries, run them don, or else we'll have to 
subsidize them. They will not be assets at all. They will 
be a drain on the economy. I'e are an economy with a 
very high ratio for services, a high ratio of services for 
export , and we ought to gain on 
these in the ronnirnon l-Iarket 
because it would lower the nationalist barriers against 
them which now exist. 
"A free society must have a free economy and you can 
not have a statused economy such as they have in rastern 
rurope, it simply isn't compatible with freedom. I don't 
believe that the attempt to give a hwnan face to communism 
in Czechoslovakia could ever have succeeded. It is inherent 
in the character of a state controlled economy not to be 
human. If you want personal freedom, you have to choose 
the system that has the devolution of economic decisions, 
which is practised in the private enterprise system. 
"The thing about the Common Market in the long run, 
if we form a successful Common Market with Britain in it, 
I think it will be an enormous magnet to the East European 
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countries. Already, they envy very much our economic 
success, because there is no doubt about it, the C. O. M. E. C. O. N. 
countries have been rather a failure in producing goods for 
the consumer revolution. In this day and age they have flunked. 
The hostility of the East European Bloc to the Common Market 
is based on a genuine fear of the success of the free enter- 
price system as manifest in the Common Market. They don't 
want Britain to go in because they regard it as a strengthening 
of the West, which it is, and that is a good reason to support 
it. 
"One has to look at the possibility that there will 
be a change in attitude in the States. One cannot simply 
expect them to go on paying our defence bills. If I were 
an American, I would be extremely irritated with the 
European countries which are prospering as never before, 
and seem to be totally incapable to defend themselves, or 
at least unprepared to pay the bill. That is one of the 
troubles in a democracy. They cannot always take a cool 
view of their own interests. 
"It is the job of leadership in politics that if you 
are convinced that a certain course of action is right and 
that public opinion is not on your side, then if you are 
in charge, you've got to go out and have a crusade and 
change public opinion. " 
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Interview n f-'?, Ho ASF' Oz ýýý'! Ll O I5 
"one o r' tali- thincs that is very important i. n the 
backte round of everyone's rnin3 is what joinil(-, the roiri; non 
Market would mean in the sense of Britain remaining 
Britain, Parliament, the nlueen, the country beire able, to 
make up its own mind. This is often. r_haracterri_se<d in the 
phrase of dislike for the bureaucrats in 'Brussels taking 
all the decisions, 't'_hey' 11 have to decide a_-tic' we' 11 have 
to do it'. It is a common attitude, and I think entirely 
wrong because all the legislatures of the countries of the 
Common Market decide what they can do, and because the Cori-, no 
Market is a success, it gives them more economic strength 
and even more political strength. flach individual country 
is able to do more of what it wanted to do of its own 
than was the case when the countries were entirely separated. 
The background sear is that if we join the Common Market 
and things are going wrong, we shan't be able to put them right 
... What I think they forget is that the Common Market is run 
by skilled politicians., The Council of Ministers has always 
paid regard to the national interests of the individual 
countries. The fact that r ance devalued the franc and 
Germany up-valued the mark was against all the rules, and 
they did it without prior consultation which was specifically 
provided for, for good reasons, and nobody objected. 
"People in this country worry that far off development 
areas, the West of England, Scotland, Ulster, will be 
forgotten and that it will be impossible for the Parliament 
in , Westminster to help those areas. But the Common Market, 
once we are into it wants to see that the whole flourishes, 
and the whole includes the West of England, Ulster and 
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Scotland. If special measures are needed for those areas, 
special measures will be taken, even though they are not 
formally in the rule book. I think that there is a great 
misunderstanding of the realities of how the Cor nion Parket 
actually works and that the feeling that once we are in, 
we are in and wholly at the whim of a group of foreigners 
is absolutely false ... 
"People worry about their job. They feel that if we 
join the Common Market there will be greater competition, 
certain firms will co out of business, they may be out of 
a job and anyhow there will be a lot of crafty foreigners, 
Germans, Italians, Frenchmen competing for their jobs wh. o 
the British people flatter themselves get paid less t1-ia n 
they do. Of course this is entirely wrong. In fact, 
labour costs, including social security, on the Continent 
are higher than here. It is much more likely that there 
will be a net outflow of people from Britain going to work 
on the Continent rather than the other way round. 
"In the back A their minds people may feel that an 
upheaval is necessary and that the Common Market would 
be a good upheaval as upheavals (o, profitable and fruitful 
in the long run. But they worry in the short run that with 
responsibility for themselves and their families that the 
welfare cushion would be removed under the Common Market 
way of life. That again is entirely wrong. Family allowance 
and old age pension on the Continent are as high, if not 
higher. The one thing that is higher in this country is 
the national Health Service, and there has never been any 
real question of the NHS being abolished as a result of our 
joining the Common Market. All of the history of harmonization 
has been of a country of lower social services in a particular 
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field 'zavi_ncr, to u; 7 fnem to the level r )-C the highest. t 
ajcai r is lot understood and. erha s is a failure' in CO117i1U i- 
cations. 
"Old peo; le are in a dilemma. Many of them do Peel 
that in the long run the Common i>iarket is good and will be 
good for the youngsters, but that it is going to be jolly 
hard or themn. Prices will go up and. the degree to which 
they'll go uTp has certainly been exaggerated in everybody's 
minds. But the leaders of both parties agreed that in the 
event prices go up, old age pensions and social security 
benefits will go up to take account of those. It has also 
been more than hinted that for the people just above the 
social security benefit level, personal income tax 
allowances will be increased so that they will get sore 
recompense for the increase in -prices dire to the Common 
Market. But of course it wouldn't be long, in nay op inionl, 
that the whole economy, having been given a spin by joinin; 
the Cormnon Market, that increase in production would be 
spinning off a higher standard of living for everybody and 
that would include old people as well as everyone else. 
"As rar as industry itself is concerned, a good part 
of industry feels that the Common Market will benefit itself, 
its shareholders, and its workers in the long run. Although 
I think it is equally recognized that there will be a cold 
shower effect. However, that is moderated by a transitional 
period. The fact that industry as a whole is keen on going 
into the Common Harket and take this bracing shower I think 
spells out something of the confidence of British industry, 
a confidence which isn't shared by the public at large. 
The British public at large, as I see it, is hesitant, 
pessimistic about its own capability and the future of the 
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country, but people running businesses seeto much more 
confident of their abilities and are willing to take 
advantage of a broader market. Trades unionists share the 
fears of possible unenriployment, and that the Common 1, 'arket 
is a paradise for laissez-faire, free for all and the 
devil take the hindmost. They seen to ignore the fact 
that nationalized industries in ^rance and elsewhere go 
on being nationalized. In fact, the sort of economy which 
is the basis of the philosophy hf the Common Tlarket is 
a mixed economy in which nationalized industries have a 
place, the only prohibition being that those nationalized 
industries must not be subsidized in a way where they 
compete unfairly with similar industries elsewhere in the 
Common Market. 
"I see the r^C as a probable first step towards a 
political union. It could be a very Good first step 
towards political union. It doesn't have to be a first 
step. Tinder the Treaty of Rome economic ar"fairs alone 
are dealt with and in certain of these decisions, the 
majority vote can decide things, although history has shown 
that if there is a substantial minority interest, it is in 
fact always respected. As far as foreign affairs and 
defence are concerned, and that is what one means by 
political union, it could only be taken by the unanimous 
decision of each and every member of the Community, and 
therefore any idea that by signing the Treaty of Rome 
you have signed yourself willy nilly to political union 
is rubbish. I myself hope that political union would 
follow, but clearly it is not going to be political union 
of either the completely unitary sort as in the case of 
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^nglaid and Scotland, nor like the united States or ranad, i 
or any other federation where there is a strong central 
government established at more or less the salve time as 
the component states. In our case it is entirely M- P-Perent 
because the component states have been there Fora thousand 
years or more and you cannot apply the same Formula. it 
is clear that through the rconomi_c !; om nuni tv that a new 
style e or political union is bei. nc evolved that isn't 
unitary or . 
^edera] but which leads to a: osition e her 
effective c'ecisi_o_is are reaches' in (-seed ; ields and in 
which there will be democratic control, and in which 
minority interests by prior consent will not be able to 
veto majority decisions. We have not reached that stage 
in constitutional amendment, but the T'T'C certainly points 
in that way. So it will be a different sort of political 
union than the world has yet seen and it will be different 
because its origins are different. It will be suited to 
7urope ans' countries with such a long long history of 
their own. 
"I think in time (going towards the end of this century) 
the ruropean Parliament will become the effective controllinc 
point rather than the national parliaments, but the 
transition will be a gradual one, and the Turopean Parliament 
will only assume that role in so far as it has proved to 
the national parliaments that it is fully capable of 
fulfilling it. If you take, for instance, foreign affairs 
where the Six have already taken the initial steps to 
co-ordinate their own policies, in particular, fields like 
the Middle Fast, then you will find that one of the 
foreign ministers will become the front runner and then lop 
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after a bit, the time will come when a man is appointed 
as the foreign affairs chief for the EEC. Then at that 
moment, who will he be answerable to. He must become 
answerable to a European rather than a national parliament 
because otherwise it wouldn't work. I think there will also 
be a change in the roles. If you take the pattern of the 
Commission and Council of Ministers, the Council of Ministers 
will become less strong and the Commission will become 
stronger, but there may be brought into it 
.a much more 
political element than exists at present, of a European 
sort, and the European Parliament will become stronger so 
as to keep its democratic control over that political element. 
The European court will remain a concept we are not used to 
because we don't have a written constitution as such. 
"Europe knows it has to live with Eastern Europe and 
Russia and it's no good saying that the best thing to do is 
an armed balanced threat between the two. It's interesting 
that the only countries that have tried to do anything about 
this are the Common Market countries, France and Germany. 
Herr Brandt has succeeded to oil the Iron Curtain so that it 
can rise a bit. Now there's serious talk of a European 
security conference between the Warsaw Pact powers and NATO 
... I don't think any of the countries in Western Europe 
had they remained on their own would have felt-strong enough 
and confident enough to get such a movement going. It's 
a good example of how good things can flow from confidence 
and strength ... 
"There are those in Western Europe who think in European 
terms, who are bound to see that where the Iron Curtain lies, 
what it divides us from is still a part of Europe. I don't 
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think it is right to assume that Eastern Europe is just the 
same as Western Europe except that it has been overrun by 
bolsheviks. I think there are real differences, but never 
mind, there are also real similarities. So I see a gradual 
freeing of impediments to economic, cultural and personal 
exchange ... Although Russia fulminated against the success 
of the Common Market and its enlargement ... once this has 
happened, and if it develops into the political and defence 
fields, I cannot but believe that Russia would prefer to 
see a much strengthened Europe, with strong links between West 
and Fast Europe, than a situation in which Russians and 
Americans confront themselves immediately across the Iron 
Curtain ... But that can only happen ... if Europe becomes 
strong and coherent economically and militarily to fill 
the vacuum in Europe itself ... And it must hope that phase 
by phase, bit by bit, area by area, Eastern Europe will come 
in with them. 
"British people are very sceptical of the press. They 
read the press a great deal, but they are very sceptical of 
it. Otherwise, how could it be that a Labour government 
could ever win when the majority of the press is Tory? They 
read in a fairly sophisticated fashion. One of the advantages 
of the press over television, which is a sort of political 
neuter, when you pick up the Daily Express, everyone knows 
they've picked up a right-wing paper. When you pick up the 
Daily Mirror, you know you've picked up a left-wing one and 
it's very easy to interpret what you read, and people are 
always making those interpretations as they read. So they 
don't just suck in what the newspapers tell them but they do 
use newspapers for information a great deal. And there has, 
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not been a lack of information in the British press. ... 
I think there has been a lot of information in the British 
press on the Common Market and Europe, but partly it hasn't 
been very much read because it is a subject that has been on 
and off the pile and people have gotten fed up with it, and 
are just waking up again now to the fact that it's real, 
that it's important and it's probably going to happen 
and they'd better inform themselves. And partly there's 
a scepticism that comes from the conversion of first of 
all, the Conservative Party when Harold Macmillan was 
converted in 1961 and then the Labour Party when Harold 
Wilson was converted in 1967, and I think people said, 
'oiiii there, what are those boys there cooking up? ' 
Now I can say, surely you must find it very convincing 
that people starting from hostile positions, quite 
" 
different people, under all sorts of pressures not to do 
so, have in fact decided that to join Europe is in fact 
right. But they say, 'It's just a Westminster cook-up, 
it's a way out of a fix, the country is in a fix and 
this is an easy way out, ... 
"And we have to remember this, that in Britain, the 
way you have your say is by voting for one big party or 
another and when they're both batting on the same side in 
a big matter like this, it does make it very awkward. And, 
funnily enough, if the Labour Party does more and more to 
espouse the cause of opposition, it may actually help 
opinion make up its mind ... (People) think the debate 
is real, not when it's between Douglas Jay and Derek Walker- 
Smith on the one hand and Geoffery Rippon and Roy Jenkins 
on the other, that sort of inter-party thing they find 
very confusing. They think it's real when they have Ted 
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Heath on the one hand and Harold Wilson on the other. So 
though you might think it is a blow for the support for 
Europe if the Labour Party does espouse the contrary 
cause, I think the debate will become more real. I 
think the pro-Europe case is a very strong one and because 
the debate becomes more real, the pro-Europeans will be 
more likely to make progress. 
"I think people's attitudes to the EEC are more 
complicated than the polls imply. The polls ask too simple 
a question. I think that as time goes on during the year 
and the debate hots up, people who say 'let's be careful, ' 
as they know more about it will come off the fence, will 
become pro. 
"People are sceptical about what they think is an 
unholy alliance between the politicians of different parties, 
between the big noises in television and the press. It 
doesn't actually help you to put the pro case because 
however right it is, it is being treated with too much 
reserve. If you have someone batting strongly on the other 
side, people can really see how the game is going and that 
will help them make up their minds more". 
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Interview 9 Leader of 1'o1; len' s anti-Varket ýrouý 
1971 
'T was a Lenuber of Parliament and I voted against 
entry into the Common Market. I'm very pro-British 
Commonwealth ... I was a "'PFN in the last war and I 
think this is perhaps connected because we saw so many 
of the men comincg from New Zealand, Australia and other 
parts of the rorlmonwealth to help us fight Nazism and I- 
therefore have a very strong sense of family relationship 
with them. It's very difficult to say precisely, but I 
don't believe that our joining a very small part of 
Western rurope, which is what it would be, is in any way 
a means of ending poverty in the world or stopping war. 
I think it's Line that the "rench and Germans have come 
together because they have had so many battles over the 
last one hunc'red years, and clearly anyone who cares 
about war and peace must be concerned that these two 
countries no longer clash, but for Britain to turn its 
back on the coirtmonwealth and go into Europe I feel would 
be a totally wrong decision. Not only from the point of 
view of our own consumer interests which I feel would be 
grossly affected were we to go in, but also from the much 
wider and in the long term far more important aspect of 
being an influence for peace in the world and for the 
ending of poverty and ending of racial conflict. sae have 
a multi-racial Commonwealth which to me provides us with 
a marvellous opportunity to start from to end racialism. 
Loads of chances to build this up into a far more effective 
piece of machinery have been lost over the years due to 
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failures by both T, cabour' and conservative- Governme, nts" 
But even t'ý. F lý ss, it st:; -11 
is a kind of entity for all 
that I-7r. ieat'l i_.: ' trying to cdo to destroy it. I reel 
passiof, ately in favour or tryi>n<< to enable the British 
Commonwealth oi nations to eventually become an important, 
significant foundation For some kind of- world order, ? gut 
I don't believe that boil(I i_ , r- up a ri coh ; nen' s club _n 
"estern '? uro; e is a step towards any sort of world order 
or world Government. 
"I'a -i 1nna-time member of the Committee for '? uclear 
Disarmament and I feel no risk at all emergin from 
rastern ^", uaro, )e In terms of the 717estern 71)rop e military 
situation. I thi. ýiý ; _t'- a 
load of absolute nonsense to 
imagine that the nussians are going to attack Western 
Furop e militarily. I don't think it matters a damn 
whether we have conventional or nuclear deterrents. I 
don't think there's any question of the Soviet Union wanting 
to attacl< western ^uro; e. I think that if the Americans 
pulled out, they'd stay right where they are. This is the 
sort of question I find difficult to answer because I 
think it's so stupid. I don't think there's anything at 
all to substantiate the opinion that for any reason at all 
the Russians wish to attack d'estern Europe. I think that 
the Russians are first and foremost concerned about the 
Soviet union and their own peoples. Certainly, they like 
to spread their own ideas in their own way, but I'm 
perfectly sure that they realize that the way to spread 
their ideas is not by warfare. They have their own areas 
that they're concerned about because they're determined of 
course, to keep a barrier between themselves and Germany, 
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and as they see it, the capitalist imperialist powers in 
the West and this I fully understand. They lost 20 million 
dead in the last war and they have a very deep concern of 
maintaining a barrier between themselves and Western 
Europe and they will not permit countries like Czechoslovakia 
and Poland to slide into the arms as they see it, the 
evils of Western Europe. There are evils on both sides, 
as I see it. I'm not a Communist, although I have 
sympathy very much with what they have done and what they do. 
But I'm not a Conservative either, I'm a socialist. 
"I think for Britain to break away from EFTA and to 
go into this small rich man's club of Western Europe 
would be utter folly for us and for any influence we can 
exert both in Western Europe and the rest of the world. 
This is essentially a big business men's club and the 
powers that are trying to force us into it are manned by 
international financiers, bankers and certain elements of 
big business both in the United States and in our own 
country and in Europe itself. It's not in the interest 
of the ordinary people in this country at all. A great 
deal of our trade is with the sterling area, outside the 
Common Market, with Australia and New Zealand to name but 
two, and they have served us marvellously over the years. 
The New Zealanders in particular geared the whole of their 
production of their dairy and meat production towards 
us during the war in order to help us when we were at our 
lowest ebb and these things should not be forgotten. We 
must be concerned with the Commonwealth sugar agreement 
countries which are almost totally dependent on us as 
their market. We can't just let these people down who 
have been friends to you over very many years and forget 
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about ttnrrr. I'nr, vary fý-ýr_'ul t'lat ttiie Thry raver m nt 
le by Týr" ''ýt1i -W,, ) lc3 
. 
ýcý'oui tui in o'u' 
frien(ls , ^(I ji,. st secs-. n, - v,, Iiat h(- acid ? ai_s in the 
higher ec'lelo,,! ' of i r'''u$ try -1nß rina. nco can : et Out of 
it an_( it's a root harr ble situation. I just think it 
is a most sa(1 ; nom? Went on Britain if we allow ourselves 
to be into this any' I'n perfectly certain that 
the majority of the British people are acairst it, 
mainly for instinctive, reasons. Some will understand 
one hit of this arýune-ýt, others will understand another 
but overall, tie Pr tish people sense, and they have 
very strange matex ity in politics, that this is not a good 
thing for a wide variety or reasons, just as they sensed 
that we bad to stand up to the Nazies in the last war. 
And they sensed it in the 1930's before the war began. 
The public vere almost rearing to go when war was declared, 
not because they were other than haters of war but because 
they knew this was the only way to combat the cruel 
terror and have Freedom for their own people and the 
people of 7urope, and they're certainly not going to sit 
down under a small section of German dominated T7estern 
Europe in the future. I think most British people would 
say that they're much more 
they are of the Russians. 
1914 war so we've grown up 
has an adverse effect when 
over. If I thought it was 
be comfortable with the Ge: 
frightened of the Germans than 
Our fathers were also in the 
with this feeling, and this 
it's been the Germans twice 
for any good purpose, I could 
^mans, but I don't. 
"I don't share the drab view that some people tend 
to share of this country's future. I think this is a 
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great country. We're in a terrible mess in certain 
respects but the people have great resilience and great 
tolerance and I prefer them to be outward looking in the 
wider sense of the term rather than inward looking in the 
narrow Western European sense of that term ... 
"I see the great strengths of democracy in this 
country being totally submerged were we to enter the 
Common Market, and a great opportunity of furthering the 
best elements of civilization on this planet would be 
lost forever ... 
"I'm thinking in terms of the Commonwealth being 
one of the imaginative forms of foundation for world 
government and I believe first of all that nations must 
be allowed to come to full adulthood and be free before 
they are capable of coming into any kind of world 
organization. 
"We don't have to create public opinion against the 
Common Market, we know it exists. We're trying to get 
through to people how they can bring their democratic 
will to bear on their elected representatives in 
Parliament so there is a truly democratic decision taken 
on this and it's not left in the hands of Parliamentarians, 
many of whom are totally out of touch with the opinions of 
the people they represent. The best solution to this 
problem would be if one of the major parties were to come 
out clearly in favour of our entry to the Common Market 
and one were to come out against entry and then have 
every candidate state precisely where they stand and make 
the general election mainly on this one issue. " 
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Interview 10 History Scholar 
Cambridge, February 19,1971 
"The Common Market itself can be seen from a variety of 
sides and it seems to me inept for anyone to claim to have 
an opinion on it unless one is a full-time expert, bocause 
no-body can be in sufficient possession of the facts. 
"One or two salient features do emerge. For those opposing 
the Common Market, convincing arguments can be produced. The 
Common Market in itself is not an economically conceived unit 
and the continual failure of the Community to produce a coherent 
and equitable agricultural policy during the history since 
the Treaty of Rome has stood to back this up ... But primarily 
it must be realised that the Common Market is a retroressive 
organisation in that it is a rich wants club, a sort of pro- 
tection racket, ^nd to this end it is serving to intensify 
the polarization of resources in a world where the sheer dem- 
-ands of population aro making such polarization not merely 
unfortunate but fatal. 
It... The Common Market was a blatantly political move 
intended primarily, and i think explicitly, to make West Ger- 
-many join a club and thus to crystallise the division of 
Germany. One can see in Germany the lychpin of Common Market 
policy in that the Conmion Market was created in the atmos- 
-phere after the Second World War where the dominant power 
factors were concentrating primarily on the reduction of the 
possibility of another German resurgence. 
"... What is emerging as the primary note of opposition 
to the Common Market ... is the retrenchment into national 
self-identity which is a phenomenon very much in the Western 
world at the monent, caused, first of all in Great 
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Britain by a slow economic decline and secondly by the final 
realization that being the nominal victor of the Second 
World War was not a carte blanche to say that the world 
owed us a living ... 
"... Entry into Europe would indeed be a stimulus for 
English industry, but it would also cause considerable 
upset to British agriculture ... The emphasis in Britain 
on mixed farming which has served to maintain an ecological 
balance would have to be destroyed in the Common Market, 
as it has been in France, in favour of larger and 
economically efficient units ... and it will mean we 
will have a continuation of such situations as in 1968 
when several million pounds of foodstuffs were dumped into 
the North Sea to maintain price levels within the community. 
This dumping only occurred, as I indicated earlier, because 
the Common Market countries have shown themselves incapable 
of producing a balanced and general economic programme ... 
"Within Britain, economic motives do, on the one hand, 
given the present set of criteria, urge one to join larger 
units, because large companies such as ICI and Shell and BP 
are already operating on this sort of scale. However, the 
argument which is derived from the German orientation of 
the primary situation still does have its effects in that 
the popular imagination was for seven years conditioned to 
believe that the German form of life was the worse and 
most brutal that has ever existed, and this image still 
does exist in the minds of the people who fought that war 
who are now in the 40-60 age group. Presumably this sort 
of feeling will die off with that generation but the 
pertinent fact is that effective executive and decision 
3O6 
making power does lie with that group of people at the 
moment. So one has ... the experience of seeing decisions 
on the Common Market being made in terms of and with 
reference to criteria which are effectively twenty years 
out of date ... 
"The nation-state has formed a useful frame of 
reference. It was a convenient size as the conceptual 
framework within which a majority of people could operate 
... National identity and the illusion of national self 
determination remain for people an extremely important 
concept because without it they feel themselves without a 
frame of reference. What is necessary then is if larger 
units are going to be introduced, for example, Europe, 
then it's going to involve shifting opinion from the 
smaller to the larger unit ... This presents a far more 
difficult problem than faced the transfer of loyalty from 
village to town to country ... The psychological effects 
of this one cannot be sure of. However, there are disturbing 
indications of this relativity of values and the loss of 
permanence, borne. out in the high percentage of mental 
breakdown and mental disorder, now a dominant problem in 
the civilised world. All this seems to me to reflect a 
loss of identity, a loss of self-location within society. 
The present situation in industrial activity and the 
extremely heavy bias in favour of machine as against man 
is going to be perpetuated by the continued existence of 
such a community as the Common Market which claims as its 
excuse that it is an economic union ... 
"A definitive decision is going to have to be made 
some time in the-near future because our governments 
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cannot continue in this sort of political limbo. 
"There are considerable long term disadvantages of 
going into Europe, not least from the ecological point of 
view. From the psychological point of view, I don't think 
people are prepared to jump to yet a larger unit, but on 
the other hand, what is becoming abundantly clear is that 
the nation-state, with the value judgements that the 
organizational unit imposes, is increasingly anachronistic. 
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Interview 11 Royal Naval Officer 
Bath, March 4,1971 
"on the whole, I would say that I'm against Britain 
joining the Common Market, but I cannot say that I am very 
strongly against. I think one of the things that bothers 
me is that the argument is being based on 'can we afford 
it? ' and 'what will be the effect on food prices? ' and 
these really are very minor issues. One starts off 
thinking that getting into the Common Market is just a 
means of getting a much bigger area for free marketing which 
ought to give our industry a chance of producing things in 
larger quantity, producing things more economically, 
putting more money into research and development and 
generally expanding. Even this, in fact, is conditional 
on how British industry survives in competition with 
European industry. I don't think for one minute that 
there is any possibility of stopping at that stage. We've 
already heard talk of the money we have to put in to 
support the agricultural policy. What I think it means 
is abandoning the whole system of taxation and the whole 
system of government that has been built up in this 
country over hundreds of years and starting with what is 
almost a clean sheet of paper. Now in fact, this would 
not be a clear break, it would be something which takes 
place over five to ten years, but at the end of that 
period, our methods of taxation, our government, our 
whole way of life can be expected to be completely different. 
"What worries me most is that our sovereignty would have 
to be completely abandoned, submerged. I think the 
countries in the Common Market must eventually end up with 
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one single central government which is highly unlikely to 
be based in the UK and certainly highly unlikely to be based 
on British traditions and methods of government. When I 
look at the way the French flirt with the Russians, the 
' way the West Germans flirt with the East Germans, I can't 
see myself as a British subject working under a government 
that is made up of a combination of those people ... 
"We in NATO have to defend Europe if we -are to defend 
ourselves, but it is by way of a shield which I personally 
feel will never be used. If the resources of NATO ever 
have to be used in a military sense, then the whole concept 
of NATO will have failed. It is absolutely vital that we 
do keep this posture and that NATO must be seen by the Russians 
as a viable force which really in fact could give them a 
lot of trouble if they ever tried to challenge it. 
"As a Britain, I must say I don't trust the Continentals. 
In two world wars one has seen the European allies collapse, 
almost turn tail, and give up very early. I think that there 
is a tremendous risk that if one of the NATO countries 
was attacked, at the last moment some of the weaker partners 
would leap out and declare their neutrality. My opinion 
is that it would come down to a very small number of countries, 
the Americans, the Canadians perhaps, Britain and Germany. 
I wouldn't even trust the French, frankly. If they saw a 
better position for France as France, I feel very confident 
that they would back out ... NATO without 'America is 
,, meaningless ... 
N 
r"I don't think the Commonwealth 
has anything to offer 
us as an alternative to the Common Market. I think most 
of our Commonwealth friends are in it, a few out of 
sentiment, but most of them for what they can get out of it. 
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They're not really interested in being Commonwealth members 
because of what the Commonwealth used to mean. 
"I've always hoped there would be some means of tying 
up with the USA. I think if you're going to put groups 
of people together into larger groups, then you must taxe 
groups of people which have ... a common interest, a" 
common way of life, and I believe that the USA and Great 
Britain have enough in common that this could happen ... 
I think that the thing that is against this really is 
geography. The thought of close links with a country three 
or four thousand miles away seems on the face of it a bit 
impossible, or would have done a few years ago, but 
communications and high speed travel are now such that it 
isn't so ridiculous as it once might have seemed. We would 
want to maintain independent governments, but those 
governments would in fact want to work very closely together. 
Our industries are already interdependent to a considerable 
extent. I think it would be more palatable to the average 
Briton than joining the Common Market ... 
"I think that Britain can't remain indefinitely a world 
power in the sense she was in the past. In time, whole 
sections of industry will cease to exist and we shall fall 
into a specialist niche ... I really fear that Britain will 
go into the Common Market. I think that whole sections 
of industry will collapse, this is inevitable. Some will 
never recover, others will recover and having recovered, 
they'll be better for it, but there will be tremendous 
upheaval and massive unemployment with it. 
"It seems a fact of life in this country that workers 
are not mobile, even if it's ten or fifteen miles away, 
0 
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they'd rather stay in one place on unemployment benefits 
than move house. I suspect that, on the other hand, some 
of the European workers would be perfectly willing to come 
to this country and this again would act against the British 
worker. I think that if we joined the Common Market, our 
workers would have to be prepared for retraining and this 
is something that hasn't been accepted by the workforce in 
this country to any real extent. So much of industry 
in this country is so hopelessly inefficient that it will 
collapse if it loses the captive market it has at the moment. 
A good deal of Continental industry is becoming very 
efficient, and it's becoming very efficient because it's 
being taken over by the USA. I think it may be too late 
at this stage to establish a Common Market that is 
completely in competition with the USA. I think the USA 
has already protected its position by getting a rather 
large foot in the door ... 
"I'm not convinced that the countries already in the 
Common Market have made anything like the amount of 
progress they like to give the impression they have. The 
Common Market countries started from a pretty poor position, 
and so far, all that has been happening is a sort of 
catching-up process. I suspect that the impetus is already 
slipping in the Common Market countries. I'm far from 
convinced that the Common Market countries are unified 
to anything like the extent that is claimed for it. I'm 
far from convinced that the advantages that are claimed, 
standard of living, productivity, are really due to the 
Common Market itself. I think these things probably might 
have happened anyway. I have yet to see a convincing 
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case put forward for us going into the Common Market. 
"I have a feeling that given more co-operation and 
understanding between management and unions, this country 
could be great again economically, without the Common Market. 
We have the skills in industry in this country, what seems 
to be lacking is the motivation. When you get down to the 
shop floor, there is still the remains of the old feelings 
that the boss is a filthy capitalist. The trades unionists 
in this country don't seem to have the capability of looking 
any farther than the ends of their own noses. The recent 
industrial strike action suggests to me that the unions 
are totally incompetent. The only solution to the problem 
that I can think of is worker participation in company 
profits in the form of ownership of shares. The Union 
worker in this country knows that if he wants a pay rise, 
he can get it simply by disrupting the public and I don't 
think management makes much effort to control this because 
they know they can just pass the increased costs along 
to the consumer. In the Common Market, this would no longer 
exist because if labour costs proved too high in one country, 
then the factory would be moved to another where the costs 
were lower. The only force in recent history that has been 
able to make the British worker 'give his all' has been a 
major war ... There has been a great sense of anti-climax 
in the country since the last war. There's the feeling, 
'We've done it, now we can relax'. Although that was many 
years ago, it is still being felt. The defeated countries, 
Germany for example, were given massive American aid to 
rebuild their factories along modern lines, which gives 
them a decided economic advantage over the apparently 
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victorious countries which are using factories and machines 
which are over one hundred years old. 
"I've always believed that the answer to snapping 
the British worker out of his lethargy is unemployment ... 
but we do have fairly high unemployment in this country 
and you'd think the others would be jolly glad to be 
working. I think perhaps one answer is that to be out of 
work these days ... really isn't much of a penalty. I 
really believe that our welfare benefits are too attractive 
... I'm afraid we're breeding a race of young people in 
this country who assume that 'they' will keep them, and 
'they' will find a house for them, and 'they' must make 
sure that they're clothed and fed, and I'm really not 
quite sure who they think 'they' is or are, but consequently, 
they feel that it doesn't matter whether they work or not. 
I think that anything that is handed to you on a plate, ... 
without you making any effort to get it is bound to be 
taken for granted, and it's a fundamental weakness in 
socialism. Socialism is good for ideal people but it 
doesn't tend to work too well with real live people. I 
think that far from improving the situation in this country, 
that if we went into the Common Market, we may well in fact 
accelerate the rate that the rest of the Common Market 
countries degrade to our sort of outlook on life that the 
state owes us a living. " 
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(-SO' T STAT7, J" : NTS 
1. I'm a food "^uropean". 
2. I think it's a load o2 absolute nonsense to imagine that 
the Puss-i_ans are goinc to attack Western Europe militarily. 
I (loll' It think i_ t matters a damn whether we have conventional 
or nuclear deterrents. 
3. The Common Market would be good for us in selling and good 
for us in buyin. 
4. The ruropean Community has already progressed far enough to 
slow that the whole concept is entirely { easible annoI, that 
it is t71-o only practicable way of coping with the problem 
of exaJgE'rdted and out-dated nati_oncalism. 
5. I'm tired of , iý? ari n(, r about the rorvnon I7arket. 
6. It woul(l he disastrous gor 7. n( -land to 7o into the Common 
Market and remain o the opinion that no other measures 
are necessary to improve her ecotlori is lper. {ormance. 
7.7, acl7 individual country in the CorImLon Ilarket is able to <o 
more of what it wanted to do of its own than was the case 
when the countries were entirely separated. 
S. l411akinU sacrifices is not pleasant, but it would be dreadful 
to be blamed by your children in 2C years time for not 
joining the C'ommon Market just because you would not pay a 
bit nor. e for your butter. 
g. The political argurnents are overwhelrninjly in favour of 
British entry to the Common Market, simply because the 
alternative would be to submerge ourselves in an economic 
and political relationship with the United States. 
10. The acceptance of the Treaty of Rome and Britain's merger 
with the "MC would raise a barrier against the future 
extensions of socialism. 
11. The British people have been so complacent and so sheltered 
for such a long time that what is needed is a very big 
challenge, and once the challenge is placed before the 
people, then ultimately it will have an invigorating effect. 
12.1uro-mania is a typical disease of leading politicians for 
whom the thought of moving awkward economic decisions to 
institutions in Brussels where they are well insulated from 
democratic processes is understandably attractive. 
13. Perhaps a graceful and comfortable decline into international 
impotence is what we really want. 
14. The only way Great Britain can influence the world today is 
by being part of a greater union. 
15. The key to the British position comes from the advantages 
of having a world market, not a ruropean market. 
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16. If we can Form a successful Common Market with Britain in 
it, I think it will be a tremendous magnet to the Tast 
7. uropean countries. 
17.7orld federation being premature, we should start with the 
creation of a federation in those regions of the world 
where a number of small states are contiguous with one 
another, so as to reduce the possibility of war in that 
region and to extend the area of democratic government. 
18. For Britain to turn its back on the Commonwealth and go 
into ^urope I Feel would be a totally wrong decision. 
19. American business in ^urope is within the next 15 years 
going- to become the third industrial power in the world 
unless nurope can unite to take over the operation horse1F. 
20. The maintenance of the Commonwealth today seems to demand 
a strong Britain in a strong European Community. 
21. The press has long influenced affairs in Britain to the 
point where entry into the EEC appears as the only hope 
of national salvation. 
22,77e are far in advance of ? Jurope when it comes to technolo(7y 
and research. mr entry in the Common M"arket would give 
impetus to people inside Europe to get prices down. 
23. I have never believed that the movement to ? uropean unity 
encourages ^urope to look inwards on itself. Rather, it 
has o ened up new opportunities for a united ? 'urope in the 
world as a whole. 
24. The Corr, Tno T'. arl: et is essentially a big businessmen's c1ut, 
and the po vers that are tryir;;; to force us into it are 
manned by international financiers, bankers and certain 
elements of biýT business both in the United States arid in 
our ova country and in Europe itself. It's not in the 
interest of the ordinary people of this country at all. 
25. It wouldn't be long in my opinion before the whole economy, 
having been given a jolt by joining the Common Market, with 
an increase in production, would be spinning off higher 
standards of living for everybody, and that would include 
old people as well as everybody else. 
26. The problem comes back to how we can best safeguard our 
interests overseas and our national interests. I think the 
only way we can do it is with closer grouping with our 
7uropean neighbours whose economic and political systems 
in terms of development are broadly similar to our own. 
27. I'm not against the Common Market, I'm just against Britain 
joining it. 
28. I think them would be much greater freedom in the economy 
in Britain if we joined the Common Market. 
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29. The C ommw1 Market i_ tseli can be 
of sides. It seers to me inept 
have an opinion about it, unless 
expert, because nobody can be in 
the facts. 
seen From aw --de variety 
for anyone to claim to 
one is a full-time 
a full possession of 
30.77hatever its weakness and faults, British policy towards 
the Third ''Torld inhabits a different and better universe 
than that of the ^T'r. 
31. ^urope cannot make its full contribution unless the 77C 
is enlarged to include Britain. 
32. The future ^rC will be a different sort of political union 
than the world has yet seen and it will be different 
because its origins are different. It will be suited to 
Turopean countries with such a long, long history of 
their own. 
33. The Common Market is a retrogressive organization that is 
serving to intensify the polarization of resources in a 
world where such polarization not merely unfortunate 
but fatal. 
34. There will be tremendous upheaval and massive unemployment 
if we join the Corrffnon Market. 
35. It is generally assumed that if the challenge of the 
Common t": arket is presented, British business will wake 
itself up and its approach will become more competitive. 
I think this is very dangerous to assume. British 
business just might go under completely. 
36. The movement towards integration of the Six, or such other 
western 7, uropean nations that may join them, is diametrically 
incompatible with the re-unification of Germany. The more 
Germany becomes integrated in the vest, the more she has 
to accept that she never can re-integrate with Fast Ger<<any. 
37. I don't think it will be the end or 
our future as an important state if 
Common Market. 
38. I think we've got to create a unites 
merging sovereignties and depend on 
rather than try to decry it because 
bond people have invented yet. 
the United Kingdom or 
we don't go into the 
:I rurope on the basis or 
our national sovereicnty 
it's the most powerful 
39. The Common Market is a compassionate society, where social 
priorities are right. Schools, welfare, pensions and 
holidays have top priority. 
40. I've always had the feeling that we're not a part of r? urope. 
41. 'or small businessmen and for the workers the Common Market 
offers a , grim and forbidding future. 
42. I can't see any argument whatsoever for Britain not going 
into the Common Market. 
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43" Joining the rr^ means accepting reýr-ulations £rorii , 3rISsels, 
which are subject co no )arliamenta. ry check or control in 
ßri_tain; they would have the force of lav, regardless o 
tiie wishes of our own House of roirmons. Chur lata courts 
could riot protect -Britain's citizens. 
44. I see the ConnMon Market as a prag1itatic series of economic 
and 2 olitical arranuel: ents cotrurtonly worked out and meetinc 
the interests of Vie' he greater inajori-ty. 
45. Social service benefits are actually a great deal higher 
in many respects in the Common Market than they are in 
Great Britain. 
46. The T^r in its present form may not be the best of all 
possible communities for us to join in the best of all 
possible worlds, but it is the only unit open to us which 
looks like meeting our requirements. 
47. The Treaty of Rome, so far as the British Parliament is 
concerned is a treaty like other treaties. if it worked 
against our national interests, we would have a right to 
do something about it in Brussels. 
48. The bogus side of the Common 1": arket issue is put over as 
being a question of deciding whether we are going to be 
independent or not, whereas in fact we have no choice. t,, 'e 
are in fact dependent on other countries and we have to 
choose between different kinds of dependence. So the 
choice facing us in a lot of ways is one of with which 
countries we shall do things together. 
49. I suspect that the impetus is already slipping in the 
Common Market. 
50. One o$ the things that bothers me is that the debate on 
British entry into the European Community has been 
concentrated too much on the short term economic problems. 
51. As far as decisions on foreign affairs and defense are 
concerned, and that is what one means by political union, 
they could only be taken by the unanimous decision of 
each and every member of the Common Market and therefore 
any idea that by signing the Treaty of Rome you have signed 
yourself willy nilly to political union is rubbish. 
52. The suggestion that people in Britain are not as other 
7uropeans are is one of the most dangerous and unacceptable 
of all arguments against entry. It has lain behind far 
too much thinking in this country since the war. 
53. What I'm opposed to in the Common Market is a written 
Constitution, alien laws in which rigid institutions are 
set up, which are designed by Frenchmen, Germans and 
Italians. They suit them but they don't suit us. 
54. I don't think that the Commonwealth has anything to offer 
us as an alternative to the Common Market. 
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55. I don't see that anything will be achieved in a common 
Market based r'urop Pan defense community trial cannot be 
achieved by Ný^'c. 
56. T-11 Britain (oesn' t go into the common i, arl: et, over the 
next few years she will become weaker and weaker econoY<<; _c 
1 iy 
ant' , )ol iti_ca_lly t'ian she would be "Uere to joit the 
r0)Il I_ aý'<: týSic_E ce a Cep Lain amount of sove_rei ity 
and thereby lain gr e. ± t (deal of econoil'i c st}: 'rii t11. 
57. GePirl tiv decision as to the I'01(' C'ltcýin x'ill 1, ty in 
the world must be u-. ade sometime in the near future be-cau Wit' 
our overi1Ju nLs ca. ilnot continue in this sort of political 
limbo. 
58. The Whole structure of the agricultural industry, the 
scale of the enterprise, the quality of British farming 
and their (-ras) oP modern technologies leaves no doubt 
that the, industry has nothing to fear and much to gain from 
Common Market entry. v 
59. I see the Common Market as a very good first ste; towards 
a political union in 'urop e. 
60. The ? ^C is nothing like so rigid and doctrinaire as it 
was. Its greater flexibility in its approach to its own 
problems is significant. 
61. I think close links with the USA would be more palatable 
than joining the Common Market. 
62. The Common Market would be incompatible with our way or 
life. 
63. Our Queen's position would be more important if we went 
into the Common Market. She would form an effective link 
between the Commonwealth and Europe. 
64. The background fear that if we join the Common Market and 
things are going wrong, we shan't be able to put them right 
is unfounded. '! hat I think people forget is that the 
Common Market is run by skilled politicians who have 
always paid regard to the national interests of the 
individual countries. 
65. One of the most deep-rooted misconceptions about the 
Common Market is that membership would in some way cause 
Britain to lose her national identity, impair her 
sovereignty, weaken her institutions or injure her 
heritage in some way. That is demonstrably untrue in the 
case of every Common Market country, notably and most 
emphatically in the case of France. 
66. English is destined to be the common tongue of the new 
united Europe. 
67. If we enter Europe we will be abandoning more than any 
other nation. 
68. Institutional government as it fares in ^urope strikes me 
as being halfway between democracy and autocracy, and if 
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it's halfway between democracy and anything else, then 
it's not good enough for rake and it's not (Tood enough for 
the Britis}i , eople. 
69. I hope we will have world &overnvnent at some stage and I 
want us to work towards that rather than tying ourselves 
to the small rich man's club of '.? Estern ruro; e. 
70. It will be another part of the cost of entry into the 
Common Market that we have to accept lower standards 
of health care. 
71. The Common Market campaign is an unholy alliance between 
the politicians of different parties, between the bier 
noises in television and the press. 
72. The Common Market in itself is not an economically 
conceived unit and the continual failure of the Cohn unity 
to produce a coherent and ecuitable agricultural policy 
. 
0uring the history since the Treaty of Rome, has stood 
to back this up. 
73. Placing our decisions in the hands of the r---c Corm-Assioi,, 
is a reactionary step which would remove Power a c-iant 
step away From the people. 
74. The European Parliament's powers are extremely limited 
and it only will assume a controlling role in so far as 
it has proved that it is fully capable of fulr"illi_o it 
and it is this fact which those critics who fear a loss 
of British sovereignty usually fail to recognise. 
75. I don't think things like treaties should be taken too 
seriously. Ir ever one country wanted to drop out of 
the Common Market sufficiently strongly, neither the 
Treaty or Rome nor the other countries could possibly 
prevent it from doing so. 
76. The prospect of _a sharp 
increase in food prices is an 
adequate reason for staying out of the 77, C. 
77. The Common Market Splits Europe between Fast and , Test and 
hardens the division between Fast and vest. 
78. It seems almost impertinent for the 'French to ride so 
high again after their humiliation in the last war. 
79. The fact that Britain is one of the biggest import 
markets in the world gives her a great deal of weight. 
People should pay to get into the British market. 
80. I think it's impossible that Britain could go into the 
Common Market, find it too much, and either drop out or 
fade out. 
81. The French and German farmers, with much less efficient 
farms than ours need an outlet for their surplus products, 
and they intend to make us pay for them. 
82. Every single advantage gained by England by joining the 
Common I-larket could be obtained without joining by simply 
continuing further Kennedy Rounds moving towards more 
and more reduction of tariffs. 
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83. "as t-"Pst stability in 7urope can happen only if "estern 
Europe becomes strong and coherent enough economically 
and militarily to fill the vacuum in Europe itself. 
84. If we joined the Common Market, we should have to abandon 
the idea that it is better to strike than to work or 
we will sink. 
85. The gap between our -erformance standards and those of 
the Common Market is already so large that in unfettered 
competition Britain would be at a permanent disadvantage. 
86. I reel that I'm being asked to take a great leap in the 
dark on this Common Market issue. 
87. The British people knew in the 30's that war was the 
only way to combat the cruel terror of Nazi Germany and 
have freedom for their own people and the people of 
Europe, and they certainly are not going to sit down under 
a small section of German dominated western '-, urope now. 
88. The Common Market countries are perhaps the last group of 
countries with which I would want to merge our national 
institutions. 
89. The Treaty of Rome would rob future generations of their 
freedom of action and this is something that should never 
be forced through the British Parliament. 
90. West Germany certainly would betray a federal state of 
western Europe if the Russians gave them an opportunity 
of uniting with their brothers on reasonable terms. 
91. This is Britain's last chance to play a role, perhaps the 
most important one, in the leadership of Europe. 
92. It is totally impractical to have a single functional 
European parliament. The different member states don't 
work a parliament in the same way. 
93. what worries me most is that in the Common Market our 
sovereignty would have to be completely abandoned, 
submerged. 
94. I have a feeling that given more co-operation and 
understanding between management and labour unions, this 
country could be great again economically, without the 
Common Market. 
95. Going into Europe is too costly for Britain. 
96. As a Briton, I must say I don't trust the Continentals. 
In two world wars one has seen the European allies collapse, 
almost turn tail, and give up very early. 
97. Decisions on British entry into the Common Market are being 
made in terms of and with reference to criteria which are 
effectively twenty years out of date. 
98. The standard of living in Britain would fall as a result 
of joining the Common Market. 
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99 I'm not convinced that the countries already in the 
Common Market have made anything like the amount of 
progress they like to give the impression they have. 
100 Political strength and economic strength are very 
closely connected. Britain isn't politically sovereign 





Subject Class Self-Rank Age Sex Party Occupation 
1 U-W 2 22 F Cons Secretary 
2 U-N 8 24 M Cons Chartered Accountant 
3 S. I. 2 20 M Cons EuroMovement Worker 
4 U-W 9 20 M None University Student 
5 U-W 2 20 M None University Student 
6 U-W 5 21 M Cons University Student 
7 U-W 9 25 M None Research Fellow 
8 E 1 52 M Cons Politician 
9 S. I. 9 55 M Lib Company Director 
10 S. I. 3 35 M Cons Export Sales Manager 
11 E 1 39 M Lib Newspaper Editor 
12 U-W 3 55 F Lab College Lecturer 
13 U-W 2 77 M Lib Retired Teacher 
14 E 5 63 M Lib Journal Editor 
15 E 11 29 M Cons University Lecturer 
16 S. I. 11 30 F Cons Sec. of AntiMkt Group 
17 S. I. 11 37 M Lab Lab Party Organizer 
18 U-W 2 44 F Lib Part-time Lecturer 
19 U-W 3 75 M Lab Clergyman 
20 E 11 29 M Lab University Lecturer 
21 E 1 40 M Lab Politician 
22 E 2 29 M Lab University Lecturer 
23 S. I. 2 51 M Cons company Proprietor 
24 U-W 3 30 M Cons journalist 
25 U-W 3 78 F Cons Housewife 
26 E 3 39 M Lab Political Correspondent 
27 E 9 41 M Lab Newspaper Editor 
28 B 6 38 F Lab Newspaper Editor 
29 S. I. 11 65 F Cons Retired Teacher 
30 E 5 55 M Lab City Councillor 
31 U-B 2 51 M Lab Electrician 
32 E 5 52 M Cons Executive 
33 F 2 26 F Lab Company EEC Expert 
34 S. I. 2 76 F Lib Lib Local Secretary 
35 S. I. 11 63 M Cons Harbour Master 
36 S. I. 9 47 M Cons Farmer 
37 S. I. 5 36 M Cons Farmer 
38 S. I. 6 68 M Lib Farmer 
39 U-B 11 63 M Lab Retired 
40 U-B 10 59 M None Driver 
41 U-W 7 55 F Cons Housewife 
42 U-W 3 63 F Cons Housewife 
43 U-W 6 24 M None RAF Flight Officer 
44 S. I. 91 37 M Cons Green Grocer 
45 U-B 10 45 F Lab Housewife 
46 U-B 10 28 F None Housewife 
47 U-B 9 68 F Cons Housewife 
48 U-B 11 30 F None Housewife 
49 E 4 42 M Cons RN Engineer 
50 U-W 1 39 F None Housewife 
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Subjects - cont. 
Subject Class Self-Rank Age Sex Party Occupation 
51 S. I. 3 55 F Cons Farmer's Wife 
52 S. I. 2 16 M Lib Student 
53 U-W 5 42 F None Welfare Officer 
54 U-W 2 21 M Cons Production Manager 
55 U-W 8 28 M Cons Solicitor 
56 S. I. 10 41 F Cons Farmer's Wife 
57 S. I. 1 49 M Cons Executive 
58 E 1 52 M Cons Co Director, Farmer 
59 U-B 11 63 M Lab Retired 
60 U-W 9 65 M Cons Retired 
61 U-B 3 47 M Lab Foreman 
62 U-W 1 55 M Cons Electrical Engineer 
63 U-B 47 F None Housewife 
64 U-B 4 37 F None Housewife 
65 U-B 11 60 M Lib CarPark Attendant 
66 U-B 10 68 M None Retired 
67 S. I. 1 36 M Cons School Master 
68 S. I. 6 45 M None Nat. Sec. FOS 
69 E 6 44 M Lab journalist 
70 E 3 29 M Lab journalist 
71 E 1 37 M Lib journalist 
72 E 11 44 H Cons Politician 
73 U-W 3 20 M None University Student 
74 U-W 10 20 M Lab University Student 
75 E 1 34 M Cons Diplomat 
Key: 
Class 
U-W Uninformed white 
U-B Uninformed blue 
E Expert 
S. I. Special Interest 
Self-Rank 
11-point scale where 1 
entry and 11 is most 
collar worker 
: ollar worker 
Group 
is most favourable to British 
opposed. Six is the neutral point. 
Political Party 
Cons Conservative Party 
Lab Labour Party 
Lib Liberal Party 
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SUMMARY TABLE OF 
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA FOR ALL FACTORS 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Classification 
1. Uninformed white collar 
2. üninformed blue collar 
3-Special interest 
4. Expert 
5-"Followers" (1 and 2) 

























All National Dailies 
Infrequent or None 
25 % 14%o 75% 50% 
7% 35% 0 25iß 
25% 35% 0 12% 
43% 14l. 25ý% 12a 
32 49% 75% 75/- 
681'o 49% 25% 24 
2.5 10.2 9.2 3.8 
36.7 47.2 26.5 44.3 
21% 359 0 75% 
780 64% 100jß 25f 
25% 57% 0 75% 
39% 7% 50% 0 
17el- 7% 0 0 
17% 28% 50% 25% 
7% 36 0 25% 
17% 21% 0 38P/- 
11% 21% 0 12% 
64% 21% 100% 25% 
54% 7% 50% 25% 
54% 0 75/- 0 
3 28 2 50% 
0 0 0 
14l 7% 0 12% 
32% 7% 25% 0 
3% 7% 0 0 
0 0 2Vo 0 
0 0 0 0 
21% 7% 0 0 
0 28% 0 25% 
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Appendix D 
Note: The questionnaire at the beginning of the test 
booklet was used only as a guide to the interviewer's 
conversation with the subject at the beginning of 
each interview, and thus does not indicate the full 
range of material covered. This material, of course, 






Secondary Education: Type of School 
Further Education: 
Occupation: 
Are you a member of any political party? 
If not, which party(ies) do you generally support?: 
What newspaper(s) do you read?: 
How often do you read?: 
Other publications: 
How often do you read?: 
What is your most important source or sources of 
information about the Common Market? Please list in order 
of importance: 
Do you travel abroad: often occasionally seldom 
never Have you lived abroad?: where 
when why 
Do you read or speak a foreign language?: 





ri-CCýTm CT ZTD 
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" 328 INSTRUCTIONS FOR JUDGEMENT SCALES 
In this part of the study, there is a selection of 
statements from the previous section. These statements 
actually were made by people with varying attitudes to 
the Common Market. What we want to know now'is what the 
statements themselves tell you about the people who made 
them. 
The way we ask you to do this is to indicate how 
favourable or unfavourable you feel the attitude which 
each statement expresses is to British entry into the 
Common Market. Beneath each statement there will be tt 
scale which looks like this: 




If you think the statement expresses an extremely 
favourable attitude towards British entry, i. e. if you 
think it was made by someone very favourable towards British 
entry, circle number 1 or 2. If you feel the attitude 
expressed is very unfavourable, circle number 10 or 11. 
Use the intermediate numbers to express intermediate 
degrees of favourableness. 
This is not a question of whether you think the 
comments are true or false, or whether you personally agree 
or disagree with them - you've already indicated this in 
the previous section - only how favourable or unfavourable 
you judge the attitude which each statement expresses to 
be towards Common Market entry. For example, if you were 
given a group of statements about France, one might be 
"Frenchmen are much more honest than other Europeans". 
Although you may feel that the truth of this statement is 
debatable, nevertheless you probably would rate it 1 or 2, 
very favourable to France on the scale. 
Please do not assume anything about the proportion 
of comments you are expected to assign to each category, 
since all degrees of favourableness and unfavourableness 
are not necessarily equally represented. Also, this is 
not a test of memory of logical consistency so please 
judge each statement individually, as it comes along 
without looking to see how it compares with earlier or 
later statements in the list. 
a 
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1. Euro-mania is a typical disease of leading politicians 
for whom the thought of moving awkward economic decisions 
to institutions in Brussels where they are well insulated 
from democratic processes is understandably attractive. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 
Extremely anti 
British entry British entry 
2. The whole structure of the agricultural industry, the 
scale of the enterprise, the quality of British farming 
and their grasp of modern technologies leaves no doubt that 
the industry has nothing to fear and much to gain from 
Common Market entry. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 
Extremely anti 
British entry British entry 
3. The British people knew in the '30's that war was the 
only way to combat the cruel terror of Nazi Germany and 
have freedom for their own people and the people of Europe, 
and they certainly are not going to sit down under a small 
section of German dominated Western Europe now. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 
Extremely anti 
British entry British entry 
4. The prospect of a sharp increase in food prices is 
an adequate reason for staying out of the EEC. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 
Extremely anti 
British entry British entry 
5. The suggestion that people in Britain are not as other 
Europeans are is one of the most dangerous and unacceptable 
of all argumets against entry. It has lain behind far too 
much thinking in this country since the war. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
6. I can't see any argument whatsoever for Britain not 
aoina into the Common Market. vv 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
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7. The only way Great Britain can influence the world 
today is by beingpart of a greater union. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
8. The movement towards integration of the Six, or such 
other western European nations that may join them, is 
diametrically incompatible with the re-unification of 
Germany. The more Germany becomes integrated in the 
West, the more she has to accept that she never can 
re-integrate with East Germany. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
9. The future EEC will be a different sort of political 
union than the world has yet seen and it will be different 
because its origins are different. It will be suited to 
European countries with such a long, long history of their 
own. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti 
British entry British entry 
10. If Britain doesn't go into the Common Market, over 
the next few years she will become weaker and weaker 
economically, and politically than she would be were she 
to join the Common Market, sacrifice a certain amount of 
sovereignty and thereby gain a great deal of economic 
strength. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
11. Going into Europe is too costly for Britain. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
12. I'm a good 'European'. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
13. The Common Market would be incompatible with our way 
of life. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
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14. If we enter Europe we will be abandoning more than 
any other nation. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
15. The standard of living in Britain would Pall as a 
result of joining the Common Market. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
16. If we can form a successful Common Market with 
Britain in it, I think it will be a tremendous magnet to 
the East European countries. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
17. The Treaty of Rome would rob future generations of 
their freedom of action and this is something that should 
never be forced through the British Parliament. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
18. The Common Market is essentially a big business men's 
club and the powers that are trying to force us into it 
are manned by international financiers, bankers and certain 
elements of big business both in the United States and in 
our own country and in Europe itself. It's not in the 
interest of the ordinary people of this country at all. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
19. The EEC in its present form may not be the best of 
all possible communities for us to join in the best of all 
possible worlds, but it is the only unit open to us which 
looks like meeting our requirements. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
20. For small businessmen and for the workers the Common 
Market offers a grim and forbidding future. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
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21. Each individual country in the Common Market is able 
to do more of what it wanted to do of its own than was the 
case when the countries were entirely separated. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
22. I feel that I'm being asked to take a great leap in 
the dark on this Common Market issue. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
23. The Common Market itself can be seen from a wide 
variety of sides. It seems to me inept for anyone to claim 
to have an opinion about it, unless one is a full time 
expert, because nobody can be in full possession of the 
facts. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
24. It is totally impractical to have a single functional 
European parliament. The different member states don't 
work a parliament in the same way. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
25. The background fear that if we join the Common Market 
and things are going wrong, we shan't be able to put them 
right is unfounded. What I think people forget is that 
the Common Market is run by skilled politicians who have 
always paid regard to the national interests of the 
individual countries. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
26. Our Queen's position would be more important if we 
went into the Common Market. She would form an effective 
link between the Commonwealth and Europe. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
27. The Common Market would be good for us in selling and 
good for us in buying. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
. 333 
28. one of the things that bothers me is that the debate 
on British entry into the European Community has been 
concentrated too much on the short term economic problems. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
29. The political arguments are overwhelmingly in favour 
of British entry to the Common Market, simply because the 
alternative would be to submerge ourselves in an economic 
and political relationship with the United States. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
30. East-West stability in Europe can happen only if 
western Europe becomes strong and coherent enough 
economically and militarily to fill the vacuum in Europe 
itself. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
31. There will be tremendous upheaval and massive 
unemployment if we join the Common Market. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
32. I'm tired of hearing about the Common Market. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
33, The maintenance of the Commonwealth today seems 
to demand a strong Britain in a strong European Community. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
34. It wouldn't be long in my opinion before the whole 
economy, having been given a jolt by joining the Common 
Market, with an increase in production, would be spinning 
off a higher standard of living for everybody, and that 
would include old people as well as everybody else. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
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35. The EEC is 
it was. Its gr, 
approach to its 
Extremely pro ý British entry 
nothing like so rigid and doctrinaire as 
eater flexibility in its approach to its 
own problems is significant. 
23456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry 
36. I don't think things like treaties should be taken too 
seriously. If ever one country wanted to drop out of the 
Common Market sufficiently strongly, neither the Treaty of 
Rome nor the other countries could possibly prevent it 
from doing so. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
37. We are far in advance of Europe when it comes to 
technology and research. Our entry in the Common Market 
would give impetus to people inside Europe to get prices 
down. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
38. Decisions on British entry into the Common Market 
are being made in terms of and with reference to criteria 
which are effectively twenty years out of date. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
39. Europe cannot make its full contribution unless the 
EEC is enlarged to include G. B. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
40. This is Britain's last chance to play a role, perhaps 
the most important one, in the leadership of Europe. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
41. American business in Europe is within the next 15 
years going to become the third industrial power in the 
world unless Europe can unite to take over the operation 
itself. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
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42. What I'm opposed 
written Constitution, 
institutions are set 
Germans and Italians. 
suit us. 






the Common Market is a 
laws in which rigid 
ich are designed by Frenchmen, 
suit them but they don't 
Extremely anti 89 10 11 British entry 
43. Placing our decisions in the hands of the EEC 
Commission is a reactionary step which would remove power 
a giant step away from the people. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
44. The Common Market countries are perhaps the last 
group of countries with which I would want to merge our 
national institutions. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
45. Whatever its weakness and faults, British policy 
towards the Third World inhabits a different and better 
universe than that of the EEC. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
46. What worries me most is that in the Common Market our 
sovereignty would have to be completely abandoned, 
submerged. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
47. A definitive 
in the world must 
because our gover: 
political limbo. 
Extremely pro 12 British entry 
decision as to the role Britain will play 
be made sometime in the near future 
nment cannot continue in this sort of 
3456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry 
48. For Britain to turn its back on the Commonwealth and 
go into Europe I feel would be a totally wrong decision. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
336 
49. I think there would be a much greater freedom in 
the economy in Britain if we joined the Common Market. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
50. Joining the EEC means accepting regulations from 
Brussels, which are subject to no parliamentary check or 
control in Britain; they would have the force of law 
regardless of the wishes of our own House of Commons. our 
law courts could not protect British citizens. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
51. Using the scale below in the same way, please note 
your own opinion on British entry into the Common Market. 
Extremely pro 123456789 10 11 Extremely anti British entry British entry 
52" How decided are you in your own mind concerning your 
own opinion on the Common Market issue? 
Very decided 123456789 10 11 Not at all decided 
53. How confident are you that your own opinion on this 
issue is the most correct or reasonable one at the present 
time? 
Very confident 123456789 10 11 Not at all confident 
54, How much does it matter to you whether or not your own 
opinion on this issue happens to be the most correct or 
reasonable at present? 
Very much 123456789 10 11 Not at all 
55, How personally involved do you feel with regard to 
this issue? 
Very involved 123456789 10 11 Not at all involved 
56. How much does (or could) this issue affect you 
personally? 




FACTOR LOADINGS OF VARIMAA SOLUTION 
SUBJECT 123456 
1 "42 -. 38 . 10 . 16 2 -. 11 . 40 . 02 -. 21 . 26 . 19 3 . 64 -. 28 . 03 . 09 -. 15 . 03 4 -. 04 . 07 -. 36 -. 00 . 32 -. 01 5 . 69 -. 42 -. 00 . 14 . 08 18 6 . 10 -. 11 -. 12 -. 14 . 07 
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. 46 7 . 09 . 08 -. 57 . 17 . 25 -. 26 8 "83 -. 30 -. 01 -. 00 -. 06 , 11 9 -. 57 . 48 -. 21 -. 02 . 09 -. 09 10 . 70 -. 16 . 06 . 12 . 15 . 22 11 . 77 -. 30 -. 00 . 15 -. 06 . 14 12 . 67 -. 13 . 08 . 06 . 08 -. 13 13 "73 -. 18 . 11 . 13 . 10 . 09 14 . 08 . 12 -. 36 -. 18 . 14 . 17 15 -. 31 . 56 -. 29 -. 17 . 02 -. 25 16 -. 34 . 64 -. 07 . 04 . 14 . 04 17 -. 62 . 53 -. 15 . 05 -. 11 -"13 is "77 -. 10 -. 08 o6 "04 . 16 19 . 62 -. 32 . 05 -. 14 -. 07 . 27 20 -. 43 "49 -. 22 -. 02 -. 11 -. 06 21 . 68 -. 28 . 16 . 10 . 21 . 27 22 . 79 -. 26 -. 06 . 21 -. 04 . 08 23 . 68 -. 13 . 06 . 06 -. 11 . 12 24 . 53 -. 26 -. 05 . 28 06 "14 25 "50 -. o8 "36 -. 05 . 02 X32 26 . 72 -. 20 -. 19 . 06 . 02 . 23 27 . 14 . 13 -. 60 -. 23 . 04 . 03 28 . 65 -. 27 -. 20 "17 . 07 . 12 29 -. 40 . 71 -. 08 -, 03 . 05 -. 04 30 "57 . 21 -. 04 . 01 -. 10 . 12 31 . 65 -. 20 . 01 -. 08 . 02 . 04 32 . 70 -. 08 . 03 -. 11 "07 . 02 33 . 77 -. 37 -"17 . 05 . 08 . 10 34 . 74 -. 25 . 05 . 12 . 02 . 
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. 60 -. 14 . 15 
. 71 -. 29 -. 20 
. 50 -. 21 . 17 
. 50 -. 09 . 11 
. 01 . 20 -. 20 
-. 26 . 44 -. 14 
. 59 -. 21 . 09 
. 62 -. 16 . 10 
-. 32 . 49 -. 12 
-. 21 . 61 -. 14 
. 68 -. 27 . 13 
. 71 -. 19 . 18 
. 29 -. 01 -. 03 
. 31 . 06 -. 14 
-. 27 . 63 . 00 
. 25 . 38 . 07 
. 75 -. 29 -. 00 
. 04 . 51 -. 32 
. 60 -. 03 -. 24 
. 74 -. 20 -. 15 
. 69 -. 10 -. 15 
-. 54 . 47 -. 10 
. 70 . 22 -. 31 
-. 18 . 24 -. 64 
. 81 -. 25 . 03 
4 5 6 
-. 10 . 22 . 38 
. 03 . 08 -. 09 
. 00 . 27 . 30 
. 11 . 17 . 36 
-. 10 . 37 . 20 
-. 11 . 13 . 05 
. 41 . 17 . 16 
. 31 -. 15 . 32 
-. 41 . 05 -. 07 
-. 23 . 21 . 18 
-. 08 -. 01 . 20 
. 09 -. 01 . 32 
. 03 . 03 . 48 
-. 24 o6 . 40 
-. 30 . 16 -. 16 
-. 03 . 42 , 04 
. 04 -. 08 . 18 
-. 13 -. 02 -. 02 
-. 01 -. 15 . 02 
. 16 -. 10 . 17 
. 10 . 09 . 12 
-. 13 . 13 . 01 
-. 18 -. 02 . 02 
. 04 -. 07 -. 06 
-. 00 . 07 . 19 
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. 16 17 " 03 
7 -, 04 
, 0^ 2 38 ' 01 
9 -"tiýC_ . 4J -. 23 -. 15 "25 --"12 
10 . v1 -. 12 -. 01 "3 j -. 233 . 19 
11 "7= -" ,G . ýý -. 22 . 02 
12 . 63 -. 1 . 03 . 00 -. 26 . 12 
13 . "7 -. 1 } . 05 . 22 -. 22- . 17 14 -. 04 "11 -. 32 . 15 -. 19 -. 06 
15 -. 2-0. . 52 -. 27 -. 31 . 00 -*24 
16 -. 2,9 " 54 -. 12 -. 01 "11'1, -006 
17 4" " 4ý q 23 . 11 28 
18 . 66 -. 10 -. 03, "29 -. 30 . 02 19 . 41 c -. 32 . 07 "36 -. 41 . 03 20 -. 37 . 43 -. 15 -. 13 .18 -031 21 . 58 -"21 "05 . 39 -. 23 . 31 22 "76 -. 27 -. 04 . 23 -. 18 . 00 23 . 59 -. 14 . 10 . 24 -. 26 -, 04 24 . 56 -. 24 -. 07 . 25 . 00 . 09 25 . 34 -. 04 . 31 . 40 -. 28 . 18 26 . 60 -. 21 -. 18 . 35 -. 23 -. 01 27 . 00 . 07 -. 56 . 03 -. 27 -. 26 28 . 61 -. 27 -. 21 . 24 -. 15 . 04 29 -. 34 . 69 -. 09 -. 11 . 11 -. 15 30 . 46 . 18 . 01 . 22 -. 26 ... 15 31 . 51 -. 19 . 00 . 14 -"37 . 06 32 . 54cr -. 06 . 00 . 13 -. 42 908 33 . 66 -. 37 -. 19 . 23 -. 31 . 08 34 . 65 -. 23 . 03 . 34 -. 24 X09 35 -. 32 . 67 -. 1 6 -. 10 . 12 . ",, l8 36 -. 03 . 28 -. 16 -. 13 . 02 " 38 37 . 38 . 06 . 03 . 18 -. 12 . 00 38 . 09 . 10 -. 28 . 15 . 02 "24 39 -. 43 . 37 -. 07 . X07 -. 35 . 01 40 -. 30 . 60 -. 11 -. 04 . 24 . 06 41 . 03 . 18 . 27 . 38 -. 33 -. 09 42 . 17 . 20 . 18 . 56 -. 08 . 09 43 . 41 -. 05 -. 26 . 36 -. 07 -. 28 44 . 34 . 09 -. 31 . 27 -. 08 -. 41 45 -. 40 . 18 -. 04 -. 02 -. 37 -. 06 
46 . 02 . 33 -. 24 . 14 -. 16 . 35 
47 -. 20 . 65 . 02 -. 11 . 16 -110 
48 -. 38 . 58 -. 23 -. 07 . 02 . 09 
49 . 31 . 02 -. 11 . 50 -"05 . 06 
- 50 . 
66 -. 24 . 06 . 24 -. 20 . 08 
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Subject 123456 
51 . 39 -. 07 . 04 . 46 -. 37 . 28 52 . 64 -. 29 -. 21 . 04 -. 30 . 04 53 . 37 -. 13 . 03 . 38 . 23 . 35 54 . 40cf -. 04 . 02 . 45 -. 13 . 21 55 -. 08 . 25 -. 34 . 19 -. 09 . 18 56 -. 26 . 44 -. 18 . 00 . 02 _, 05 57 . 66 -. 16 . 00 . 29 . 08 , 23 58 . 61 cf -. 18 . 15 . 45 -. 01 _, 05 
59 -. 44cf . 46 -. 14 . 16 -. 21 _018 60 -. 32 . 62 -. 22 . 12 -. 10 _. 02 61 . 51 -. 25 . 12 . 30 -. 39 . 10 62 . 59c2 -. 17 . 16 . 45 -"25 . 11 63 . 16 -. 01 -. 04 . 52 -. 11 . 01 64 . 08 . 05 -. 15 . 42 -. 35 _, 02 65 -. 34 . 64 -. 07 -. 23 -. 14 -001 66 . 18 . 46 -. 12 . 08 -. 14 . 30 67 . 63 -. 30 . 03 . 31 -. 31 100 68 -. 01 . 46 -. 28 -. 02 -. 13 _, 27 69 . 49 -. 08 -. 15 . 12 -. 29 -*23 70 . 68 -. 23 -. 09 . 31 -. 20 _010 71 . 62 -. 10 -. 17 . 25 -. 23 1103 72 -. 53cf . 47 -. 15 -. 08 . 14 -, 04 73 -51 CE -. 25 -,, 27 . 12 -. 48 -. 09 74 -. 12 . 15 -. 55 -. 08 . 12 -, 37 75 . 66 -. 23 . 00 . 32 -. 38 . 12 
c2 Subjects with loadings of + 40 or greater on more than 
one factor are confounded. - 
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APPENDIX F 
Judgement Scale Statement Means 



















































Mean Self-Ranking 6.4 
Mean Involvement Score 3.4 
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? u(1 el<<ent Scale Statement I: eans an(l 7ariance 
Across the Four Factors 
Statement Iiean variance 
1 9.5 . 52 2 2.0 
. 12 3 10.3 
. 20 4 9.2 . 38 5 2.7 . 06 6 1.6 
. 21 7 2.5 . 28 8 '5.4 1.32 9 3.2 1.04 10 2.3 
. 24 11 9.6 
. 22 12 3.2 
. 21 13 9.6 
. 36 14 9.0 . 52 15 9.0 
. 11 16 2.8 
. 08 17 10.1 
. 59 18 10.0 
. 25 19 3.5 . 07 20 9.7 . 21 21 3.1 . 41 22 7.7 
. 04 23 5.7 
. 12 24 8.0 
. 14 25 2.5 
. 06 26 2.6 
. 12 27 2.1 
. 30 28 5.7 . 85 29 3.2 1.54 30 2.9 . 52 31 10.2 
. 29 32 7.5 
. 29 33 2.8 
. 14 34 2.4 . 64 35 3.0 . 04 4.0 . 04 37 2.7 . 14 38 7.0 . 35 39 2.2 
. 04 40 1.7 
. 01 41 2.3 . 44 42 9.6 . 43 43 9.7 . 42 44 10.2 
. 54 45 8.6 
. 18 46 8.8 1.70 47 4.2 
. 22 48 9.7 
. 59 49 2.5 
. 01 50 10.0 
. 13 
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-32 7.9 33 2.4 
34 2.0 
35 2.8 














Mean Self-Rank 2.5 
Mean Involvement Score 3.0 
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10 2.6 I-lean Self-Rank 10.2 
11 9.6 
12 3.8 
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11 10.0 Mean Self-Rank 7.1 
12 4.1 
13 9.3 
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